

Counsel for the State Bar <b>DONALD R. STEEDMAN, SBN 104927</b> THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA 180 HOWARD STREET SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94105 TELEPHONE: (415) 538-2000	Case number(s) 00-0-11096 03-0-02647 04-0-10927 04-0-11087 04-0-15286	(for Court's use)  <b>PUBLIC MATTER</b>  <b>FILED</b> <i>LS</i>  FEB 08 2005  STATE BAR COURT CLERK'S OFFICE SAN FRANCISCO
Counsel for Respondent <b>DORON WEINBERG, SBN 46131</b> 523 OCTAVIA STREET SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94102 TELEPHONE: (415) 431-3472	Submitted to <input type="checkbox"/> assigned judge <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> settlement judge	STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION AND ORDER APPROVING  ACTUAL SUSPENSION  <input type="checkbox"/> PREVIOUS STIPULATION REJECTED
In the Matter of <b>MADAN MOHAN S. AHLUWALIA</b>  Bar # 175664 A Member of the State Bar of California (Respondent)	(date) (hardship, special circumstances or other good cause per rule 284, Rules of Procedure)	

**A. Parties' Acknowledgments:**

- (1) Respondent is a member of the State Bar of California, admitted JANUARY 20, 1995 (date)
- (2) The parties agree to be bound by the factual stipulations contained herein even if conclusions of law or disposition are rejected or changed by the Supreme Court.
- (3) All investigations or proceedings listed by case number in the caption of this stipulation, are entirely resolved by this stipulation and are deemed consolidated. Dismissed charge(s)/count(s) are listed under "Dismissals." The stipulation and order consist of 11 pages.
- (4) A statement of acts or omissions acknowledged by Respondent as cause or causes for discipline is included under "Facts."
- (5) Conclusions of law, drawn from and specifically referring to the facts are also included under "Conclusions of Law."
- (6) No more than 30 days prior to the filing of this stipulation, Respondent has been advised in writing of any pending investigation/proceeding not resolved by this stipulation, except for criminal investigations.
- (7) Payment of Disciplinary Costs—Respondent acknowledges the provisions of Bus. & Prof. Code §§6086.10 & 6140.7. (Check one option only):
  - until costs are paid in full, Respondent will remain actually suspended from the practice of law unless relief is obtained per rule 284, Rules of Procedure.
  - costs to be paid in equal amounts prior to February 1 for the following membership years:  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 (hardship, special circumstances or other good cause per rule 284, Rules of Procedure)
  - costs waived in part as set forth under "Partial Waiver of Costs"
  - costs entirely waived

Note: All information required by this form and any additional information which cannot be provided in the space provided, shall be set forth in a text component of this stipulation under specific headings, i.e. "Facts," "Dismissals," "Conclusions of Law."

(Stipulation form approved by SSC Executive Committee 10/16/00)

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Actual suspension



8. Aggravating Circumstances (For definition, see Standards for Attorney Actions for Professional Misconduct, standard 1.2(b).) Facts supporting aggravating circumstances are required.

(1)  Prior record of discipline [see standard 1.2(f)]

(a)  State Bar Court case # of prior case \_\_\_\_\_

(b)  date prior discipline effective \_\_\_\_\_

(c)  Rules of Professional Conduct/ State Bar Act violations: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

(d)  degree of prior discipline \_\_\_\_\_

(e)  If Respondent has two or more incidents of prior discipline, use space provided below or under "Prior Discipline".

- (2)  Dishonesty: Respondent's misconduct was surrounded by or followed by bad faith, dishonesty, concealment, overreaching or other violations of the State Bar Act or Rules of Professional Conduct.
- (3)  Trust Violation: Trust funds or property were involved and Respondent refused or was unable to account to the client or person who was the object of the misconduct for improper conduct toward said funds or property.
- (4)  Harm: Respondent's misconduct harmed significantly a client, the public or the administration of justice.
- (5)  Indifference: Respondent demonstrated indifference toward rectification of or atonement for the consequences of his or her misconduct.
- (6)  Lack of Cooperation: Respondent displayed a lack of candor and cooperation to victims of his/her misconduct or to the State Bar during disciplinary investigation or proceedings.
- (7)  Multiple/Pattern of Misconduct: Respondent's current misconduct evidences multiple acts of wrongdoing or demonstrates a pattern of misconduct.
- (8)  No aggravating circumstances are involved.

Additional aggravating circumstances:

C. Mitigating Circumstances (Standard 1.2(e).) Facts supporting mitigating circumstances are required.

- (1)  No Prior Discipline: Respondent has no prior record of discipline ~~or any other type of practice~~ coupled with present misconduct which is not deemed serious.
- (2)  No Harm: Respondent did not harm the client or person who was the object of the misconduct.
- (3)  Candor/Cooperation: Respondent displayed spontaneous candor and cooperation to the victims of his/her misconduct and to the State Bar during disciplinary investigation and proceedings.
- (4)  Remorse: Respondent promptly took objective steps spontaneously demonstrating remorse and recognition of the wrongdoing, which steps were designed to timely atone for any consequences of his/her misconduct.
- (5)  Restitution: Respondent paid \$ \_\_\_\_\_ on \_\_\_\_\_ to restitution to \_\_\_\_\_ without the threat or force of disciplinary, civil or criminal proceedings.
- (6)  Delay: These disciplinary proceedings were excessively delayed. The delay is not attributable to Respondent and the delay prejudiced him/her.
- (7)  Good Faith: Respondent acted in good faith.
- (8)  Emotional/Physical Difficulties: At the time of the stipulated act or acts of professional misconduct Respondent suffered extreme emotional difficulties or physical disabilities which expert testimony would establish was directly responsible for the misconduct. The difficulties or disabilities were not the product of any illegal conduct by the member, such as illegal drug or substance abuse, and Respondent no longer suffers from such difficulties or disabilities.
- (9)  Severe Financial Stress: At the time of the misconduct, Respondent suffered from severe financial stress which resulted from circumstances not reasonably foreseeable or which were beyond his/her control and which were directly responsible for the misconduct.
- (10)  Family Problems: At the time of the misconduct, Respondent suffered extreme difficulties in his/her personal life which were other than emotional or physical in nature.
- (11)  Good Character: Respondent's good character is attested to by a wide range of references in the legal and general communities who are aware of the full extent of his/her misconduct.
- (12)  Rehabilitation: Considerable time has passed since the acts of professional misconduct occurred followed by convincing proof of subsequent rehabilitation.
- (13)  No mitigating circumstances are involved.

Additional mitigating circumstances:

D. Discipline

1. Stayed Suspension.

A. Respondent shall be suspended from the practice of law for a period of ONE (1) YEAR

- i. and until Respondent shows proof satisfactory to the State Bar Court of rehabilitation and present fitness to practice and present learning and ability in the law pursuant to standard 1.4(c)(i), Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct
- ii. and until Respondent pays restitution to \_\_\_\_\_ (payee(s)) (or the Client Security Fund, if appropriate), in the amount of \_\_\_\_\_, plus 10% per annum accruing from \_\_\_\_\_ and provides proof thereof to the Probation Unit, Office of the Chief Trial Counsel
- iii. and until Respondent does the following: \_\_\_\_\_

B. The above-referenced suspension shall be stayed.

2. Probation.

Respondent shall be placed on probation for a period of TWO (2) YEARS which shall commence upon the effective date of the Supreme Court order herein. (See rule 953, California Rules of Court.)

3. Actual Suspension.

A. Respondent shall be actually suspended from the practice of law in the State of California for a period of THIRTY (30) DAYS

- i. and until Respondent shows proof satisfactory to the State Bar Court of rehabilitation and present fitness to practice and present learning and ability in the law pursuant to standard 1.4(c)(ii), Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct
- ii. and until Respondent pays restitution to \_\_\_\_\_ (payee(s)) (or the Client Security Fund, if appropriate), in the amount of \_\_\_\_\_, plus 10% per annum accruing from \_\_\_\_\_ and provides proof thereof to the Probation Unit, Office of the Chief Trial Counsel
- iii. and until Respondent does the following: \_\_\_\_\_

E. Additional Conditions of Probation:

- (1)  If Respondent is actually suspended for two years or more, he/she shall remain actually suspended until he/she proves to the State Bar Court his/her rehabilitation, fitness to practice, and learning and ability in general law, pursuant to standard 1.4(c)(ii), Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct.
- (2)  During the probation period, Respondent shall comply with the provisions of the State Bar Act and Rules of Professional Conduct.
- (3)  Within ten (10) days of any change, Respondent shall report to the Membership Records Office of the State Bar and to the Probation Unit, all changes of information, including current office address and telephone number, or other address for State Bar purposes, as prescribed by section 6002.1 of the Business and Professions Code.
- (4)  Respondent shall submit written quarterly reports to the Probation Unit on each January 10, April 10, July 10, and October 10 of the period of probation. Under penalty of perjury, respondent shall state whether respondent has complied with the State Bar Act, the Rules of Professional Conduct, and all

conditions of probation during the preceding calendar quarter. If the first report would cover less than 30 days, that report shall be submitted on the next quarter date, and cover the extended period.

In addition to all quarterly reports, a final report, containing the same information, is due no earlier than twenty (20) days before the last day of the period of probation and no later than the last day of probation.

- (5)  Respondent shall be assigned a probation monitor. Respondent shall promptly review the terms and conditions of probation with the probation monitor to establish a manner and schedule of compliance. During the period of probation, respondent shall furnish to the monitor such reports as may be requested, in addition to the quarterly reports required to be submitted to the Probation Unit. Respondent shall cooperate fully with the probation monitor.
- (6)  Subject to assertion of applicable privileges, Respondent shall answer fully, promptly and truthfully any inquiries of the Probation Unit of the Office of the Chief Trial Counsel and any probation monitor assigned under these conditions which are directed to Respondent personally or in writing relating to whether Respondent is complying or has complied with the probation conditions.
- (7)  Within one (1) year of the effective date of the discipline herein, respondent shall provide to the Probation Unit satisfactory proof of attendance at a session of the Ethics School, and passage of the test given at the end of that session.
- No Ethics School recommended.
- (8)  Respondent shall comply with all conditions of probation imposed in the underlying criminal matter and shall so declare under penalty of perjury in conjunction with any quarterly report to be filed with the Probation Unit.
- (9)  The following conditions are attached hereto and incorporated:
- |   |   |
|---|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Substance Abuse Conditions | <input type="checkbox"/> Law Office Management Conditions |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Medical Conditions         | <input type="checkbox"/> Financial Conditions             |
- (10)  Other conditions negotiated by the parties:
- Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination: Respondent shall provide proof of passage of the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination ("MPRE"), administered by the National Conference of Bar Examiners, to the Probation Unit of the Office of the Chief Trial Counsel during the period of actual suspension or within one year, whichever period is longer. Failure to pass the MPRE results in actual suspension without further hearing until passage. But see rule 951(b), California Rules of Court, and rule 321(a)(1) & (c), Rules of Procedure.
- No MPRE recommended.
- Rule 955, California Rules of Court: Respondent shall comply with the provisions of subdivisions (a) and (c) of rule 955, California Rules of Court, within 30 and 40 days, respectively, from the effective date of the Supreme Court order herein.
- Conditional Rule 955, California Rules of Court: If Respondent remains actually suspended for 90 days or more, he/she shall comply with the provisions of subdivisions (a) and (c) of rule 955, California Rules of Court, within 120 and 130 days, respectively, from the effective date of the Supreme Court order herein.
- Credit for Interim Suspension [conviction referral cases only]: Respondent shall be credited for the period of his/her interim suspension toward the stipulated period of actual suspension.

**ATTACHMENT TO**  
**STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION**

IN THE MATTER OF:      Madan M.S. Ahlulalia

CASE NUMBER(S):      00-O-11096 ET AL.

**FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.**

Respondent admits that the following facts are true and that he/she is culpable of violations of the specified statutes and/or Rules of Professional Conduct:

**THE RANDHAWA MATTER**  
Case No. 00-O-11096

1.      On or about August 1997 Harbhajan Randhawa retained respondent to assist him with a petition for asylum in the United States, case number A-75 306 327. Randhawa paid respondent \$1,000 to represent him through the conclusion of the asylum hearing.

2.      On or about November 24, 1998, the Immigration Court scheduled a hearing in Randhawa's matter for April 3, 1998. On or about March 30, 1998, the Immigration and Naturalization Services ("INS") moved to continue the April 3, 1998 hearing. On or about April 2, 1998, the Immigration Court granted the continuance.

3.      On or about April 17, 1998, the Immigration Court rescheduled the hearing to November 23, 1998 and properly served respondent's office with a copy of the notice of hearing. Prior to November 23, 1998, the Immigration Court continued the matter to April 19, 1999 and properly served respondent's office with a copy of the notice of hearing.

4.      Subsequently, respondent failed to advise Randhawa of the April 19, 1999 hearing date.

5.      Respondent appeared at the hearing, but Randhawa did not because he was not aware that the hearing was scheduled for April 19, 1999.

6.      On or about April 19, 1999, the Immigration Court issued an order that Randhawa be removed from the United States to India and personally served respondent with a copy of the order.

7.      On or about May 5, 1999, the INS issued a notice to Randhawa ordering him to appear on May 24, 1999 for deportation to India. The INS properly served respondent's office with the notice.

8.      Randhawa did not report for deportation on May 5, 1999.

9.      On or about November 18, 1999, Respondent filed a motion to reopen the case based upon ineffective assistance of counsel. Respondent included with the motion his

declaration which stated that the reason Randhawa failed to appear was due to a clerical error in respondent's office. Specifically, respondent stated that he had another client with the same name as Randhawa and respondent's staff mistakenly sent the hearing notice to respondent's other client with the same name.

10. Respondent did not include with the motion proof that Randhawa had complied with the *Lozada* requirement that all motions based upon ineffective assistance of counsel to be accompanied by a client complaint to the relevant state bar or an explanation as to why the complaint was not pursued.

11. On or about December 27, 1999 the Immigration Court denied respondent's motion to reopen Randhawa's case on grounds that the motion was filed beyond the 180 days time limitation for such motions and because the motion did not comply with *Lozada*.

12. Prior to on or about January 17, 2000, respondent prepared two letters for Randhawa to sign.

13. The first letter, dated January 17, 2000, was a letter from Randhawa to the State Bar in which Randhawa stated that respondent provided ineffective assistance of counsel due to respondent's failure to notify Randhawa of the April 19, 1999 hearing. The sole purpose of the letter was to comply with *Lozada*. Respondent arranged for Randhawa to mail the January 17, 2000 letter on or about January 17, 2000.

14. The second letter, dated January 18, 2000, was a letter from Randhawa to the State Bar asking the State Bar to withdraw its complaint.

15. On or about January 17, 2000, respondent explained to Randhawa that to prevail on the motion to reopen, Randhawa had to file a complaint with the State Bar. At that time, Randhawa did not want to file a complaint with the State Bar because he felt that respondent made a minor mistake. Randhawa signed the letter because respondent advised him that it was necessary to prevail on his motion to reopen.

16. On or about January 17, 2000, Randhawa filed a complaint with the State Bar against respondent.

17. On or about January 20, 2000, respondent filed a motion to reconsider the court's denial of the motion to reopen.

18. On January 27, 2000 the Immigration Court denied the second motion to reopen. The court noted that respondent had not produced any evidence to support his claim that he had sent the notice to the wrong client.

19. On or about February 15, 2000, respondent mailed the January 18, 2000 letter to the State Bar, which requested that the State Bar withdraw the complaint. The letter also stated that the only reason Randhawa filed the complaint was because the Immigration Court would not reopen Randhawa's matter without it.

20. On or about February 24, 2000, Randhawa employed attorney Robert Jobe to file an appeal with the Board of Immigration Appeals, appealing the Immigration Court's refusal to reopen Randhawa's assylum case. The case currently is pending before the Ninth Circuit.

21. Respondent did not earn any of the \$1000 he was paid in advance fees because any services he did perform resulted in no benefit to Randhawa.

22. As a result of respondent's failure to notify Randhawa about his April 19, 1999 hearing before the Immigration Court, Randhawa was ordered deported. Randhawa never received a hearing on his asylum application due to respondent's failure to notify Randhawa of the hearing.

23. By failing to return any of the \$1,000 Randhawa paid in advance fees, respondent failed to refund promptly any part of a fee paid in advance that has not been earned in wilful violation of Rule 3-700, Rules of Professional Conduct.

24. By failing to notify Randhawa of the April 19, 1999 hearing date and failing to file a competent motion to set aside the deportation order, respondent failed to competently perform the services for which he was employed in wilful violation of Rule of Professional Conduct 3-110(a).

### THE KULDIP SINGH MATTER

Case No. 03-O-02647

25. Prior to on or about August 1, 1997, Kuldip Singh filed an asylum application. The Immigration Court denied the application and ordered Singh deported. On or about August 1, 1997, Singh employed respondent to represent him in his appeal proceedings before the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA"). Singh paid respondent \$360 to represent him before the BIA.

26. On or about September 4, 1997, Singh married Sukhwinder Kaur, a lawful US permanent resident. Subsequently, respondent's office filed an Immigrant Petition for Relative on behalf of Singh based on his marriage to Kaur. On or about September 21, 1997, the INS approved the Petition for Relative.

27. On or about October 26, 1998 Singh and Kaur's first child Manpreet Batth was born. On or about February 6, 2001 Singh and Kaur's second child Bhjanpreet Batth was born.

28. On or about September 20, 2001, the BIA affirmed the Immigration Court's August 1, 1997 decision and dismissed Singh's appeal. Therefore, the Immigration Court's order was final and Singh's deportation order became outstanding.

29. On or about October 11, 2001, Singh employed respondent to appeal the BIA decision to the Ninth Circuit. Singh paid respondent \$500 for representation before the Ninth Circuit.

30. On or about October 11, 2001, Singh also employed respondent to assist with a V-1 visa on Singh's behalf, based on his marriage to a permanent resident. Singh paid respondent \$495 to assist with the V-1 visa.

31. On or about November 27, 2001, Singh contacted respondent to determine the status of the appeal to the Ninth Circuit. Respondent stated to Singh that he had failed to file the appeal. Respondent explained to Singh that respondent missed the filing deadline because he had been in Canada and forgot about the deadline while respondent was in Canada.

32. During the conversation, respondent assured Singh that he Singh would not be deported based on his pending V-1 visa status. Respondent assured Singh that the V-1 visa



would be approved and Singh had nothing to worry about. Respondent also promised Singh that he would refund him the attorney fee of \$500, because respondent never filed the appeal with the Ninth Circuit.

33. In truth and in fact, Singh still was subject to deportation because respondent failed to file the appeal with the Ninth Circuit. Therefore, respondent's legal advise to Singh was incorrect and subjected Singh to deportation.

34. On or about January 3, 2003, Singh retained attorney Hardeep Rai to assist him with his immigration issues. Singh requested a copy of his file from respondent's office. At the time Singh requested his file, respondent stated to Singh that he did not have to pay the outstanding balance of \$1000 and that respondent would continue to handle Singh's case without charge.

35. Singh refused respondent's offer of further services. Respondent apologized again for not filing the petition for review before the Ninth Circuit but this time offered as excuse his father's death.

36. After reviewing he file, Rai informed Singh that he could try to reopen Singh's immigration case based on a claim of respondent's ineffective assistance of counsel. Singh agreed to pursue that claim.

37. On or about February 2003, Singh received a letter from the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services ("BCIS") (successor to INS) ordering him to appear for an interview on March 7, 2003 regarding his application for employment authorization. Rai advised Singh not to attend he interview because he would be deported.

38. On or about March 7, 2003, Singh appeared for the BCIS interview based upon respondent's assurances that Singh could not be deported because of the pending V-1 visa application.

39. When Singh appeared for the interview, he was taken into custody due to the outstanding deportation order. Singh remained in custody until June 9, 2003. He is afraid of being deported any time.

40. Prior to May 2003, Singh employed attorney Robert Jobe to assist him with his immigration issues. Prior to on or about May 23, 2003, Jobe filed a petition for habeas corpus based on ineffective assistance of counsel. On or about May 23, 2003, the Immigration Court granted the motion and reopened Singh's matter.

41. As a result of the reopening of Singh's matter, Singh was released from custody on or about June 9, 2003.

42. Respondent's failure to file the Ninth Circuit brief, failure to file a motion to reopen based upon ineffective assistance of counsel and advise to Singh that he was not subject to the deportation order due to the pending V-1 visa resulted in Singh's imprisonment from March 7, 2003 to June 9, 2003.

43. Respondent did not earn any of the \$500 he was paid in advance fees to file an appeal with the Ninth Circuit because respondent failed to file the appeal.

44. Respondent promised he would repay Singh the \$500.

45. To date, respondent has failed to return any money to Singh.

46. By failing to return any of the \$500 Singh paid in advance fees, respondent failed to refund promptly any part of a fee paid in advance that has not been earned in wilful violation of Rule 3-700(D)(2).

47. Respondent recklessly failed to perform legal services with competence by failing to file the Ninth Circuit brief, failing to file a motion to reopen based upon his ineffective assistance of counsel and failing to advise Singh that Singh was subject to deportation as a result of respondent's ineffective assistance of counsel in wilful violation of Rule of Professional Conduct 3-100(A).

#### **REPEATED FAILURES TO PERFORM**

48. In several matters, respondent recklessly and repeatedly failed to perform legal services with competence because he failed keep immigration clients informed of the status of their appeals of adverse immigration decisions. In these cases, the clients reasonably believed that applicant was pursuing the appeal when he either was not or the appeal was decided adversely. These cases are as follows:

49. In the Deep Singh Sekhon matter (State Bar case no.04-O-10927), respondent failed to pursue the appeal (which should have been filed in 1999).

50. In the Jarnail Dass matter (State Bar Case no. 04-O-11087), respondent failed to advise his client of the outcome of an appeal (which had been decided in July 2002). The client learned of the decision on his own in May 2003.

51. In the Pritihvi Singh matter (State Bar Case no. 04-O-15286), respondent failed to file a timely appeal (in or about 1998) and failed to advise the client of the outcome of this fact.

52. By repeatedly failing to perform competent legal services in these matters, respondent wilfully violated Rule of Professional Conduct 3-110(A).

#### **OTHER PROCEEDINGS.**

The disclosure date referred to, on page one, paragraph A.(6), was December 17, 2004.

Date 1/16/05

  
Respondent's signature


MADAN MOHAN S. AHLUWALIA  
print name

Date 1/16/05

  
Respondent's Counsel's signature

DORON WEINBERG  
print name

Date 1/17/05

  
Deputy Trial Counsel's signature

DONALD R. STREEDMAN  
print name

**ORDER**


Finding the stipulation to be fair to the parties and that it adequately protects the public, IT IS ORDERED that the requested dismissal of counts/charges, if any, is GRANTED without prejudice, and:

- The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED and the DISCIPLINE RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
- The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED AS MODIFIED as set forth below, and the DISCIPLINE IS RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.

*See attached Modifications.*

The parties are bound by the stipulation as approved unless: 1) a motion to withdraw or modify the stipulation, filed within 15 days after service of this order, is granted; or 2) this court modifies or further modifies the approved stipulation. (See rule 135(b), Rules of Procedure.) The effective date of this disposition is the effective date of the Supreme Court order herein, normally 30 days after file date. (See rule 953(a), California Rules of Court.)

Date 2/8/05

  
Judge of the State Bar/Court

**IN THE MATTER OF MADAN MOHAN S. AHLUWALIA**  
**State Bar Court Case Nos. 00-O-11096; 03-O-02647; 04-O-10927; 04-O-11087; 04-O-15286**

**COURT'S MODIFICATIONS TO STIPULATED FACTS,**  
**CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION**

1. At page 5, under "Additional Conditions of Probation, insert an "x" in the box next to paragraph (9) and an "x" in the box next to "Financial Conditions."

Respondent must pay restitution to: (1) Harbhajan Randhawa in the amount of \$1,000 plus interest of 10% per annum from September 1, 1997, and (2) Kuldip Singh in the amount of \$500 plus interest of 10% per annum from October 11, 2001. If the Client Security Fund (CSF) has reimbursed one or more of the payees for all or any portion of the principal amounts, Respondent must also pay restitution to CSF of the amounts paid, plus applicable interest and costs. Respondent must pay the restitution and provide satisfactory proof of payment to the Office of Probation no later than 30 days from the effective date of the Supreme Court order in this matter.

2. At page 6, in paragraph 2, the reference to "November 24, 1998" is deleted and replaced with "November 24, 1997."
3. At page 6, in paragraph 8, the reference to "May 5, 1999" is deleted and replaced with "May 24, 1999."

Dated: February 8, 2005

  
JOANN M. REMKE  
Judge of the State Bar Court

**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**  
**[Rule 62(b), Rules Proc.; Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a(4)]**

I am a Case Administrator of the State Bar Court. I am over the age of eighteen and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to standard court practice, in the City and County of San Francisco, on February 8, 2005, I deposited a true copy of the following document(s):

**STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION  
AND ORDER APPROVING**

in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:


- by first-class mail, with postage thereon fully prepaid, through the United States Postal Service at San Francisco, California, addressed as follows:

**DORON WEINBERG  
523 OCTAVIA ST  
SAN FRANCISCO CA 94102**

- by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of California addressed as follows:

**DONALD STEEDMAN, Enforcement, San Francisco**

I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in San Francisco, California, on **February 8, 2005.**



\_\_\_\_\_  
**Laine Silber**  
Case Administrator  
State Bar Court