Case Number(s): 04-O-14198
In the Matter of: Gloria S. Weil-Herrera, Bar # 103988, A Member of the State Bar of California, (Respondent).
Counsel For The State Bar: Agustin Hernandez, Bar # 161625,
Counsel for Respondent: In Pro Per, Bar #
Submitted to: Settlement Judge – State Bar Court Clerk’s Office San Francisco.
Filed: June 30, 2006.
<<not>> checked. PREVIOUS STIPULATION REJECTED
Note: All information required by this form and any additional information which cannot be provided in the space provided, must be set forth in an attachment to this stipulation under specific headings, e.g., "Facts," "Dismissals," "Conclusions of Law," "Supporting Authority," etc.
1. Respondent is a member of the State Bar of California, admitted June 10, 1982.
2. The parties agree to be bound by the factual stipulations contained herein even if conclusions of law or disposition are rejected or changed by the Supreme Court.
3. All investigations or proceedings listed by case number in the caption of this stipulation are entirely resolved by this stipulation and are deemed consolidated. Dismissed charge(s)/count(s) are listed under "Dismissals." The stipulation consists of 12 pages, not including the order.
4. A statement of acts or omissions acknowledged by Respondent as cause or causes for discipline is included under "Facts."
5. Conclusions of law, drawn from and specifically referring to the facts are also included under "Conclusions of Law".
6. The parties must include supporting authority for the recommended level of discipline under the heading "Supporting Authority."
7. No more than 30 days prior to the filing of this stipulation, Respondent has been advised in writing of any pending investigation/proceeding not resolved by this stipulation, except for criminal investigations.
8. Payment of Disciplinary Costs-Respondent acknowledges the provisions of Bus. & Prof. Code §§6086.10 & 6140.7. (Check one option only):
checked. Costs are added to membership fee for calendar year following effective date of discipline (public reproval).
<<not>> checked. Case ineligible for costs (private reproval).
<<not>> checked. Costs are to be paid in equal amounts prior to February 1 for the following membership years: . (Hardship, special circumstances or other good cause per rule 5.132, Rules of Procedure.) If Respondent fails to pay any installment as described above, or as may be modified by the State Bar Court, the remaining balance is due and payable immediately.
<<not>> checked. Costs are waived in part as set forth in a separate attachment entitled "Partial Waiver of Costs".
<<not>> checked. Costs are entirely waived.
9. The parties understand that:
<<not>> checked. (a) A private reproval imposed on a respondent as a result of a stipulation approved by the Court prior to initiation of a State Bar Court proceeding is part of the respondent’s official State Bar membership records, but is not disclosed in response to public inquiries and is not reported on the State Bar’s web page. The record of the proceeding in which such a private reproval was imposed is not available to the public except as part of the record of any subsequent proceeding in which it is introduced as evidence of a prior record of discipline under the Rules of Procedure of the State Bar.
<<not>> checked. (b) A private reproval imposed on a respondent after initiation of a State Bar Court proceeding is part of the respondent’s official State Bar Membership records, is disclosed in response to public inquiries and is reported as a record of public discipline on the State Bar’s web page.
checked. (c) A public reproval imposed on a respondent is publicly available as part of the respondent’s official State Bar membership records, is disclosed in response to public inquiries and is reported as a record of public discipline on the State Bar’s web page.
IN THE MATTER OF: Gloria S. Weil-Herrera, State Bar No. 103988
STATE BAR COURT CASE NUMBER: 04-O-14198
FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
Respondent admits that the following facts are true and that she is culpable of violations of the specified statutes and/or Rules of Professional Conduct.
FACTS.
1. Prior to employing Respondent, Blanca Ramirez ("Ramirez") was an employee at World Wide Immigration Services ("World Wide"). World Wide was an immigration services provider.
2. In or about April 2001, World Wide filed an application for asylum on behalf of Ramirez with the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS").
3. On or about .July 30, 2001, the INS scheduled a hearing on a removal proceeding to be held in Immigration Court on October 11, 2001.
4. On or about October 5, 2001, non-attorney Jose Mejia ("Mejia"), one of the owners of World Wide, contacted Respondent to have her represent Ramirez at the October 11, 2001 removal proceeding. Mejia paid Respondent $500 to appear at the removal proceeding on behalf of Ramirez. Pursuant to World Wide and Respondent’s agreement, World Wide would prepare all of the necessary pleadings.
5. On or about October 11, 2001, Respondent appeared at the removal proceeding in Immigration Court along with Ramirez. During the heating on the removal proceeding, Respondent and Ramirez withdrew asylum petition and requested relief under the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act ("NACARA"). The court ordered that the written application for relief under NACARA be filed with the court on or before December 21, 2001, and scheduled a hearing on the merits for August 21, 2002. During this hearing, with Ramirez and an official court interpreter present, the judge of the Immigration Court specifically stated that if the written application was not filed by that date, the court would deem her application abandoned.
6. On or about October 11, 2001, immediately after the removal proceeding, Respondent sent Ramirez a letter confirming that the Immigration Court ordered that the written application for relief under NACARA had to be filed with the court on or before December 21, 2001, and that it had scheduled a hearing on the merits for August 21, 2002. In this letter, Respondent also confirmed that Ramirez would ensure that Word Wide would prepare the written application and file it with the Immigration Court. In this letter, Respondent also warned Ramirez that if she did not have the written application filed with the court by December 21, 2001, the court would deem her application abandoned.
7. Thereafter, Respondent followed up with Ramirez and World Wide to ensure that the written application for relief under NACARA was being prepared. Word Wide told Respondent that they had prepared and filed the written application with the Immigration Court. Furthermore, Ramirez even provided Respondent with a copy of the written application which had been stamped by the Immigration Court indicating that the filing fees had been paid on October 16, 2001. However, although the application had been stamped by the court reflecting that the fees had been paid, it had not actually been filed with the Immigration Court.
8. Thereafter, Ramirez stopped working at World Wide and Respondent was unable to communicate with her because she did not have her current contact information.
9. At no time did Respondent, Ramirez or World Wide file a written application for relief under NACARA on behalf of Ramirez.
10. On or about January 14, 2002, the Immigration Court denied Ramirez’ request for relief under NACARA because she had failed to file the written application with the court by December 21, 2001: On this date, the Immigration Court served notice of its January 14, 2002 order on Respondent along with notice that any appeals must be filed with the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") within 30 days.
11. Since Respondent had been unable to reach Ramirez because she had left World Wide and not provided Respondent with new contact information, Respondent was unable to determine if Ramirez wanted to appeal the Immigration Court’s January 14, 2002 order. In abundance of caution, Respondent decided to file an appeal on behalf of Ramirez to preserve her fights. Unfortunately, however, due to a staff’s error, the appeal was filed with the BIA one day late, and ultimately dismissed as a result thereof. Respondent had until February 13, 2002, to file an appeal on behalf of Ramirez. On February 12, 2002, Respondent prepared the appeal and instructed her staff to send it to the BIA via FedEx on this day so that it would be received and filed with the BIA on the due date of February 13, 2002. For unknown reasons, Respondent’s staff did not submit the appeal to FedEx until February 13, 2002, the day that it was due at the BIA. Consequently, Ramirez’ appeal was not received by the BIA until February 14, 2002, one day late.
12. On or about October 7, 2003, Ramirez’ appeal was dismissed by the BIA because it was not filed on or before February 13, 2002.
13. Ramirez’s ease is still pending in Immigration Court.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
14. By failing to prepare and file the written application for relief under NACARA; by relying on Ramirez and/or World Wide to prepare and file the written application for relief under NACARA; and by failing to adequately supervise her staff to ensure that the appeal was timely filed, Respondent intentionally, recklessly, or repeatedly failed to perform a legal services with competence in violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-110(A).
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES.
FACTS SUPPORTING MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES.
Respondent acknowledged her misconduct mid voluntarily implemented new office policies and procedures to prevent the recurrence of this type of misconduct, even before the State Bar’s involvement.
In an effort to prevent future similar misconduct, on or about February 7, 2003, Respondent sent letters by certified mail to all of her immigration clients informing them that it was necessary for her office to prepare and review all documents related to their case. In this letter, Respondent asked each client to call and make an appointment to meet with her and discuss their case within two weeks. Respondent also stated that if the clients did not meet with her to address this issue, she would withdraw as their attorney.
Respondent sent these letters to her clients after reading the State Bar Court’s Valinoti decision, but before Ramirez even filed her complaint with the State Bar. In re Valinoti Not reported in Cal.Rtpr.2nd, 2002 WL 31907316 (Cal. Bar Ct.), 2003 Daily Journal D.A.R. 167, 03 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 132, 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 498.
AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING DISCIPLINE.
Standard 2.4(b), Title IV, Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct provides that "[c]ulpability of a member of wilfully failing to perform services in an individual matter or matters not demonstrating a pattern of misconduct or culpability of a member of wilfully failing to communicate with a client shall result in reproval or suspension depending upon the extent of the misconduct and the degree of harm to the client."
A respondent received a private reproval for failure to perform legal services with competence in violation of former Rule 6-101(A)(2) of the Rules of Professional Conduct [now governed by Rule 3-110(A)]. Respondent failed to ensure that his client was aware of a state inheritance tax that was assessed against her which resulted in a judgment being entered against her property. In mitigation, the court considered that respondent offered to pay the accrued interest attributable to his oversight (however, he had not paid it and restitution was ordered with the private reproval).
The court also considered that respondent had voluntarily improved his office procedures to prevent the recurrence of this misconduct. The court also considered that respondent was candid, cooperative and had no prior record of discipline. Matter of Respondent G (Review Dept. 1992) 2 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 175.
COSTS OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS.
Respondent acknowledges that the Office of the Chief Trial Counsel has informed respondent that as of May 9, 2006, the estimated prosecution costs in this matter are approximately $1,983. Respondent acknowledges that this figure is an estimate only and that it does not include State Bar Court costs which will be included in any final cost assessment. Respondent further acknowledges that should this stipulation be rejected or should relief from the stipulation be granted, the costs in this matter may increase due to the cost of further proceedings.
PENDING PROCEEDINGS.
The disclosure date referred to, on page one, paragraph A.(7), was May 9, 2006.
SIGNATURE OF THE PARTIES
Case Number(s): 04-O-14198
In the Matter of: Gloria S. Weil-Herrera
By their signatures below, the parties and their counsel, as applicable, signify their agreement with each of the recitation and each of the terms and conditions of this Stipulation Re Facts, Conclusions of Law and Disposition.
Signed by:
Respondent: Gloria Weil-Herrera
Date: June 1, 2006
Respondent’s Counsel:
Date:
Deputy Trial Counsel: Agustin Hernandez
Date: June 2, 2006
Case Number(s): 04-O-14198
In the Matter of: Gloria S. Weil-Herrera
Finding the stipulation to be fair to the parties and that it adequately protects the public, IT IS ORDERED that the requested dismissal of counts/charges, if any, is GRANTED without prejudice, and:
checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED AND THE REPROVAL IMPOSED.
checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED AS MODIFIED as set forth below, and the REPROVAL IMPOSED.
<<not>> checked. All court dates in the Hearing Department are vacated.
The parties are bound by the stipulation as approved unless: 1) a motion to withdraw or modify the stipulation, filed within 15 days after service of this order, is granted; or 2) this court modifies or further modifies the approved stipulation. (See rule 125(b), Rules of Procedure.) Otherwise the stipulation shall be effective 15 days after service of this order.
Failure to comply with any conditions attached to this reproval man constitute cause for a separate proceeding for willful breach of rule 1-110, Rules of Professional Conduct.
Signed by:
Judge of the State Bar Court: Pat McElroy
Date: June 30, 2006
[Rule 62(b); Rules Proc.; Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a(4)]
I am a Case Administrator of the State Bar Court of California. I am over the age of eighteen and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to standard court practice, in the City and County of San Francisco, on June 30, 2006, I deposited a true copy of the following document(s):
STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION AND ORDER APPROVING
in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:
checked. by first-class mail, with postage thereon fully prepaid, through the United States Postal Service at San Francisco, California, addressed as follows:
GLORIA S. WEIL-HERRERA
523 W 6TH ST #377
LOS ANGELES, CA 90017
checked. by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of California addressed as follows:
AGUSTIN HERNANDEZ, Enforcement, Los Angeles
I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in San Francisco, California, on June 30, 2006.
Signed by:
George Hue
Case Administrator
State Bar Court