Case Number(s): 05-H-00454
In the Matter of: Ronald Jeffrey Isles, Bar # 176096, A Member of the State Bar of California, (Respondent).
Counsel For The State Bar: Kristin L. Ritsema, Bar # 149966
Counsel for Respondent: In Pro Per, Bar #
Submitted to: State Bar Court Clerk’s Office Los Angeles.
Filed: December 1, 2005.
<<not>> checked. PREVIOUS STIPULATION REJECTED
Note: All information required by this form and any additional information which cannot be provided in the space provided, must be set forth in an attachment to this stipulation under specific headings, e.g., "Facts," "Dismissals," "Conclusions of Law," "Supporting Authority," etc.
1. Respondent is a member of the State Bar of California, admitted April 20, 1995.
2. The parties agree to be bound by the factual stipulations contained herein even if conclusions of law or disposition are rejected or changed by the Supreme Court.
3. All investigations or proceedings listed by case number in the caption of this stipulation are entirely resolved by this stipulation and are deemed consolidated. Dismissed charge(s)/count(s) are listed under "Dismissals." The stipulation consists of 14 pages, not including the order.
4. A statement of acts or omissions acknowledged by Respondent as cause or causes for discipline is included under "Facts."
5. Conclusions of law, drawn from and specifically referring to the facts are also included under "Conclusions of Law".
6. The parties must include supporting authority for the recommended level of discipline under the heading "Supporting Authority."
7. No more than 30 days prior to the filing of this stipulation, Respondent has been advised in writing of any pending investigation/proceeding not resolved by this stipulation, except for criminal investigations.
8. Payment of Disciplinary Costs-Respondent acknowledges the provisions of Bus. & Prof. Code §§6086.10 & 6140.7. (Check one option only):
checked. Costs are added to membership fee for calendar year following effective date of discipline.
<<not>> checked. Costs are to be paid in equal amounts prior to February 1 for the following membership years: . (Hardship, special circumstances or other good cause per rule 5.132, Rules of Procedure.) If Respondent fails to pay any installment as described above, or as may be modified by the State Bar Court, the remaining balance is due and payable immediately.
<<not>> checked. Costs are waived in part as set forth in a separate attachment entitled "Partial Waiver of Costs".
<<not>> checked. Costs are entirely waived.
IN THE MATTER OF: Ronald Jeffrey Isles, State Bar No. 176096
STATE BAR COURT CASE NUMBER: 05-H-00454
FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
Respondent admits that the following facts are tree and that he is culpable of violations of the specified statutes and/or Rules of Professional Conduct.
COUNT ONE
Case No. 05-H-00454
Rule 1-110 of the Rules of Professional Conduct
[Failure to Comply with Conditions of Reproval]
1. Respondent wilfully violated rule 1-110 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, by failing to comply with the conditions attached to a reproval administered by the State Bar, as follows:
2. On or about March 28, 2003, Respondent entered into a Stipulation Re Facts,
Conclusions of Law and Disposition ("Stipulation") with the State Bar of California in case number 03-O-00096.
3. On or about April 14, 2003, the Hearing Department of the State Bar Court filed an order approving the Stipulation and imposing the public reproval with conditions set forth in the Stipulation (the "reproval order").
4. On or about April 14, 2003, the reproval order was properly served by mail upon Respondent.
5. Pursuant to the April 14, 2003 reproval order, Respondent was ordered to comply with the following condition, among others:
a. to provide to the Office of Probation within one year of the effective date of the reproval satisfactory proof of attendance at State Bar Ethics School and passage of the test given at the end of the session; and
b. to provide to the Office of Probation within one year of the effective date of the reproval satisfactory proof of attendance at State Bar Client Trust Accounting School and passage of the test given at the end of the session.
6. The April 14, 1003 reproval order became effective on May 4, 2003.
7. On or about May 2, 2003, Probation Deputy Yolanda Acosta ("Ms. Acosta") of the Office of Probation of the State Bar of California wrote a letter to Respondent in which she reminded Respondent of the terms and conditions of his reproval imposed pursuant to the April 14, 2003 reproval order. In the May 2, 2003 letter, Ms. Acosta specifically advised Respondent regarding his obligation to provide proof of completion of State Bar Ethics School and State Bar Client Trust Accounting School by May 4, 2004. Enclosed with the May 2, 2003 letter to Respondent were, among other things, copies of the relevant portion of the Stipulation setting forth the conditions of Respondent’s reproval, an information sheet regarding Ethics School and Client Trust Accounting School, an enrollment application for Ethics School and Client Trust Accounting School, and a schedule for Ethics School and Client Trust Accounting School.
8. Ms. Acosta’s May 2, 2003 letter to Respondent was mailed on or about May 2, 2003 via the United States Postal Service, first class postage prepaid, in a sealed envelope addressed to Respondent at his official State Bar membership records address. The May 2, 2003 letter was not returned as undeliverable or for any other reason by the United States Postal Service.
9. Respondent received the May 2, 2003 letter from Ms. Acosta.
10. Respondent failed to timely complete State Bar Ethics School and provide proof of same to the Office of Probation, which was to have been completed by May 4, 2004.
11. Respondent failed to timely complete State Bar Client Trust Accounting School and provide proof of same to the Office of Probation, which was to have been completed by May 4, 2004.
12. Respondent belatedly completed State Bar Ethics School on April 14, 2005.
13. Respondent belatedly completed State Bar Client Trust Accounting School on June 10, 2005.
14. By failing to timely complete State Bar Ethics School and State Bar Client Trust Accounting School and provide proof of same to the Office of Probation, Respondent failed to comply with the terms and conditions of the April 14, 2003 reproval order.
15. By failing to comply with the terms and conditions of the reproval order, Respondent wilfully violated rule 1-110 of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
PENDING PROCEEDINGS.
The disclosure date referred to, on page one, paragraph A.(7), was October 28, 2005.
AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING DISCIPLINE.
A. The Standards
Standard 1.3 provides that the primary purposes of disciplinary proceedings and imposing sanctions for professional misconduct are "the protection of the public, the courts and the legal profession; the maintenance of high professional standards by attorneys; and the preservation of public confidence in the legal profession."
Standard 1.6(a) provides that the appropriate sanction for an act of professional misconduct shall be the sanction set forth in the standards for the particular misconduct found.
Standard 2.9 provides that culpability of a member of wilfully failing to comply with the terms and conditions of a reproval shall result in suspension.
Standard 1.7(a) provides that if a member is found culpable of misconduct and has a prior record of one imposition of discipline, the degree of discipline imposed in the current proceeding shall be greater than that imposed in the prior proceeding unless the prior was remote in time and the offense for which it was imposed was so minimal that it would be manifestly unjust to impose greater discipline in the current proceeding.
The Supreme Court gives the Standards "great weight," and will reject a recommendation consistent with the Standards only where the Court entertains "grave doubts" as to its propriety. (ln re Naney (1990) 51 Cal. 3d 186, 190; In re Silverton (2005) 36 Cal. 4th 81, 91, 92.) Further, although the Standards are not mandatory, it is well established that the Standards may be deviated from only when there is a compelling, well-defined reason to do so. See Aronin v. State Bar (1990) 52 Cal. 3d 276, 291; Bates v. State Bar (1990) 52 Cal. 3d 1056, 1060, fn. 2.
B. The Case Law
A reproval violation similar to the current case (though procedurally different) is Conroy v. State Bar (1990) 51 Cal. 3d 799, 274 Cal. Rptr. 692. In Conroy, the underlying discipline was a private reproval with conditions, one of which was that respondent was required to take and pass the Professional Responsibility Examination (hereinafter "PRE") within one year of the effective date of the reproval, or on or before December 30, 1987. The respondent failed to timely take and pass the PRE. However, he did tardily take and pass the PRE in March 1988, before the State Bar filed the reproval violation proceeding. In Conroy, the respondent defaulted at the Hearing Department level and was found culpable of wilful violation of rule 9-101 of the former Rules of Professional Conduct, the precursor to rule 1-110 of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
The Supreme Court in Conroy decreed the belated passage of the PRE to be an "extenuating factor," but not "significant mitigation." In aggravation, the Court found that the respondent had the one prior private reproval, that by defaulting the respondent failed to appreciate the seriousness of the charges and the importance of participating in the State Bar proceedings, and that by suggesting on review that his misconduct was a mere technical lapse, he had failed to show remorse for his misconduct. On balance, the Supreme Court concluded that aggravating circumstances significantly outweighed mitigating circumstances and imposed a one year suspension from practice, stayed, with a one year period of probation on terms and conditions including a sixty-day actual suspension.
The respondent in Conroy violated only a single condition of his reproval, while Respondent violated two conditions. Like the respondent in Conroy, Respondent has only one prior imposition of discipline, though his was a public reproval rather than a private reproval as in Conroy. In addition, like the respondent in Conroy, Respondent belatedly brought himself current with the conditions of his reproval by completing Ethics School and Client Trust Accounting School. Most significant, however, is that unlike the defaulting respondent in Conroy, Respondent is cooperating and participating in this proceeding. In light of this important fact, and in light of the fact that Respondent has recognized his wrongdoing and this matter is settling early, thereby saving State Bar resources that would otherwise be spent further prosecuting this matter, it seems appropriate to impose less discipline in the current case than that imposed in Conroy.
In the Matter of Meyer (Review Dept. 1997) 3 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 697, also provides guidance for an appropriate level of discipline. The respondent in Meyer violated conditions attached to a private reproval by filing one probation report late, failing to file two other probation reports, and by not certifying his completion of six hours of continuing legal education. In aggravation, the attorney had two prior impositions of discipline (both private reprovals), committed multiple acts of misconduct, showed indifference toward rectification of his misconduct, and failed to cooperate in the proceedings by not filing a pretrial statement, failing to attend three pretrial hearings, and defaulting at time of trial. There were no circumstances in mitigation. The Review Department concluded that the misconduct in Meyer called for a higher level of discipline than had been imposed by the Supreme Court in Conroy v. State Bar, and recommended the imposition of a two-year suspension from practice, execution stayed, with three years’ probation on terms and conditions including a ninety-day actual suspension.
In the Matter of Stansbury (Review Dept. 2000) 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 103 is also instructive. The attorney in that matter was publicly reproved in a matter in which he defaulted in the State Bar Court. Conditions attached the reproval included Ethics School attendance and payment of restitution to a former client. The attorney was alleged to have violated both the Ethics School and restitution conditions. He did not answer the notice of disciplinary charges, and his default was entered in the second case, as it had been in the first. The State Bar sought review of the Hearing Department’s default decision due to a disagreement with the Hearing
Department’s application of the then recently enacted role 205 of the Rules of Procedure of the State Bar. The Review Department conducted its review de novo, including the recommended discipline. The Review Department found in aggravation that the attorney had a prior record of discipline and demonstrated a contemptuous attitude toward the disciplinary proceeding by allowing his default to enter. The Review Department concluded that In the Matter of Meyer provided an apt comparison and recommended the imposition of a two year suspension from practice, stayed, with an actual suspension for ninety days and until several ancillary conditions were met.
Both Meyer and Stansbury are more egregious than the current case because they both involved more aggravating circumstances, no mitigating circumstances, and defaulting respondents. Therefore, it is appropriate to impose less discipline in the current case than that imposed in Meyer and Stansbury.
In the Matter of Posthuma (Review Dept. 1998) 3 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 813 is the only other published case arising from a reproval violation. The respondent in that matter had been privately reproved with conditions including the passage of the California PRE. He obtained an extension to comply, but then missed the extended compliance deadline. The Review Department rejected any possibility of good faith mitigation based on the respondent’s claim that he misunderstood the extended compliance deadline, as well as any possibility of mitigation for belated compliance after the new disciplinary case had been commenced. No other mitigation was found, and the attorney’s prior record of discipline was the only aggravation. The Review Department recommended the imposition of a public reproval, over the dissent of Judge Norian, who would have recommended a period of probation and stayed suspension.
Posthuma is not an appropriate measure for the degree of discipline in this matter. The prior discipline in Posthuma was a private, not a public reproval as was Respondent’s prior discipline. Thus, the imposition of the subsequent public reproval in that matter was at least consistent with Standard 1.7(a), if not 2.9. The imposition of a reproval in Respondent’s case would be inconsistent with both Standards.
SIGNATURE OF THE PARTIES
Case Number(s): 05-H-00454
In the Matter of: Ronald Jeffrey Isles
By their signatures below, the parties and their counsel, as applicable, signify their agreement with each of the recitation and each of the terms and conditions of this Stipulation Re Facts, Conclusions of Law and Disposition.
Signed by:
Respondent: Ronald Jeffrey Isles
Date: November 10, 2005
Respondent’s Counsel:
Date:
Deputy Trial Counsel: Kristin L. Ritsema
Date: November 15, 2005
Case Number(s): 05-H-00454
In the Matter of: Ronald Jeffrey Isles
Finding the stipulation to be fair to the parties and that it adequately protects the public, IT IS ORDERED that the requested dismissal of counts/charges, if any, is GRANTED without prejudice, and:
checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED and the DISCIPLINE RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
<<not>> checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED AS MODIFIED as set forth below, and the DISCIPLINE IS RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
<<not>> checked. All Hearing dates are vacated.
The parties are bound by the stipulation as approved unless: 1) a motion to withdraw or modify the stipulation, filed within 15 days after service of this order, is granted; or 2) this court modifies or further modifies the approved stipulation. (See rule 135(b), Rules of Procedure.) The effective date of this disposition is the effective date of the Supreme Court order herein, normally 30 days after the file date. (See rule 953(a), California Rules of Court.)
Signed by:
Judge of the State Bar Court: Richard A. Platel
Date: November 30, 2005
[Rule 62(b); Rules Proc. ; Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a(4)]
I am a Case Administrator of the State Bar Court of California. I am over the age of eighteen and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to standard court practice, in the City and County of Los Angeles on December 1, 2005, I deposited a true copy of the following document(s):
STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION AND ORDER APPROVING
in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:
checked. by first-class mail, with postage thereon fully prepaid, through the United States Postal Service at Los Angeles, California, addressed as follows:
RONALD JEFFREY ISLES ESQ
307 E CHAPMAN AVENUE
ORANGE, CA 92866
checked. by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of California addressed as follows:
KRISTIN RITSEMA A/L, Enforcement, Los Angeles
I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in Los Angeles, California, on December 1, 2005.
Signed by:
Angela Owens-Carpenter
Case Administrator
State Bar Court