Case Number(s): 05-O-00308-RAH
In the Matter of: Kenneth E. Knoblock, Bar # 157230, A Member of the State Bar of California, (Respondent).
Counsel For The State Bar: Charles T. Calix, Deputy Trial Counsel
1149 S. Hill Street
Los Angeles, CA 90015-2299
(213) 765-1000
Bar # 146853,
Counsel for Respondent: In Pro Per, Kenneth E. Knoblock
395 Beaumont Gin Apt. 158
Escondido, CA 92026
Bar # 157230
Submitted to: Settlement Judge
Filed: March 3, 2011 – State Bar Court Clerk’s Office Los Angeles.
<<not>> checked. PREVIOUS STIPULATION REJECTED
Note: All information required by this form and any additional information which cannot be provided in the space provided, must be set forth in an attachment to this stipulation under specific headings, e.g., "Facts," "Dismissals," "Conclusions of Law," "Supporting Authority," etc.
1. Respondent is a member of the State Bar of California, admitted December 16, 1991.
2. The parties agree to be bound by the factual stipulations contained herein even if conclusions of law or disposition are rejected or changed by the Supreme Court.
3. All investigations or proceedings listed by case number in the caption of this stipulation are entirely resolved by this stipulation and are deemed consolidated. Dismissed charge(s)/count(s) are listed under "Dismissals." The stipulation consists of (25) pages, not including the order.
4. A statement of acts or omissions acknowledged by Respondent as cause or causes for discipline is included under "Facts."
5. Conclusions of law, drawn from and specifically referring to the facts are also included under "Conclusions of Law".
6. The parties must include supporting authority for the recommended level of discipline under the heading "Supporting Authority."
7. No more than 30 days prior to the filing of this stipulation, Respondent has been advised in writing of any pending investigation/proceeding not resolved by this stipulation, except for criminal investigations.
8. Payment of Disciplinary Costs-Respondent acknowledges the provisions of Bus. & Prof. Code §§6086.10 & 6140.7. (Check one option only):
checked. Costs are awarded to the
State Bar.
<<not>> checked. Costs are waived in part as set forth in a
separate attachment entitled "Partial Waiver of Costs".
<<not>> checked. Costs are entirely waived.
9.
ORDER OF INACTIVE ENROLLMENT:
The parties are aware that if this stipulation is approved, the judge will
issue an order of inactive enrollment under Business and Professions Code
section 6007, subdivision (c)(4), and Rules of Procedure of the State Bar, rule
5.111(D)(1).
IN THE MATTER OF: KENNETH E. KNOBLOCK, State Bar No. 157230
STATE BAR COURT CASE NUMBER: 05-O-00308-RAH
Kenneth E. Knoblock ("Respondent") admits that the following facts are true and that he is culpable of violations of the specified statutes and/or Rules of Professional Conduct.
FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
The Stipulation as to Facts and Culpability executed on February 4, 2009 by Respondent and counsel for the State Bar that is attached hereto is incorporated as though fully set forth at length.
PENDING PROCEEDINGS.
The disclosure date referred to, on page 2, paragraph A(7), was January 19, 2011.
AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING DISCIPLINE.
Standard 1.3 of the Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct ("Standards") provides that the purpose of the disciplinary system is, "the protection of the public, the courts and the legal profession; the maintenance of high professional standards by attorneys and the preservation of public confidence in the legal profession."
Standard 1.7(b) provides as follows:
If a member is found culpable of professional misconduct in any proceeding in which discipline may be imposed and the member has a record of two prior impositions of discipline as defined by Standard 1.2(0, the degree of discipline in the current proceeding shall be disbarment unless the most compelling mitigating circumstances clearly predominate.
Standard 2.2(a) provides as follows:
Culpability of a member of willful misappropriation of entrusted funds or property shall result in disbarment. Only if the amount of funds or property misappropriated is insignificantly small or if the most compelling mitigating circumstances clearly predominate, shall disbarment not be imposed. In those latter cases, the discipline shall not be less than a one-year actual suspension, irrespective of mitigating circumstances.
Standard 2.4(a) provides as follows: "Culpability of a member of a pattern of willfully failing to perform services demonstrating the member’s abandonment of the causes in which he was retained shall result in disbarment."
In In re Silverton (.2005) 36 Cal.4th 81, 93, the Supreme Court held that the Standards are to be applied unless the exceptions set forth in them are satisfied or the attorney can otherwise establish grave doubts as to the propriety of the sanction. The Supreme Court further held in language applicable to Standards 1.7(b) and 2.2(a) that:
when an attorney has previously been disbarred, disbarment is the appropriate sanction for subsequent professional misconduct unless the exception set forth in standard 1.7(a) is satisfied or the attorney can otherwise establish "grave doubts as to the propriety" of disbarment in the particular case. ld at p. 93.
Respondent has been disciplined twice, which invokes Standard 1.7(b), and misappropriated significant sums of money in this matter, which invokes Standard 2.2(a). Consequently, the appropriate discipline is disbarment.
In In the Matter of Conner (Review Dept. 2008) 5 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 93, the respondent misappropriated approximately $26,699.56 from a client, and created fraudulent documents to justify the misappropriation. The respondent was disbarred even though he had been a member for 12 ½ years without discipline. The Review Department held, in part, that:
An attorney who deliberately takes a client’s funds, intending to keep them permanently, and answers the client’s inquiries with lies and evasions, is deserving of more severe discipline than an attorney who has acted negligently, without intent to deprive and without acts of deception. (Edwards v. State Bar, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 38.)
The Review Department in Conner, supra, 5 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. at p. 101, cited with approval the decisions of Grim v. State Bar (1991) 53 Cal.3d 21, where the Supreme Court disbarred an attorney who willfully misappropriated $5,546 from a client, and Chang v. State Bar (1989) 49 Cal.3d 114, where the Supreme Court disbarred an attorney who willfully misappropriated $7,898.44 from a client, failed to render an account, and misrepresented to the State Bar the circumstances surrounding the misappropriation.
In In the Matter of Blum (Review Dept. 1994) 3 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 170, the respondent failed to perform and misappropriated $55,000 from a client who spoke little English in one case, and failed to report sanctions in another case. Although the respondent had been a member for over 20 years without discipline, he was disbarred.
In In the Matter of Collins (Review Dept. 1992) 2 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 1, 14, the Review Department held as follows:
We recommend discipline to protect the public, enforce professional standards and maintain public confidence in the legal profession, not to punish. (See Walker v. State Bar, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 1117; see also std. 1.3.) Measured by these principles, we should be most concerned, as is the Supreme Court, when it appears that an attorney is likely to repeat the very serious misconduct of which he has been found culpable. (See Cooper v. State Bar (1987)43 Cal.3d 1016, 1029.) ld. at p. 14.
IN THE MATTER OF: KENNETH E. KNOBLOCK, State Bar No. 157230
STATE BAR COURT CASE NUMBER: 05-O-00308-RAH
Kenneth E. Knoblock ("Respondent") admits that the following facts are true and that he is culpable of violations of the specified statutes and/or Rules of Professional Conduct.
FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
The Stipulation as to Facts and Culpability executed on February 4, 2009 by Respondent and counsel for the State Bar that is attached hereto is incorporated as though fully set forth at length.
PENDING PROCEEDINGS.
The disclosure date referred to, on page 2, paragraph A(7), was January 19, 2011.
AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING DISCIPLINE.
Standard 1.3 of the Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct ("Standards") provides that the purpose of the disciplinary system is, "the protection of the public, the courts and the legal profession; the maintenance of high professional standards by attorneys and the preservation of public confidence in the legal profession."
Standard 1.7(b) provides as follows:
If a member is found culpable of professional misconduct in any proceeding in which discipline may be imposed and the member has a record of two prior impositions of discipline as defined by Standard 1.2(f), the degree of discipline in the current proceeding shall be disbarment unless the most compelling mitigating circumstances clearly predominate.
Standard 2.2(a) provides as follows:
Culpability of a member of willful misappropriation of entrusted funds or property shall result in disbarment. Only if the amount of funds or property misappropriated is insignificantly small or if the most compelling mitigating circumstances clearly predominate, shall disbarment not be imposed. In those latter cases, the discipline shall not be less than a one-year actual suspension, irrespective of mitigating circumstances.
Standard 2.4(a) provides as follows: "Culpability of a member of a pattern of willfully failing to perform services demonstrating the member’s abandonment of the causes in which he was retained shall result in disbarment."
IN THE MATTER OF: KENNETH KNOBLOCK, State Bar No. 157230
STATE BAR COURT CASE NUMBER: 05-O-00308-RAH
STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA OFFICE OF THE CHIEF TRIAL COUNSEL
SCOTT J. DREXEL, No. 65670
CHIEF TRIAL COUNSEL
RUSSELL G. WEINER, No. 94504
DEPUTY CHIEF TRIAL COUNSEL
VICTORIA R. MOLLOY, No. 97747
ASSISTANT CHIEF TRIAL COUNSEL
KEVIN B. TAYLOR, No. 151715
SUPERVISING TRIAL COUNSEL
CHRISTINE SOUHRADA, No. 228256
DEPUTY TRIAL COUNSEL
1149 South Hill Street
Los Angeles, California 90015-2299
Telephone: (213) 765-1162
FILED : February 4, 2009
STATE BAR COURT HEARING DEPARTMENT - LOS ANGELES
In the Matter of:
KENNETH KNOBLOCK,
No. 157230,
A Member of the State Bar
Case No. 05-O-00308 - RAH
STIPULATION AS TO FACTS AND CULPABILITY
IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED by and between the State Bar of California, by and through Deputy Trial Counsel Christine Souhrada, and KENNETH KNOBLOCK, ("Respondent"), appearing in pro per, in accordance with rule 131 of Rules of Procedure of the State Bar of California as follows:
A. JURISDICTION
Respondent was admitted to the practice of law in the State of California on December 23 16, 1991 and since that time has been a member of the State Bar of California.
B. WAIVERS AND UNDERSTANDING OF THE PARTIES
It is understood and acknowledged by the parties to this stipulation that:
1. This stipulation as to facts is binding upon the parties regardless of the disposition or degree of discipline recommended or imposed.
2. The stipulated facts contained in this stipulation constitute admissions of fact and may not be withdrawn by either party, except with Court approval.
3. Evidence to prove or disprove a stipulated fact is inadmissible at trial. The parties agree that either party may seek to admit evidence at trial as to facts not contained in this stipulation, which do not contradict these stipulated facts. Neither party waives the right to submit and present evidence relating to mitigation or relating to aggravation.
C. STATEMENT OF STIPULATED FACTS
The parties hereby stipulate that the following facts are true.
Case No. 05-O-00308
1. On January 29, 2001, Evelyne San Miguel ("San Miguel"), as conservator for her mentally disabled daughter, Michelle ("Michelle"), employed Respondent to file a lawsuit on behalf of Michelle against various healthcare providers ("Michelle’s case"). Respondent agreed to provide all of the necessary legal services on an hourly fee basis.
2. On January 29, 2001 and April 26, 2001, San Miguel paid Respondent $5,000 and $2,500, respectively, in advanced attorneys fees for Michelle’s case.
3. In early 2001, Respondent used $2,500 of San Miguel’s advanced fees to pay for attorney Roger Thomson’s ("Thomson") attorney’s fees. Thomson was Respondent’s associate counsel on Michelle’s case until in or about April 2001 when Respondent terminated Thomson’s association.
4. On May 10, 2001, Respondent and San Miguel entered into a new retainer agreement wherein Respondent agreed to provide all of the necessary legal services on Michelle’s case on a contingency fee basis instead of on an hourly fee basis. Based upon the new agreement, Respondent required that San Miguel pay the costs of litigation in advance.
5. On June 1, 2001, Respondent issued check no. 1234 from his client trust account number ***-***3970 at Wells Fargo Bank ("CTA") for $5,000 made payable to attorney Hamilton Moore ("Moore") for his attorney’s fees. Moore was Respondent’s associate counsel on Michelle’s case until in or about July 2002 when Respondent terminated Moore’s association.
6. On May 23, 2001, San Miguel paid Respondent $30,000 in advanced costs.
7. On May 24, 2001, Respondent deposited San Miguel’s check for $30,000 in advanced costs into his CTA. At no time did San Miguel authorize Respondent to use any portion of the $30,000 for his personal use or to pay for anything other than costs on Michelle’s case.
8. From in or about 2001 through 2003, Respondent paid for the following costs on Michelle’s case:
Vicky Vanni, R.N. $2,500.00;
John Butler (investigator) $1,581.60;
Knox Photocopy Service $642.58;
Dr. Sahagian $350.00;
Legal Resource Video $1,276.37;
Court filing fee $232.00;
Court filing fee $230.00;
Total: $6,812.55
9. At no time did Respondent pay for any additional costs on Michelle’s case.
10. During the period of March 27., 2002, and March 19, 2003, Respondent was required to maintain at least $23,187.45 in his CTA on behalf of San Miguel.
11. Between March 27, 2002, and March 19, 2003, the balance in the CTA fell below $23,187.45 on repeated dates, including, but not limited to, the following:
Date: 03/27/02, Balance: $17,764.12
Date: 04/08/02, Balance: $14,764.12
Date: 04/11/02, Balance: $14,264.12
Date: 04/12/02, Balance: $13,464.12
Date: 04/17/02, Balance: $12,464.12
Date: 04/18/02, Balance: $10,464.12
Date: 04/22/02, Balance: $8,464.12
Date: 01/15/03, Balance: $2,499.50
Date: 01/28/03, Balance: $1,499.50
Date: 01/31/03, Balance: $473.50
Date: 03/19/03, Balance: 0.00
12. Respondent, with gross negligence, misappropriated $23,187.45 of San Miguel’s funds.
13. If called to testify, Respondent would testify that he billed for reasonably necessary legal fees.
14. On December 31, 2001, Respondent filed Michelle’s case in San Diego County Superior Court.
15. On March 7, 2003, Respondent opened another client trust account number * * ** ~ * * 416 at Union Bank of California ("2nd CTA")
16. In November 2003, Respondent settled Michelle’s case for $95,000 in cash up front, plus a $120,571.20 annuity. Pursuant to the terms of the settlement, a portion of the $95,000 was be used to pay for attorney fees and another portion for reimbursement of the costs incurred during the litigation.
17. On November 18, 2003, Respondent filed a Petition to Approve Compromise of Claim of Incompetent Person ("Petition") to have the court approve the settlement of Michelle’s case. In the Petition, Respondent indicated that the attorney fees and costs incurred were $53,892.80 and $6,812.55, respectively. In the petition Respondent asked the court to approve the payment of $53,892.80 in attorney fees and $6,812.55 in costs to Respondent.
18. On November 1, 2003, the court granted the Petition and ordered the defendants in Michelle’s case to pay Respondent a total of $60,705.35 consisting of $53,892.80 in attorney fees and $6,812.55 in costs from the $95,000 portion of the settlement.
19. On November 25, 2003, the insurance carrier for the defendants in Michelle’s case forwarded a settlement draft to Respondent in the amount of $60,705.35 consisting of $53,892.80 in attorney fees and $6,812.55 in costs ("attorney fees and costs settlement draft"). Respondent received the attorney fees and costs settlement draft.
20. Pursuant to the terms of the settlement and the order granting the petition, San Miguel was entitled to receive $14,312.55 from the attorney fees and costs settlement draft, consisting of $7,500.00 as reimbursement for the attorney fees that she advanced and $6,812.55 for the costs that she advanced.
21. On December 1,2003, Respondent deposited the attorney fees and costs settlement draft into his 2nd CTA.
22. From December 1, 2003, through October 2004, Respondent was required to maintain in an attorney client trust account the sum of $14,312.55 on behalf of San Miguel.
23. On September 30, 2004, the balance in the 2nd CTA fell to $9,267.78.
24. In October 2004, Respondent refunded $2,000 of advanced costs to San Miguel.
25. In October 2004, Respondent paid San Miguel an additional $6,996.95 by check from his business account.
26. From October 29, 2004, through on or about December 31, 2001~, Respondent was required to maintain in an attorney client trust account the sum of $5,315.60 on behalf of San Miguel.
27. Between October 29, 2004, and December 31, 2004, the balance in the 2nd CTA fell below $5,315.60 on repeated dates, including, but not limited to, the following:
Date: 11/30/04, Balance: $2,549.03
Date: 12/31/04, Balance: $2,274.37
28. Respondent, with gross negligence, misappropriated $3,041.23 of San Miguel’s funds.
29. Between June 2, 2001, and September 8, 2002, Respondent issued checks drawn upon his CTA to pay his personal and business expenses including, but not limited to, the following:
Check No.: 1236, Date: 06/02/01, Amount: $592.32
Check No.: 1248, Date: 06/20/01, Amount: $3,198.85
Check No.: 1249, Date: 06/22/01, Amount: $185.00
Check No.: 1252, Date: 06/23/01, Amount: $223.61
Check No.: 1256, Date: 06/28/01, Amount: $54.00
Check No.: 1258, Date: 06/28/01, Amount: $85.54
Check No.: 1261, Date: 06/29/01, Amount: $737.82
Check No.: 1268, Date: 08/04/01, Amount: $2,700.00
Check No.: 1282, Date: 09/07/01, Amount: $737.82
Check No.: 1283, Date: 09/12/01, Amount: $500.00
Check No.: 1295, Date: 10/09/01, Amount: $880.00
Check No.: 1296, Date: 10/12/01, Amount: $200.00
Check No.: 1297, Date: 10/12/01, Amount: $306.00
Check No.: 1299, Date: 10/16/01, Amount: $400.00
Check No.: 1300, Date: 10/19/01, Amount: $100.00
Check No.: 1301, Date: 10/29/01, Amount: $100.00
Check No.: 1302, Date: 10/29/01, Amount: $100.00
Check No.: 1303, Date: 11/02/01, Amount: $658.44
Check No.: 1304, Date: 11/06/01, Amount: $2,443.44
Check No.: 1306, Date: 11/06/01, Amount: $45.00
Check No.: 1312, Date: 11/12/01, Amount: $200.00
Check No.: 1313, Date: 11/15/01, Amount: $100.00
Check No.: 1315, Date: 11/16/01, Amount: $3,000.00
Check No.: 1317, Date: 11/16/01, Amount: $100.00
Check No.: 1319, Date: 11/19/01, Amount: $50.00
Check No.: 1328, Date: 12/06/01, Amount: $100.00
Check No.: 1330, Date: 12/09/01, Amount: $1,676.97
Check No.: 1335, Date: 12/14/01, Amount: $300.00
Check No.: 1337, Date: 12/16/01, Amount: $177.07
Check No.: 1341, Date: 12/20/01, Amount: $500.00
Check No.: 1342, Date: 12/20/01, Amount: $500.00
Check No.: 1377, Date: 02/22/02, Amount: $500.00
Check No.: 1379, Date: 03/01/02, Amount: $500.00
Check No.: 1408, Date: 09/08/02, Amount: $75.00
30. Respondent failed to comply with his Minimum Continuing Legal Education ("MCLE") requirements by January 31, 2003.
31. On May 23, 2003, the State Bar’s Office of Certification sent a letter to Respondent at his membership records address. The letter was entitled, "MCLE Non-Compliance 60-Day Notice" and informed Respondent that if he failed t9 provide proof of compliance with MCLE requirements by September 15, 2003, he would be enrolled as an inactive member of the State Bar and not be permitted to practice law until he complied with MCLE requirements. Respondent received the letter.
32. On July 31, 2003, the State Bar’s Office of Certification sent a letter to Respondent at his membership records address. The letter was entitled, "MCLE Non-Compliance Final Notice" and informed Respondent that if he failed to comply with MCLE requirements by September 15, 2003, he would be enrolled as an inactive member of the State Bar and not be permitted to practice law until he complied with MCLE requirements. Res received the letter.
33. Respondent failed to provide proof of compliance with MCLE requirements by September 15, 2003.
34. On September 16, 2003, Respondent was enrolled as an inactive member of the State Bar because of his non-compliance with MCLE requirements. Respondent remained enrolled as an inactive member of the State Bar until November 13, 2003, when he complied with MCLE requirements.. Between September 16, 2003 and November 16, 2003, Respondent knew he was not entitled to practice.
35. On September 22, 2003, the State Bar’s Office of Certification sent a letter to entitled, ~MCLE Non-Compliance Notice of Enrollment on Not Entitled Status" informing him that he had been enrolled on "not entitled" status effective September 16, 2003, and was not entitled to practice law because of his non-compliance with MCLE requirements..The letter was properly sent to Respondent at his State Bar membership records address. Respondent received this letter.
36. On September 23, 2003, while Respondent was not entitled to practice law, Respondent prepared and sent a letter to attorney Paul Smith ("Smith") wherein he discussed the strengths and weaknesses of Michelle’s case, the proposed settlement terms£ and his reasons why the case should be settled. The letter was dated September 23, 2003, signed by Respondent, and printed on letterhead which contained the language, "KENNETH KNOBLOCK ESQUIRE," "ATTORNEY AT LAW," and LAW OFFICES OF KENNETH KNOBLOCK."
37. On September 23, 2003, when Respondent sent the letter to Smith, Respondent knew he was not entitled to practice law and knowingly practiced law while he was not entitled to practice law.
38. At the time Respondent sent the letter to Smith, he misrepresented to Smith that he was entitled to practice law when he knew that he was not entitled to practice law.
39. At no time did Respondent inform San Miguel that he was not entitled to practice law effective September 16, 2003.
Case No. 05-O-03944
40. On April 19, 2002, Donald Washington ("Washington") was injured while in the course and scope of employment with Continental Airlines, Inc. ("Continental") when the vehicle he was driving collided with another vehicle that was towing an airplane. Starship Transport, LLC ("Starship") was the. owner and operator of the vehicle that collided with Washington’s vehicle.
41. On April 27, 2003, Washington employed Respondent to represent him in a worker’s compensation claim against Continental ("workers compensation case") and a third party claim against Starship ("third party case"). Respondent agreed to provide all of the necessary legal services in both cases on a contingency fee basis.
42. On April 17, 2003, Respondent filed the third party case on behalf of Washington in Orange County Superior Court entitled Washington v. Starship Transport, LLC, et al., case no. 03CC05741.
43. After filing the third party case, Respondent failed to perform any legal services of value on behalf Washington in the third party case.
44. On September 23, 2003, the court scheduled a Case Management Conference (“CMC") in the third party case for October 29, 2003. On September 23, 2003, the court served notice of the October 29, 2003 CMC to Respondent. Respondent received the notice.
45. On October 29, 2003, Respondent failed to appear at the CMC. As a result, the court scheduled an order to show cause hearing re dismissal for December 3, 2003 ("OSC re dismissal"). On October 3 l, 2003, the court served notice of the OSC re dismissal on Respondent. Respondent received the notice.
46. On December 3, 2003, Respondent failed to appear at the OSC re dismissal. As a result, the court dismissed the third party case. On December 5, 2003, the court served notice on Respondent that the court dismissed the third party case on December 3, 2003, as a result of Respondent’s failure to appear at the OSC re dismissal. Respondent received the notice.
47. At no time did Respondent file a motion to set aside the dismissal of the third party case or seek any other relief on behalf of Washington.
48. At no time did Respondent inform Washington that the third party case was dismissed by the court.
49. From late April 2004 to early December 2004, Washington left approximately 100 telephone messages with Respondent inquiring about the status of the third party case and requested that Respondent return the calls. Respondent received the messages. Respondent did not return the calls.
50. On December 6, 2004, Respondent sent a letter to Washington misrepresenting the status of the third party case. Respondent stated the he thought that there was a "significant chance" that Washington could be found to be primarily responsible for the accident and that the owner of the airplane ~would probably" tile a cross-complaint against him to recover the property damage to the airplane. Respondent also stated that the third party case was "dangerous" and could expose Washington to "legal liability." These statements were false because Washington could not be found liable in a case that had already been dismissed by the court, and Starship could not file a cross-complaint in a case that had been dismissed. Respondent also knowingly failed to disclose in this letter that the third party case had already been dismissed by the court.
51. At the time that he sent his December 6, 2004 letter to Washington, Respondent knew that his statements were false because he knew that the court had dismissed the third party case.
52. Thereafter, Washington again left several telephone messages for Respondent requesting the status of the third party case. Respondent received the messages. Respondent did not return the calls.
53. After failing to receive any response from Respondent, in or about early 2005, Washington went to the Orange County Superior Court to determine the status of the third party case. This is when Washington discovered for the first time that the court had dismissed the third party case on December 3, 2003, as a result of Respondent’s failure to appear in court.
54. In early 2005, Washington employed a new attorney, Robert Gibson ("Gibson"), to represent him in a malpractice claim against Respondent.
55. On June 14, 2005, Respondent sent a letter to Gibson offering to resolve the potential claim for malpractice by Washington by submitting the matter to a binding arbitration upon the condition that Washington would not file a complaint with the State Bar.
56. At no time did Respondent inform Washington that Respondent was not entitled to practice law effective September 16, 2003.
Case No. 05-O-04161
57. On January 9, 2003, Louis Del Vecchio ("Del Vecchio") employed Respondent to represent Del Vecchio as trustee of the Glenn C. Jones Living Trust ("Jones Trust") and on behalf of the Jones Trust to evict tenants from a house that was owned by the Jones Trust ("unlawful detainer action").
58. On September 16, 2003, while Respondent was not entitled to practice law, Respondent spoke with Del Vecchio on the telephone and advised him about the status and the legal process of the unlawful detainer action, giving Del Vecchio legal advice.
59. On October 20, 2003, while Respondent was not entitled to practice law, Respondent spoke with Del Vecchio and advised him about the status of the unlawful detainer action, giving Del Vecchio legal advice.
60. On October 23, 2003, while Respondent was not entitled to practice law, Respondent prepared and mailed a letter to Del Vecchio about the status of the unlawful detainer action, giving Del Vecchio legal advice.
61. On October 23, 2003, while Respondent was not entitled to practice law, Respondent spoke with Del Vecchio on the telephone about the status of the unlawful detainer action, giving Del Vecchio legal advice. .
62. On September 9, 2005, Respondent filed with the court a petition for attorney fees seeking to be paid for the attorney services that he provided in the unlawful detainer action while he was not entitled to practice law.
63. On September 16, 2003, October 20, 2003, and October 23, 2003, when Respondent communicated by telephone and correspondence with Del Vecchio about the status of the unlawful detainer action, Respondent knew that he was not entitled to practice law.
64. When Respondent signed and filed the petition for attorney fees seeking to be paid for attorney services that he provided while he was not entitled to practice law, he misrepresented to the court that he was entitled to practice law at the time that he provided the attorney services when he knew that he was not entitled to practice law at that time.
65. At no time did Respondent inform Del Vecchio that Respondent was not entitled to
practice law effective September 16, 2003.
66. On September 14, 2005, the State Bar opened an investigation, case no. 05-O-04161, pursuant to a complaint filed by Del Vecchio ("Del Vecchio complaint").
67. On September 26, 2005 and April 17, 2006, a State Bar Investigator wrote to Respondent regarding the Del Vecchio complaint.
68. Both the September 26, 2005 and April 17, 2006 letters were placed in sealed envelopes addressed to Respondent at his State Bar of California membership records address. The letters were mailed by first class mail, postage prepaid, by depositing for collection, by the United States Postal Service in the ordinary course of business on or about the date on each letter. The United States Postal Service did not return the investigator’s letters as undeliverable or for any other reason. Respondent received these letters.
69. The investigator’s letters requested that Respondent respond in writing to specified allegations of misconduct being investigated by the State Bar in the Del Vecchio complaint.
70. At no time did Respondent respond to the investigator’s letters or otherwise communicate with the investigator.
D. STIPULATION AS TO CULPABILITY
Case No. 05-O-00308
1. Respondent admits that by not maintaining $23,187.45 on behalf of San Miguel in a client trust account between March 27, 2002 and March 19, 2003, Respondent failed to maintain client funds in trust, in wilful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 4-100(A).
2. Respondent admits that by misappropriating $23,187.45 that he was required to maintain in trust for San Miguel, Respondent committed an act involving moral turpitude, dishonesty or corruption, in wilful violation of Business and Professions Code, section 6106.
3. Respondent admits that by not maintaining $14,312.55 from December 1, 2003, through October 2004, and $5,315.60 from October 29, 2004, through December 31, 2004, on behalf of San Miguel in a client trust account, Respondent failed to maintain client funds, in trust, in wilful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 4-100(a).
4. Respondent admits that by misappropriating $3,041.23 that Respondent received on behalf of San Miguel for reimbursement of attorney fees and costs, Respondent committed an act involving moral turpitude, dishonesty or corruption, in wilful violation of Business and Professions Code, section 6106.
5. Respondent admits that by issuing checks from his CTA to pay personal and business expenses, Respondent misused his client trust account, in wilful violation of rule 4- 100(A), Rules of Professional Conduct.
6. Respondent admits that by preparing and sending the September 23, 2003 letter when he was not entitled to practice law, Respondent held himself out as entitled to practice law and actually practiced law when he was not entitled to do so, in wilful violation of Business and Professions Code sections 6125 and 6126, and thereby failed to support the laws of the State of California in violation of Business and Professions Code, section 6068(a).
7. Respondent admits that by practicing law when Respondent knew that he was not entitled to do so, Respondent committed an act or acts involving moral turpitude, dishonesty or corruption, in wilful violation of Business and Professions Code section 6106.
8. Respondent admits that by misrepresenting to Smith that he was entitled to practice law when he knew that he was not entitled to practice law, Respondent committed acts involving moral turpitude, dishonesty or corruption, in wilful violation of Business and. Professions Code, section 6106.
9. Respondent admits that by failing to inform San Miguel that he was not entitled to practice law effective September 16, 2003, Respondent wilfully failed to keep a client reasonably informed of significant developments in a matter in which Respondent had agreed to provide legal services, in wilful violation of Business and Professions Code, section 6068(m).
Case No. 05-O-03944
10. Respondent admits that by failing to appear in court on October 29, 2003, and December 3, 2003, failing to perform any legal services of value after filing the third party case, allowing the third party case to be dismissed, and failing to file a motion to set aside the dismissal of the third party case or seek any other relief, Respondent recklessly, or repeatedly failed to perform legal services with competence, in wilful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-110(A).
11. Respondent admits that by failing to inform Washington that the third party case was dismissed by the court, Respondent wilfully failed to keep a client reasonably informed of significant developments in a matter in which Respondent had agreed to provide legal services, in wilful violation of Business and Professions Code, section 6068(m).
12. Respondent admits that by sending a letter to Washington containing statements Respondent knew were not true, and by failing to inform him that the third party case had been dismissed by the court, Respondent committed acts involving moral turpitude, dishonesty or corruption, in wilful violation of Business and Professions Code, section 6106.
13. Respondent admits that by failing to respond to Washington’s telephone calls, Respondent failed to respond to a client’s reasonable status inquiries in wilful violation of Business and Professions Code, section 6068(m).
14. Respondent admits that by offering to resolve a potential claim for malpractice by submitting the matter to a binding arbitration upon the condition that Washington would not file a complaint with the State Bar, Respondent sought an agreement that Respondent’s professional misconduct or the terms of a settlement of a claim for professional misconduct would not be reported to the disciplinary agency, in wilful violation of Business and Professions Code, section 6090.5(a)(1).
15. Respondent admits that by failing to inform Washington that Respondent was not entitled to practice law effective September 16, 2003, Respondent wilfully failed to keep. a client reasonably informed of significant developments in a matter in which Respondent had agreed to provide legal services, in wilful violation of Business and Professions Code, section 6068(m).
Case No. 05-O-04161
16. Respondent admits that by practicing law when he was not entitled to practice law, Respondent held himself out as entitled to practice law and actually practiced law when he was not entitled to do so, in wilful violation of Business and Professions Code sections 6125 and 6126, and thereby failed to support the laws of the State of California in violation of Business and Professions Code, section 6068(a).
17. Respondent admits that by communicating with Del Vecchio and advising him about the status of the unlawful detainer action when Respondent knew that he was not entitled to practice law, Respondent committed an act or acts involving moral turpitude, dishonesty or corruption, in wilful violation of Business and Professions Code section 6106.
18. Respondent admits that by misrepresenting to the court that he was entitled to practice law when he knew that he was not entitled to practice law, Respondent committed acts involving moral turpitude, dishonesty or corruption, in wilful violation of Business and Professions Code, section 6106.
19. Respondent admits that by failing to inform Del Vecchio that Respondent was not entitled to practice law effective September 16, 2003, Respondent wilfully failed to keep a client reasonably informed of significant developments in a matter in which Respondent had agreed to provide legal services, in wilful violation of Business and Professions Code, section 6068(m).
20. Respondent admits that by not providing a written response to the investigators letters regarding the allegations in the Del Vecchio complaint or otherwise cooperating in the investigation of the Del Vecchio complaint, Respondent failed to cooperate in a disciplinary investigation in wilful violation of Business and Professions Code, section 60680).
Respectfully submitted,
THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA OFFICE OF THE CHIEF TRIAL COUNSEL
Dated: February 4, 2009
Signed By:
Christine Souhrada
Deputy Trial Counsel
Dated: February 4, 2009
Signed By:
Kenneth Knoblock
Respondent
Case Number(s): 05-O-00308-RAH
In the Matter of: Kenneth E. Knoblack
By their signatures below, the parties and their counsel, as applicable, signify their agreement with each of the recitation and each of the terms and conditions of this Stipulation Re Facts, Conclusions of Law and Disposition.
Signed by:
Respondent: Kenneth E. Knoblock
Date: February 16, 2011
Respondent’s Counsel:
Date:
Deputy Trial Counsel: Charles T. Calix
Date: February 23, 2011
Case Number(s): 05-O-00308-RAH
In the Matter of: Kenneth E. Knoblock
Finding the stipulation to be fair to the parties and that it adequately protects the public, IT IS ORDERED that the requested dismissal of counts/charges, if any is GRANTED without prejudice, and:
<<not>> checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED and the DISCIPLINE RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED AS MODIFIED as set forth below, and the DISCIPLINE IS RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
checked. All Hearing dates are vacated. 1.
1. On page 1 of the stipulation, in the middle of the page, the designation "Submitted to: Settlement Judge "is deleted, and the designation "Submitted to: Assigned Judge" is substituted in its place.
2. On page 5 of the stipulation, in paragraph E(2) (Restitution), in the last sentence, the word "days" is deleted so that the last sentence now reads: "Respondent must pay the above restitution and furnish satisfactory proof of payment to the State Bar’s Office of Probation in Los Angeles no later than five (5) years from the effective date of the Supreme Court order in this case."
The parties are bound by the stipulation as approved unless: 1) a motion to withdraw or modify the stipulation, filed within 15 days after service of this order, is granted; or 2) this court modifies or further modifies the approved stipulation. (See rule 5.58 (E) & (F), Rules of Procedure.) The effective date of this disposition is the effective date of the Supreme Court order herein, normally 30 days after the file date. (See rule 9.18(a), California Rules of Court.)
Respondent is ordered transferred to involuntary inactive status pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 6007, subdivision (c)(4). Respondent’s inactive enrollment will be effective three (3) calendar days after this order is served by mail and will terminate upon the effective date of the Supreme Court’s order imposing discipline herein, or as provided for by rule 5.111(D)(2) or the Rules of Procedure of the State Bar of California, or as otherwise ordered by the Supreme Court pursuant to its plenary jurisdiction.
Signed by:
Judge of the State Bar Court: Richard A. Honn
Date: March 3, 2011
[Rules Proc. of State Bar; Rule 5.27(B); Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a(4)]
I am a Case Administrator of the State Bar Court of California. I am over the age of eighteen and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to standard court practice, in the City and County of Los Angeles, on March 3, 2011, I deposited a true copy of the following document(s):
STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION AND ORDER APPROVING; ORDER OF INVOLUNTARY INACTIVE ENROLLMENT
in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:
checked. by first-class mail, with postage thereon fully prepaid, through the United States Postal Service at Los Angeles, California, addressed as follows:
KENNETH KNOB ESQ
395 BEAUMONT GLN APT 158
ESCONDIDO, CA 92026
checked. by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of California addressed as follows:
Charles T. Calix, Enforcement, Los Angeles
I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in Los Angeles, California, on March 3, 2011.
Signed by:
Julieta E. Gonzales
Case Administrator
State Bar Court