Case Number(s): 05-O-04340
In the Matter of: Olga Alexandra Karasik, Bar # 169636, A Member of the State Bar of California, (Respondent).
Counsel For The State Bar: Charles T. Calix, Bar #146853
Counsel for Respondent: Arthur L. Margolis, Bar #57703
Submitted to: Settlement Judge – State Bar Court Clerk’s Office Los Angeles.
Filed: January 6, 2010.
<<not>> checked. PREVIOUS STIPULATION REJECTED
Note: All information required by this form and any additional information which cannot be provided in the space provided, must be set forth in an attachment to this stipulation under specific headings, e.g., "Facts," "Dismissals," "Conclusions of Law," "Supporting Authority," etc.
1. Respondent is a member of the State Bar of California, admitted January 10, 1994.
2. The parties agree to be bound by the factual stipulations contained herein even if conclusions of law or disposition are rejected or changed by the Supreme Court.
3. All investigations or proceedings listed by case number in the caption of this stipulation are entirely resolved by this stipulation and are deemed consolidated. Dismissed charge(s)/count(s) are listed under "Dismissals." The stipulation consists of 10 pages, not including the order.
4. A statement of acts or omissions acknowledged by Respondent as cause or causes for discipline is included under "Facts."
5. Conclusions of law, drawn from and specifically referring to the facts are also included under "Conclusions of Law".
6. The parties must include supporting authority for the recommended level of discipline under the heading "Supporting Authority."
7. No more than 30 days prior to the filing of this stipulation, Respondent has been advised in writing of any pending investigation/proceeding not resolved by this stipulation, except for criminal investigations.
8. Payment of Disciplinary Costs-Respondent acknowledges the provisions of Bus. & Prof. Code §§6086.10 & 6140.7. (Check one option only):
<<not>> checked. Costs are added to membership fee for calendar year following effective date of discipline.
checked. Costs are to be paid in equal amounts prior to February 1 for the following membership years: two (2) billing cycles following the effective date of the Supreme Court order. (Hardship, special circumstances or other good cause per rule 5.132, Rules of Procedure)
<<not>> checked. Costs are waived in part as set forth in a separate attachment entitled "Partial Waiver of Costs".
<<not>> checked. Costs are entirely waived.
Case Number(s): 05-O-04340
In the Matter of: Olga Alexandra Karasik
Business and Professions Code § 6085.5 Disciplinary Charges; Pleas to Allegations
There are three kinds of pleas to the allegations of a notice of disciplinary charges or other pleading which initiates a disciplinary proceeding against a member:
(a) Admission of culpability.
(b) Denial of culpability.
(c) Nolo contendere, subject to the approval of the State Bar Court. The court shall ascertain whether the member completely understands that a plea of nolo contendere shall be considered the same as an admission of culpability and that, upon a plea of nolo contendere, the court shall find the member culpable. The legal effect of such a plea shall be the same as that of an admission of culpability for all purposes, except that the plea and any admissions required by the count during any inquiry it makes as to the voluntariness of, or the factual basis for, the pleas, may not be used against the member as an admission in any civil suit based upon or growing out of the act upon which the disciplinary proceeding is based. (Added by Stats. 1996 ch. 1104.)(emphasis supplied)
RULE 133, Rules of Procedure of the State Bar of California STIPULATION AS TO FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION
(a) A proposed stipulation as to facts, conclusions of law, and disposition shall set forth each of the following:…
(5) a statement that respondent either
(i) admits the facts set forth in the stipulation are true and that he or she is culpable of violations of the specified statutes and/or Rules of Professional Conduct or
(ii) pleads halo contendere to those facts and violations. If the respondent pleads nolo contendere, the stipulation shall include each of the following:
(a) an acknowledgment that the respondent completely understands that the plea of nolo contendere shall be considered the same as an admission of the stipulated facts and of his or her culpability of the statutes and/or Rules of Professional Conduct specified in the stipulation; and
(b) if requested by the Court, a statement by the deputy trial counsel that the factual stipulations are supported by evidence obtained in the Slate Bar investigation of the matter. (emphasis supplied)
I, the Respondent in this matter, have read the applicable provisions of Business and Professions Code section 6085.5 and rule 133(a)(5)of the Rules of Procedure of the State Bar. I plead nolo contendere to the charges set forth in this stipulation and I completely understand that my plea will be considered the same as an admission of culpability except as stated in Business and Professions Code section 6085.5(c).
Signed by:
Respondent: Olga Karasik
Date: December 8, 2009
IN THE MATTER OF: OLGA ALEXANDRA KARASIK, State Bar No. 169636
STATE BAR COURT CASE NUMBER: 05-O-04340
Olga Alexandra Karasik ("Respondent") pleads nolo contendere to the following facts and violations. Respondent completely understands that the plea for nolo contendere shall be considered the same as an admission of the stipulated facts and of his or her culpability of the statutes and/or Rules of Professional Conduct specified herein, except as stated in the attached and signed nolo contendere plea form.
FACTS.
1. Prior to January 2004, Mark Boothby ("Boothby") and Frank Parker ("Parker") entered into a partnership agreement to develop property for investment purposes in Lancaster, California, for their mutual profit, and Boothby incorporated a limited liability company in Nevada titled "Fresh Start Developments, LLC" ("Fresh Start"). Parker purchased property in Lancaster (the "Lancaster Property") and paid all of the expenses associated with the development of the Lancaster Property. The title to the Lancaster Property was held in Parker’s name. Towards the end of 2003, Boothby and Parker entered into negotiations with a general contractor, Dan Pryor ("Pryor"), to develop a condominium project on the Lancaster Property.
2. On or about January 14, 2004, Boothby, Parker and Fresh Start retained Respondent, at that time an associate attorney with Wasserman, Comden & Casselman, LLP, to represent Boothby, Parker, and Fresh Start in negotiations with Pryor in connection with the land development agreement and to formalize the agreement with Pryor.
3. Between on or about January 20, 2004, and on or about February 13, 2004, Pryor informed Respondent that he would not enter into the land development agreement with Fresh Start, because Fresh Start did not own the Lancaster property, and that he would only enter into an agreement with Parker.
4. On or before February 13, 2005, Respondent prepared a land development agreement for Parker to enter into with Pryor.
5. On or about February 13, 2004, Parker and Pryor signed the land development agreement.
6. At or about the same time, a dispute arose between Parker and Boothby resulting in Parker’s termination of his partnership agreement with Boothby to develop property for investment purposes.
7. On or about February 22, 2004, Boothby informed Respondent that he had a dispute with Parker in connection with the land development agreement.
8. On or about March 5, 2004, Respondent prepared and mailed a letter to Boothby and Parker that stated that due to the conflict between the parties she would not be able to continue representing any of them in the land development agreement. At about the same time or shortly thereafter Boothby retained attorney Kapp to represent his interests.
9. In or about May or June 2004, Parker, represented by another attorney, and Pryor entered into negotiations regarding modifications of the land development agreement, which included Parker’s sale of the Lancaster Property by to Pryor.
10. In or about the end of June 2004, Pryor employed Respondent to review documents for Pryor in connection with modification of the land development agreement with Parker, which included Parker’s sale of the Lancaster Property to Pryor.
11. In or about the beginning of July 2004, Respondent reviewed documents for Pryor to modify the land development agreement, which included documents reflecting Parker’s sale of the Lancaster Property to Pryor.
12. Respondent did not inform Boothby that she was going to represent Pryor in modification of Pryor’s land development agreement with Parker, which included the sale of the Lancaster Property from Parker to Pryor, and/or obtain Boothby’s informed written consent to permit her to represent Pryor in matters concerning the land development agreement and/or the Lancaster Property.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
13. By representing Pryor in purchasing the Lancaster Property from Parker after she had declared a conflict in representing Boothby and Parker in their contract negotiations with Pryor concerning that property, Respondent accepted employment adverse to a former client (Boothby) where, by reason of the representation of the client or former client, Respondent had accepted representation of more than one client in a matter in which the interests of the clients actually conflicted without the informed written consent of each client in willful rule 3-310(E).
PENDING PROCEEDINGS.
The disclosure date referred to, on page 2, paragraph A(7), was November 23, 2009.
AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING DISCIPLINE.
Standard 1.3 of the "Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct" ("Standard") provides guidance as to the imposition of discipline and interpretation of specific Standards. It states that the primary purpose of discipline is the protection of the public, the courts and the legal profession.
Standard 2.10 provides that culpability of a willful violation of any Rule of Professional Conduct not specified in these standards shall result in reproval or suspension according to the gravity of the offense or the harm, if any, to the victim, with due regard to the purposes of imposing discipline set forth in standard 1.3.
In In re Morse (1995) 11 Cal .4th 184, 206, the Supreme Court stated the purpose of disciplinary proceedings are the protection of the public, the courts, and the legal profession, the maintenance of high professional standards by attorneys, and the preservation of public confidence in the legal profession.
The Standards authorize reproval or suspension in this matter. Respondent’s misconduct involved a single client matter and does not establish a pattern. She has pied nolo contendere that she failed to obtain informed written consent of each of her clients and thereby cooperated with the State Bar in entering into this Stipulation. Given the extent of the misconduct and the degree of harm to the clients, the appropriate level of discipline is a suspension of two (2) years, stayed upon the condition that she be placed on probation for three (3) years.
SIGNATURE OF THE PARTIES
Case Number(s): 05-O-04340
In the Matter of: Olga Alexandra Karasik
By their signatures below, the parties and their counsel, as applicable, signify their agreement with each of the recitation and each of the terms and conditions of this Stipulation Re Facts, Conclusions of Law and Disposition.
Signed by:
Respondent: Olga Alexandra Karasik
Date: December 8, 2009
Respondent’s Counsel: Arthur Margolis
Date: December 8, 2009
Deputy Trial Counsel: Charles T. Calix
Date: December 8, 2009
Case Number(s): 05-O-04340
In the Matter of: Olga Alexandra Karasik
Finding the stipulation to be fair to the parties and that it adequately protects the public, IT IS ORDERED that the requested dismissal of counts/charges, if any, is GRANTED without prejudice, and:
checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED and the DISCIPLINE RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
<<not>> checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED AS MODIFIED as set forth below, and the DISCIPLINE IS RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
<<not>> checked. All Hearing dates are vacated.
The parties are bound by the stipulation as approved unless: 1) a motion to withdraw or modify the stipulation, filed within 15 days after service of this order, is granted; or 2) this court modifies or further modifies the approved stipulation. (See rule 135 (b), Rules of Procedure.) The effective date of this disposition is the effective date of the Supreme Court order herein, normally 30 days after the file date. (See rule 9.18(a), California Rules of Court.)
Signed by:
Judge of the State Bar Court: Richard A. Honn
Date: January 5, 2010
[Rules Proc. of State Bar; Rule 5.27(B); Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a(4)]
I am a Case Administrator of the State Bar Court of California. I am over the age of eighteen and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to standard court practice, in the City and
County of Los Angeles, on January 6, 2010, I deposited a true copy of the following document(s):
STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION AND ORDER APPROVING
in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:
checked. by first-class mail, with postage thereon fully prepaid, through the United States Postal Service at Los Angeles, California, addressed as follows:
ARTHUR L. MARGOLIS ESQ
MARGOLIS & MARGOLIS LLP
2000 RIVERSIDE DR
LOS ANGELES, CA 90039
checked. by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of California addressed as follows:
Charles T. Calix, Enforcement, Los Angeles
I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in Los Angeles, California, on January 6, 2010.
Signed by:
Julieta E. Gonzales
Case Administrator
State Bar Court