Case Number(s): 06-O-15480 and 07-H-13336
In the Matter of: Alex Justin Ranciglio, Bar # 162222, A Member of the State Bar of California, (Respondent).
Counsel For The State Bar: Agustin Hernandez, Deputy Trial Counsel
1149 South Hill Street
Los Angeles, CA 90015-2299
(213) 765-1713
Bar # 161625
Counsel for Respondent: David Cameron Carr,
530 B Street, Suite 1410
San Diego, CA 92101
(619) 696-0526
Bar # 124510
Submitted to: Settlement Judge at State Bar Court Clerk’s Office Los Angeles
<<not>> checked. PREVIOUS STIPULATION REJECTED
Note: All information required by this form and any additional information which cannot be provided in the space provided, must be set forth in an attachment to this stipulation under specific headings, e.g., "Facts," "Dismissals," "Conclusions of Law," "Supporting Authority," etc.
1. Respondent is a member of the State Bar of California, admitted December 14, 1992.
2. The parties agree to be bound by the factual stipulations contained herein even if conclusions of law or disposition are rejected or changed by the Supreme Court.
3. All investigations or proceedings listed by case number in the caption of this stipulation are entirely resolved by this stipulation and are deemed consolidated. Dismissed charge(s)/count(s) are listed under "Dismissals." The stipulation consists of 13 pages, not including the order.
4. A statement of acts or omissions acknowledged by Respondent as cause or causes for discipline is included under "Facts."
5. Conclusions of law, drawn from and specifically referring to the facts are also included under "Conclusions of Law".
6. The parties must include supporting authority for the recommended level of discipline under the heading "Supporting Authority."
7. No more than 30 days prior to the filing of this stipulation, Respondent has been advised in writing of any pending investigation/proceeding not resolved by this stipulation, except for criminal investigations.
8. Payment of Disciplinary Costs-Respondent acknowledges the provisions of Bus. & Prof. Code §§6086.10 & 6140.7. (Check one option only):
<<not>> checked. Until costs are paid in full, Respondent will remain actually suspended from the practice of law unless relief is obtained per rule 5.130, Rules of Procedure.
checked. Costs are to be paid in equal amounts prior to February 1 for the following membership years: 2012, 2013 and 2014. (Hardship, special circumstances or other good cause per rule 5.132, Rules of Procedure.) If Respondent fails to pay any installment as described above, or as may be modified by the State Bar Court, the remaining balance is due and payable immediately.
<<not>> checked. Costs are waived in part as set forth in a separate attachment entitled "Partial Waiver of Costs".
<<not>> checked. Costs are entirely waived.
At the time of the misconduct in this stipulation, Respondent had been suffering from a long history of depression which contributed to the misconduct. The depression intensified upon retiring from the military in 1992 and not being able to find employment as an attorney. (Respondent was admitted to the practice of law in California in 1992, but was admitted to practice in the State of Missouri in 1969. From 1969 through 1992, Respondent served in the United States Air force as a judge advocate). In 1997, Respondent’s marriage of 28 years ended in divorce. In 1998, Respondent was laid off from his job as an attorney. Unable to find other employment as an attorney, Respondent began working as a substitute teacher. Respondent has sought and received treatment for his depression. Respondent has been participating in the Lawyer Assistance Program since October 2008.
Due to his depression, Respondent could not bring himself open mail from the State Bar and could not timely comply with the terms and conditions of his reproval. Eventually, Respondent did attend and pass Ethics School on December 6, 2007, and filed all of his missing Quarterly Reports in 2008. Respondent also took the MPRE on November 8, 2008, but did not receive a passing score.
IN THE MATTER OF: ALEX JUSTIN RANCIGLIO
CASE NUMBER: 06-O-15480 & 07-H-13336
WAIVER OF VARIANCE BETWEEN NOTICE OF DISCIPLINARY CHARGES AND STIPULATED FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The parties waive any variance between the Notices of Disciplinary Charges filed on May 28, 2008 (07-H13336) and August 13, 2010 (06-0-15480), and the facts and/or conclusions of law contained in this stipulation. Additionally, the parties waive the issuance of an amended Notice of Disciplinary Charges. The parties further waive the right to the filing of a Notice of Disciplinary Charges and to a formal hearing on any charge not included in the pending Notices of Disciplinary Charges.
FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
Respondent admits that the following facts are true and that he is culpable of violations of the specified statutes and/or Rules of Professional Conduct.
Case No. 07-H-13336 (Violation of Public Reproval Matter):
INCORPORATION OF PRIOR STIPULATION
On June 11, 2009, the parties filed with the State Bar Court in the Alternative Discipline Program ("ADP") a Stipulation re Facts and Conclusions of Law pertaining to Case No. 07-H-13336 ("Prior Stipulation"). Respondent was released from ADP proceedings under rule 5.386, Rules of Procedure of the State Bar. The facts and conclusions of law pursuant to the Prior Stipulation, which remain binding, are incorporated and
fully set forth herein.
FACTS:
1. On or about June 16, 2006, Respondent entered into a Stipulation re Facts, Conclusions of Law and Disposition ("Stipulation") with the State Bar of California in Case No. 04-0-14783.
2. On or about July 31, 2006 the Hearing Department of the State Bar Court filed an Order approving the Stipulation and imposing on Respondent a Public Reproval with conditions ("Order").
3. On or about July 31, 2006, the State Bar Court properly served the Order on Respondent at his official State Bar Membership Records address at P.O. Box 1316, Attn: Legal Department, San Bernardino, CA 92402-1316. Respondent received the Order.
4. The Order and Public Reproval became effective on or about August 21, 2006.
5. Pursuant to the Order, Respondent was required to comply with certain terms and conditions attached to the Public Reproval for the period of two (2) years from the effective date of the Order, including the following:
a) Within thirty (30) days from the effective date of discipline, Respondent was required to contact the Office of Probation and schedule a meeting with Respondent’s assigned probation deputy to discuss the terms and conditions of his probation;
b) Respondent was required to submit written quarterly reports to the Office of Probation no later than October 10, 2006, January 10, 2007, April 10, 2007, July 10, 2007, October 10, 2007, January 10, 2008, April 10, 2008, and July 10, 2008, and a final quarterly report due no later than August 21, 2008, during the condition period of the Public Reproval;
c) Within one (1) year of the effective date of the Order, Respondent was required to provide to the Office of Probation satisfactory proof of attendance of Ethics School and passage of the test given at the end of that session; and
d) Within one (1) year of the effective date of the Order, Respondent was required to provide proof of passage of the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination ("MPRE") to the Office of Probation.
e) On or about August 16, 2006, a Probation Deputy in the State Bar’s Office of Probation mailed a letter to Respondent, reminding him of the terms of his Public Reproval which became effective August 21, 2006. The letter was properly addressed and mailed to Respondent at his official State Bar Membership Records address at P.O. Box 1316, Attn: Legal Department, San Bernardino, CA 92402-1316. The letter was not returned by the U.S. Postal Service as undeliverable, or for any other reason. Respondent received the letter.
6. During the two years from the effective date of the Court Order of the Public Reproval imposed in this matter, Respondent did not comply with the terms and conditions attached to it, to wit: Respondent did not contact any Probation Deputy or anyone else in the Office of Probation to schedule a meeting with his assigned Probation Deputy or anyone else in the Office of Probation to discuss the terms and conditions of his probation; did not submit the quarterly reports to the Office of Probation due no later than October 10, 2006, January 10, 2007, April 10, 2007, July 10, 2007, October 10, 2007, January 10, 2008, and April 10, 2008 ; did not submit to the Office of Probation proof of attendance and successful completion of Ethics School; and did not submit to the Office of Probation proof of passage of the MPRE.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
7. By not contacting anyone at the Office of Probation to schedule a meeting to discuss the terms and conditions of his probation; by not submitting timely to the Office of Probation any quarterly reports; by not submitting timely to the Office of Probation proof of attendance and successful completion of the Ethics School; and by not submitting timely to the Office of Probation proof of passage of the MPRE, Respondent
failed to comply with all conditions attached to his disciplinary probation, in willful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 1-110.
Case No. 06-O-15480 (Complainant: Arlene Hughes)
FACTS:
8. Arlene Rae Hughes ("Arlene") and A.R. Hughes (a.k.a. Frank Maher, hereinafter "Hughes") were together from 1979 through 2006 but were never married.
9. On January 1, 1983, Hughes and Arlene signed a Partnership Agreement and became partners in a business named "Panamex."
10. From 1991 through 2006 Respondent provided legal services to Hughes, Arlene, and Panamex.
11. In early 2004, Arlene informed Hughes that she wanted to dissolve the partnership because she did not want to be responsible for Panamex’s debt and tax liabilities. At that time, neither Arlene nor Hughes took any affirmative steps to formally dissolve the partnership. However, Hughes remained in Oregon and solely operated Panamex, and Arlene moved to Southern California and was no longer involved with Panamex.
12. On January 5, 2006, Hughes was admitted to Loma Linda Medical Center due to a diagnosis of terminal cancer. Hughes remained in the hospital from January 5, 2006, until his death on February 6, 2006.
13. On January 10, 2006, Respondent informed Arlene that he was buying Panamex from Hughes and that she needed to sign a Notice of Dissolution to formally dissolve Panamex. Arlene informed Respondent that she thought the partnership had already been dissolved. Respondent informed Arlene that Panamex had not been formally dissolved.
14. On January 11, 2006, Respondent presented a Notice of Dissolution of Panamex to Arlene for her signature. Arlene signed the Notice of Dissolution on this date.
15. On January 25, 2006, Hughes signed a Bill of Sale that transferred Hughes’ interest in Panamex and its assets to Respondent (Bill of Sale).
16. The terms of the acquisition contained in the Bill of Sale were not fair and reasonable to Hughes and were not fully disclosed and transmitted in writing in a manner that should have been reasonably understood by Hughes. The Bill of Sale did not specify how much Panamex and its assets were worth. The consideration given by Respondent to Hughes for Panamex was in lieu of payment for legal services rendered by Respondent to Hughes and Panamex throughout many years. The Bill of Sale did not specify the value of Respondent’s legal services.
17. At the time that Respondent obtained Hughes’ signature on the Bill of Sale, Respondent did not advise Hughes in writing that he could to seek the advice from an independent lawyer of his choice and did not give him a reasonable opportunity to seek that advice.
18. Respondent did not inform Arlene of the value of Panamex and its assets or its liabilities. Respondent did not give anything of value to Arlene in return for her signature on the Notice of Dissolution. Arlene was the sole beneficiary under Hughes’ will, and under the will, she was potentially entitled to receive Panamex and its assets and liabilities. Hughes’ estate has not been probated and it is unknown if there will be any remaining assets after satisfying all of Panamex’s debt and tax liabilities. However, in 2004, Arlene did inform Hughes that she wanted to dissolve the partnership because she did not want to be responsible for any of Panamex’s debt and tax liabilities. Up until January 10, 2006, Arlene believed that the partnership had been dissolved.
19. At the time that Respondent obtained Arlene’s signature on the Notice of Dissolution, Respondent did not advise Arlene in writing that she could to seek the advice from an independent lawyer of her choice and did not give her a reasonable opportunity to seek that advice.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
20. By knowingly acquiring an ownership interest in Panamex when the terms of the acquisition were not fair and reasonable to Hughes and were not fully disclosed to him in writing in a manner that could have been reasonably understood by him; and by failing to advise Hughes in writing that he may seek the advice from an independent lawyer of his choice and not giving him a reasonable opportunity to seek that advice,
Respondent improperly acquired an interest adverse to a client, in willful violation of Rule 3-300, Rules of Professional Conduct.
21. By entering into a business transaction with Arlene and not fully disclosing to her in writing the terms of the transaction in a manner that could have been reasonably understood by her; and by failing to advise Arlene in writing that she may seek the advice from an independent lawyer of her choice and not giving her a reasonable opportunity to seek that advice, Respondent improperly entered into a business transaction with a client, in willful violation of Rule 3-300, Rules of Professional Conduct.
PENDING PROCEEDINGS.
The disclosure date referred to, on page 2, paragraph A(7), was June 16, 2011.
AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING DISCIPLINE.
Standards
Standard 1.3, Title IV, Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct, provides that the primary purposes of the disciplinary system are: "the protection of the public, the courts and the legal profession; the maintenance of high professional standards by attorneys and the preservation of public confidence in the legal profession."
Standard 1.7(a) provides that if a member has a prior imposition of discipline, "the degree of discipline imposed in the current proceeding shall be greater than that imposed in the prior proceeding unless the prior discipline imposed was so remote in time to the current proceeding and the offense for which it was imposed was so minimal in severity that imposing greater discipline in the current proceeding would be
manifestly unjust."
Standard 1.6(a) states that "[i]f two or more acts of professional misconduct are found or acknowledged in a single disciplinary proceeding, and different sanctions are prescribed by these standards for said acts, the sanction imposed shall be the more or most severe of the different applicable sanctions."
Standard 2.8 provides that Respondent’s violation of rule 3-300, Rules of Professional Conduct shall result in suspension "unless the extent of the member’s misconduct and the harm to the client are minimal, in which case, the degree of discipline shall be reproval."
Standard 2.9 provides that a violation of rule 1-110, Rules of Professional Conduct, shall result in suspension.
Case Law
The Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of the standards and has held that great weight should be given to the application of the standards in determining the appropriate level of discipline. (In re Silverton (2005) 36 Cal. 4th 81 .) The standards must be followed unless there is a compelling reason justifying a deviation from the standards. (In the Matter of Bouyer (Review Dept. 1991) 1 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 404.) The Supreme Court has held that unless it has "grave doubts as to the propriety of the recommended discipline," it will uphold the application of the standards. In re Silverton, supra, 36 Cal. 4th at p. 91-92.
The Supreme Court imposed discipline consisting of a one-year stayed suspension with 60 days of actual suspension and one year of probation for violating the terms and conditions of a prior discipline. The respondent failed to take and pass the MPRE within the required time. Conroy actually defaulted in his matter and made no showing of an inability to comply with his probationary condition. In aggravation, the Court considered that Conroy had one prior imposition of discipline, failed to participate in the disciplinary proceedings, and demonstrated a lack of understanding of the gravity of his misconduct. (Conroy v. State Bar (1990) 51 Cal.3d 799.)
In this case, Ranciglio failed to comply with more than one condition of probation, but Ranciglio was suffering from depression at the time and has participated in these proceedings. Conroy defaulted in his proceedings and made no showing of an inability to comply with his probationary condition.
The Review Department imposed discipline consisting of a one-year stayed suspension with 60 days of actual suspension and two years of probation when an attorney acquired an interest adverse interest to his clients (and committed additional misconduct). Fonte drafted a trust for his clients and named himself the
successor trustee. Pursuant to the trust, Fonte could borrow money from the trust without any security. Fonte failed to adequately disclose the import of this provision to his clients, and failed to advise them in writing that they could seek advice from independent counsel or give them the opportunity to do so. In another matter, Fonte represented clients with adverse interests. Fonte failed to advise them of the conflicts of interest arising from his representation and failed to obtain their written consent to his representation. Fonte also failed to provide an accounting. In mitigation, Fonte had no record of prior discipline in 25 years of practice and had extensive public service. In aggravation, the court considered that Fonte was overreaching when he removed $2,500 from one of the client’s funds while he had a conflict of interest; tried to induce the clients to withdraw their State Bar complaints; misled the probate court; lacked candor; committed multiple acts of misconduct; caused significant harm to his clients; and demonstrated an indifference toward rectification or atonement for the consequences of his misconduct. (In the Matter of Fonte (Review Department 1994) 2 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 752.)
Fonte’s misconduct is more severe and egregious that Ranciglio’s misconduct. Fonte did have 25 years of practice without discipline wile Respondent has one prior imposition of discipline. However, Fonte has serious aggravating circumstances.
The standards and case law support a 90-day actual suspension. As discussed above on page 4, Respondent is entitled to mitigation due to his depression. Discipline consisting of a one-year stayed suspension with 90 days of actual suspension and two years of probation is appropriate and sufficient to protect the public, the courts and the integrity of the legal profession.
DISMISSALS.
The parties respectfully request the Court to dismiss the following alleged violations in the interest of justice:
Case Number 06-O-15480 Count Three
Alleged Violation 06-O-15480 Three Business and Professions Code, section 6106
Case Number 06-0-15480 Count Four
Alleged Violation Business and Professions Code, section 6106
Case Number(s): 06-O-15480 and 07-H-13336
In the Matter of: Alex Justin Rancigilo
By their signatures below, the parties and their counsel, as applicable, signify their agreement with each of the recitation and each of the terms and conditions of this Stipulation Re Facts, Conclusions of Law and Disposition.
Signed by:
Respondent: Alex Justin Rancigilo
Date: 6/20/2011
Respondent’s Counsel: David Cameron Carr
Date: 6/20/11
Deputy Trial Counsel: Agustin Hernandez
Date: 6/20/11
Case Number(s): 06-O-15480 and 07-H-13336
In the Matter of: Alex Justin Rancigilo
Finding the stipulation to be fair to the parties and that it adequately protects the public, IT IS ORDERED that the requested dismissal of counts/charges, if any is GRANTED without prejudice, and:
checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED and the DISCIPLINE RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
<<not>> checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED AS MODIFIED as set forth below, and the DISCIPLINE IS RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
<<not>> checked. All Hearing dates are vacated.
The parties are bound by the stipulation as approved unless: 1) a motion to withdraw or modify the stipulation, filed within 15 days after service of this order, is granted; or 2) this court modifies or further modifies the approved stipulation. (See rule 5.58 (E) & (F), Rules of Procedure.) The effective date of this disposition is the effective date of the Supreme Court order herein, normally 30 days after the file date. (See rule 9.18(a), California Rules of Court.)
Signed by:
Judge of the State Bar Court: Richard A. Platel
Date: 7/5/11
[Rules Proc. of State Bar; Rule 5.27(B); Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a(4)]
I am a Case Administrator of the State Bar Court of California. I am over the age of eighteen and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to standard court practice, in the City and County of Los Angeles, on January 24, 2012, I deposited a true copy of the following document(s):
STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION AND
ORDER APPROVING
in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:
checked by first-class mail, with postage thereon fully prepaid, through the United States Postal Service at Los Angeles, California, addressed as follows;
DAVID C. CARR, ESQ.
LAW OFFICE OF DAVID CAMERON CARR
530 B STREET SUITE 1410
SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA 92101
checked by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of California addressed as follows:
AGUSTIN HERNANDEZ, ESQ. Enforcement, Los Angeles
I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in Los Angeles, California, on July 7, 2011.
Signed by:
Rose Luthi
Case Administrator
State Bar Court