Case Number(s): 07-O-11654
In the Matter of: Christine A. Gray, Bar # 154209, A Member of the State Bar of California, (Respondent).
Counsel For The State Bar: Djinna M. Gochis, Bar # 108360
Counsel for Respondent: In Pro Per, Bar #
Submitted to: Assigned Judge – State Bar Court Clerk’s Office Los Angeles.
Filed: November 13, 2008.
<<not>> checked. PREVIOUS STIPULATION REJECTED
Note: All information required by this form and any additional information which cannot be provided in the space provided, must be set forth in an attachment to this stipulation under specific headings, e.g., "Facts," "Dismissals," "Conclusions of Law," "Supporting Authority," etc.
1. Respondent is a member of the State Bar of California, admitted December 10, 1991.
2. The parties agree to be bound by the factual stipulations contained herein even if conclusions of law or disposition are rejected or changed by the Supreme Court.
3. All investigations or proceedings listed by case number in the caption of this stipulation are entirely resolved by this stipulation and are deemed consolidated. Dismissed charge(s)/count(s) are listed under "Dismissals." The stipulation consists of 12 pages, not including the order.
4. A statement of acts or omissions acknowledged by Respondent as cause or causes for discipline is included under "Facts."
5. Conclusions of law, drawn from and specifically referring to the facts are also included under "Conclusions of Law".
6. The parties must include supporting authority for the recommended level of discipline under the heading "Supporting Authority."
7. No more than 30 days prior to the filing of this stipulation, Respondent has been advised in writing of any pending investigation/proceeding not resolved by this stipulation, except for criminal investigations.
8. Payment of Disciplinary Costs-Respondent acknowledges the provisions of Bus. & Prof. Code §§6086.10 & 6140.7. (Check one option only):
<<not>> checked. Costs are added to membership fee for calendar year following effective date of discipline.
checked. Costs are to be paid in equal amounts prior to February 1 for the following membership years: 2009, 2010, 2011. (Hardship, special circumstances or other good cause per rule 5.132, Rules of Procedure.)
<<not>> checked. Costs are waived in part as set forth in a separate attachment entitled "Partial Waiver of Costs".
<<not>> checked. Costs are entirely waived.
IN THE MATTER OF: CHRISTINE A. GRAY, State Bar No. 154209
STATE BAR COURT CASE NUMBER: 07-O-11654
FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Respondent admits that the following facts are true and that she is culpable of wilfully violating rules 3-300 and 3-310(C)(1) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
1. Christine A. Gray ("Respondent") was admitted to the practice of law in the State of California on December 10, 2001, was a member at all times pertinent to these charges and is currently a member of the State Bar of California. She is presently a voluntarily inactive member, effective February 2008.
Count One
07-0-11654
Complainant Laws
2. Respondent was hired by Vernita Laws (" Ms. Laws") in or about 1993. From and after that time, they became friends. Respondent assisted Ms. Laws individually in various legal matters up until approximately May 2005, without charge. The next representation, for which Respondent was paid, began in or about June 2005, regarding the dissolution of Ms. Laws’ marriage.
3. On or about May 6, 2005, Ms. Laws made a loan to the Respondent of $26,000.00 with which Respondent purchased a vehicle. Ms. Laws was placed on Respondent’s vehicle title as the lienholder.
4. Respondent did not, however, comply with the requirements of rule 3-300 in taking the loan, to wit, there was no writing by which the terms of the agreement were fully disclosed to Ms. Laws in terms that would be reasonably understood; Ms. Laws was not advised nor provided an opportunity to seek independent counsel before making the loan, and Ms. Laws did not consent, in writing, to the making of the loan.
5. Respondent has been fulfilling the terms of the loan by making monthly payments. Respondent has made arrangements to pay back the balance of the loan to Laws on or before June 7, 2009.
Conclusions of Law
6. By failing to transmit the terms of the loan to Laws in writing, failing to advise Laws to or provide an opportunity for her to seek independent counsel, and failing to obtain Laws’ written consent, Respondent wilfully violated rule 3-300 of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
COUNT TWO
07-0-11654
Complainant Laws
7. Respondent was hired by Ms. Laws regarding the dissolution of her marriage in June 2005. In January 2006, Respondent also began to represent David Laws, Ms. Law’s husband. She acted as their counsel until May or June 2006. Respondent was paid the total sum of $25,000.00, in installments, from and after June 2005. The last payment was in May 2006 approximately one month before Respondent’s dismissal.
8. Respondent cannot produce a written consent for the dual representation of Mr. and Mrs. Law in their divorce, where their interests potentially conflicted.
Conclusions of Law
9. By her conduct, Respondent accepted representation of more than one client where their interests potentially conflicted in wilful violation of rule 3-310(C)(1) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
PENDING PROCEEDINGS
The disclosure date referred to on page one, paragraph (A)(7) was October 27, 2008.
COSTS OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
Respondent acknowledges that the Office of the Chief Trial Counsel has informed Respondent that as of October 20, 2008, the estimated prosecution costs in this matter are approximately $1,983. Respondent acknowledges that this figure is an estimate only. Respondent further acknowledges that should this stipulation be rejected or should relief from the stipulation be granted, the costs in this matter may increase due to the cost of further proceedings.
OTHERS CIRCUMSTANCES BEARING ON THE DISPOSITION
For purposes of this settlement only, the following is accepted:
Respondent allowed herself to become careless in seeking to document, documenting and keeping records of key events in her dealings with Ms. Laws, because although she acted as her attorney over the years, she primarily thought of her as her friend. Respondent understands that whether or not she was paid, she was still acting as an attorney. She understands that payment for services is not an element of defining "representation" pursuant to the Rules of Professional Conduct. Respondent saw her dealings with Ms. Laws as being at arms length, when they were not, in fact. She was not sufficiently sensitive to the power imbalance between them and that her status as an attorney lent her an authority and credibility which influences others inherently and not always to their benefit. Respondent feels that the complaint against her was a consequence of her client’s declination to submit documents which were a condition precedent to concluding the marital settlement. However, she has come to understand that her views in that regard do not obviate the presence of a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
Respondent has also come to understand that her role as attorney governs her relationships and obligations, and that the Rules of Professional Conduct regarding adverse interest and conflict are designed to prevent precisely the kind of problems and challenges that have developed in her dealings with her former client. She understands that taking loans from clients or any pecuniary or financial interest, even if all the requirements of rule 3-300 are followed, and even if the parties consider themselves "friends", is not a prudent path given an attorney’s higher fiduciary obligations. That a client (perhaps exacerbated by the additional relationship of friend in this case) reposes trust in someone who is an attorney and that pecuniary relationships without the adherence to the rules are inherently an abuse of that trust (See for example, Beery v. State Bar(1987) 43 Cal.3d 802).
As to the 3-310(C)(1) conflict by representing both Mr. And Ms. Laws in their divorce: Although Respondent insists that she did do a written "waiver" (disclosure) so that she could represent both of them, (that she returned to Ms. Laws, with the original file, upon what Respondent did not then realize, turned out to be he end of their relationship) she has no hard copy, nor a computer file demonstrating the original draft of one, nor a transmittal letter that indicates such a "waiver" was sent to the clients. Respondent understands that the failure to produce the written disclosure is her responsibility, not the responsibility of the clients.
Respondent has been an attorney since 1991 without prior discipline. She has been cooperative in responding to the investigator and to the attorney reviewing the matter. She arranged for a repayment of the loan in or about January 2007, before the State Bar received a complaint in or about March 2007.
STANDARDS AND CASE AUTHORITY BEARING UPON THE DISPOSITION
The Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct provide that the purposes of discipline include the protection of the public, the courts and the legal profession, the maintenance of high professional standards and the preservation of public confidence. A permissible object of discipline is the rehabilitation of the member.
The Standard that specifically applies to rule 3-300, 2.8, states that a wilful violation shall result in suspension unless the extent of the member’s misconduct and the harm to the client are minimal, in which case, the degree of discipline shall be reproval.
As is often the circumstance in making an evaluation, case law demonstrates varied responses to conduct like that presented herein, also within the broad range of reproval to actual suspension (for example, Hunniecutt v. State Bar (1988) 44 Cal. 3d 362; Ritter v. State Bar (1985) 40 Cal.3d. 595). Ritter is a seminal, older case with a fact pattern not unlike the one here at Bar. In Ritter, the clients had known each other since the early 1970s. They were friends. The member represented the wife in a medical malpractice case in 1975 through 1978. In the latter course of that representation, Respondent asked for a loan of a portion of their settlement. There was an "investment agreement" and although the attorney insisted that he had given them sufficient opportunity to seek counsel, the court disagreed.
Because of the fact that the relationship between an attorney and client is one of the highest fiduciary character, the court noted that all dealings between them that are beneficial to an attorney (as obviously a $25,000 loan to Respondent herein was) will be scrutinized closely for any unfairness. The rule makes it incumbent on the lawyer to assure that the rule and its various prongs are followed.
In the Review Department case of Anthony Fonte (1994) 2 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 752, there were three violations found, 3-300, 3-310 (both as in this case) and a failure to account 4-100(B)(3)1 the court imposed one year stayed, two years probation and sixty days actual suspension. Footnote 1: In this matter, there was originally a 4-100(B)(3) allegation, but based on the totality of the evidence to date, it has been determined that this is more a civil/fee arbitration matter than a discipline one.] In the case at bar, it is believed that the same basic disposition as that given in Ritter (involving only a 3-300), will address both violations and discharge the primary purposes of attorney discipline as well as to foster the rehabilitation of the member.
SIGNATURE OF THE PARTIES
Case Number(s): 07-O-11654
In the Matter of: Christine A. Gray
By their signatures below, the parties and their counsel, as applicable, signify their agreement with each of the recitation and each of the terms and conditions of this Stipulation Re Facts, Conclusions of Law and Disposition.
Signed by:
Respondent: Christine A. Gray
Date: November 3, 2008
Respondent’s Counsel:
Date:
Deputy Trial Counsel: Djinna M. Gochis
Date: November 6, 2008
Case Number(s): 07-O-11654
In the Matter of: Christine A. Gray
Finding the stipulation to be fair to the parties and that it adequately protects the public, IT IS ORDERED that the requested dismissal of counts/charges, if any, is GRANTED without prejudice, and:
<<not>> checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED and the DISCIPLINE RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED AS MODIFIED as set forth below, and the DISCIPLINE IS RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
<<not>> checked. All Hearing dates are vacated.
Paragraph A (8) is modified to refer to membership years 2010, 2011, and 2012.
The parties are bound by the stipulation as approved unless: 1) a motion to withdraw or modify the stipulation, filed within 15 days after service of this order, is granted; or 2) this court modifies or further modifies the approved stipulation. (See rule 135(b), Rules of Procedure.) The effective date of this disposition is the effective date of the Supreme Court order herein, normally 30 days after the file date. (See rule 9.18(a), California Rules of Court.)
Signed by:
Judge of the State Bar Court: Donald F. Miles
Date: November 13, 2008
[Rules Proc. of State Bar; Rule 5.27(B); Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a(4)]
I am a Case Administrator of the State Bar Court of California. I am over the age of eighteen and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to standard court practice, in the City and County of Los Angeles, on November 13, 2008, I deposited a true copy of the following document(s):
STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION AND ORDER APPROVING STAYED SUSPENSION; NO ACTUAL SUSPENSION
in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:
checked. by first-class mail, with postage thereon fully prepaid, through the United States Postal Service at Los Angeles, California, addressed as follows:
CHRISTINE A. GRAY
743 WHITEMARSH AVE
DELTONA, FL 32725
checked. by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of California addressed as follows:
DJINNA M. GOCHIS, Enforcement, Los Angeles
I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in Los Angeles, California, on November 13, 2008.
Signed by:
Tammy Cleaver
Case Administrator
State Bar Court