Case Number(s): 07-O-13710
In the Matter of: Vladslav Vitman, Bar # 203140 , A Member of the State Bar of California, (Respondent).
Counsel For The State Bar: Allen Blumenthal, Bar # 110243,
Counsel for Respondent: Jonathan Arons, Bar # 111257,
Submitted to: Assigned Judge – State Bar Court Clerk’s Office San Francisco.
<<not>> checked. PREVIOUS STIPULATION REJECTED
Note: All information required by this form and any additional information which cannot be provided in the space provided, must be set forth in an attachment to this stipulation under specific headings, e.g., "Facts," "Dismissals," "Conclusions of Law," "Supporting Authority," etc.
1. Respondent is a member of the State Bar of California, admitted November 22, 1999.
2. The parties agree to be bound by the factual stipulations contained herein even if conclusions of law or disposition are rejected or changed by the Supreme Court.
3. All investigations or proceedings listed by case number in the caption of this stipulation are entirely resolved by this stipulation and are deemed consolidated. Dismissed charge(s)/count(s) are listed under "Dismissals." The stipulation consists of 11 pages, not including the order.
4. A statement of acts or omissions acknowledged by Respondent as cause or causes for discipline is included under "Facts."
5. Conclusions of law, drawn from and specifically referring to the facts are also included under "Conclusions of Law".
6. The parties must include supporting authority for the recommended level of discipline under the heading "Supporting Authority."
7. No more than 30 days prior to the filing of this stipulation, Respondent has been advised in writing of any pending investigation/proceeding not resolved by this stipulation, except for criminal investigations.
8. Payment of Disciplinary Costs-Respondent acknowledges the provisions of Bus. & Prof. Code §§6086.10 & 6140.7. (Check one option only):
checked. Until costs are paid in full, Respondent will remain actually suspended from the practice of law unless relief is obtained per rule 284, Rules of Procedure.
<<not>> checked. Costs are to be paid in equal amounts prior to February 1 for the following membership years: . (Hardship, special circumstances or other good cause per rule 5.132, Rules of Procedure.) If Respondent fails to pay any installment as described above, or as may be modified by the State Bar Court, the remaining balance is due and payable immediately.
<<not>> checked. Costs are waived in part as set forth in a separate attachment entitled "Partial Waiver of Costs".
<<not>> checked. Costs are entirely waived.
IN THE MATTER OF: Vladislav Viltman, State Bar No. 203140
STATE BAR COURT CASE NUMBER: 07-O-13710
FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
Facts:
1. Respondent was admitted to the practice of law in California on November 22, 1999 and was a member of the State Bar at all times pertinent herein and is currently a member of the State Bar.
2. Since at least December 30, 2006, respondent maintained a client trust account at Bank of America (hereinafter "respondent’s CTA").
3. On January 5, 2007, respondent deposited $4,000 into his CTA of earned attorney’s fees. Subsequently, he failed to promptly remove the earned fees from his CTA. Respondent intentionally kept those funds in his CTA as a surplus. Those funds were not an insignificant amount and were not used to pay bank fees. Respondent failed to research whether he was entitled to do this. In fact, he was not entitled to maintain $4,000 of his own funds in respondent’s CTA.
4. On May 21, 2007, respondent issued check no. 1125 for $3,700 from his CTA to attorney Susan Griffin ("Griffin") for legal services for respondent in his own personal matter. This was for personal expenses not related to any client. Respondent used his CTA for personal expenses.
5. At the time he issued check no. 1125, respondent had insufficient funds in his CTA to cover the check. At the time he issued and delivered check no. 1125 to Ms. Griffin, respondent knew there were insufficient funds in his CTA to cover the cheek. He hoped to place other funds into his CTA before Ms. Griffin deposited the funds into her own account, but failed to do so.
6. On May 31, 2007, check no. 1125 from respondent’s CTA was returned as a result of insufficient funds. Ms. Griffin had attempted to deposit check no. 1125 into her account, but there were insufficient funds in respondent’s CTA to cover the check.
7. On June 4, 2007 before respondent knew check no. 1125 had been returned for insufficient funds, respondent transferred $2,000 from his personal checking account to his CTA. However, respondent knew that even with this $2,000 deposit there were insufficient funds to cover the check to Ms. Griffin.
8. On June 5, 2007, respondent transferred $2,000 from his CTA to his personal checking account. He did so because he had learned the check to Ms. Griffin had not cleared his account and he now intended to issue a personal check to Ms. Griffin.
9. On June 8, 2007, respondent wrote a $4,000 check (check no. 1519) from his personal checking account to pay Ms. Griffin.
10. On October 24, 2007, when contacted by the State Bar, respondent admitted to the State Bar that he paid $3,700 to Ms. Griffin from his CTA for personal legal services. Ms. Griffin’s services were not related to any client work. Further; respondent issued a check when he knew he had insufficient funds in his client trust account.
11. Respondent used his CTA for paying personal or business expenses. Respondent made no effort to determine his responsibilities relating to his CTA and failed to comply with his responsibilities relating to his CTA. He cloaked a check for his personal or business expenses with the aura of a client trust account and the financial soundness of such accounts. He abdicated and violated his responsibilities regarding his CTA.
Conclusion of Law:
By failing to withdraw his earned fees promptly, by keeping his own personal funds in his CTA, by issuing a check to Ms. Griffin for his own personal matter and not related to any client expenses, and by transferring funds from his personal checking account into his CTA to pay Ms. Griffin, respondent commingled his personal funds with his client funds and misused his CTA, in willful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct rule 4-100(A).
By issuing a check from his CTA when he knew there were insufficient funds in his CTA to cover the check, commingling his funds with client funds, by failing to withdraw earned fees, by transferring funds into his CTA and by issuing checks for respondent’s personal and business expenses, by making no effort to determine his responsibilities relating to his CTA, by failing to comply with his responsibilities relating to his CTA, by cloaking checks for his personal and business expenses with the aura of a client trust account and the financial soundness of such accounts, and by abdicating and violating his responsibilities regarding his CTA, respondent committed an act or acts involving moral turpitude, dishonesty or corruption, in willful violation of Business & Professions Code section 6106.
PENDING PROCEEDINGS.
The disclosure date referred to, on page one, paragraph A.(7), was September 24, 2008.
AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING DISCIPLINE.
Standard 2.3 of the Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professions Misconduct (hereinafter "standard") recommends an actual suspension for a finding of moral turpitude, dishonesty, or corruption.
Standard 2.2(b) provides culpability of a member for commingling of entrusted funds or property or the commission of another violation of rule 4-100, Rules of Professional Conduct, none of which offenses resulted in the willful misappropriation of entrusted funds or property, shall result in at least three months actual suspension from the practice of law, irrespective of mitigating circumstances.
The Supreme Court recently re-affirmed that great weight is to be given the Standards and that they should be followed whenever possible. (In re Silverton (2005) 36 Cal.4th 81, 92.)
Thus, while the Standards are not mandatory, the Supreme. Court has held that they should be followed unless the charged attorney can demonstrate the existence of extraordinary circumstances justifying a lesser sanction. (In re Silverton, supra, 36 Cal.4th at 92.) That is, it is Respondent’s burden to demonstrate that there are extraordinary circumstances justifying a lesser sanction than that recommended by the Standards.
Although the standards call for a 90 day actual suspension, given respondent’s mitigation, including his showing of good character, his lack of priors, and the very limited misuse of his CTA, the parties believe that it is appropriate to deviate from the standards.
Case law also supports an actual suspension of thirty days. Every attorney is supposed to know that trust accounts are never to be used for personal purposes, even if client funds are not on deposit. (See Arm v. State Bar (1990) 50 Cal.3d 763, 777; In the Matter of Bleecker (Review Dept., 1990) 1 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 113,123; In the Matter of Heiser (Review Dept., 1990)1 Cal State Bar Ct. Rptr. 47, 54.)
As the Review Department has written: "By using Trust Account checks to pay personal debts, the attorney cloaks the transaction with the care and soundness represented by the account and its relation to the confidential bond between attorney and the client. Trading on the ’aura’ of the Trust Account, the attorney seeks to offer the check recipient added assurance as to the validity of the instrument." In the Matter of Heiser, supra, 1 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. At 54.
In commingling cases, the discipline has generally ranged from six months actual suspension to 60 day actual suspension when there are no other violations. In In the Matter of Doran (Review Dept. 1998) 3 Cal..State Bar Ct. Rptr. 871, an attorney was suspended for 18 months, stayed, 3 years probation, and six months actual suspension for repeated violations of rule 4-100 over three years by depositing personal funds into the attorney’s CTAs and using these accounts for personal expenses. Moral turpitude was found for using the CTA for expenses and repeatedly issuing NSF checks. The attorney had no prior record of discipline, but the misconduct began within two years of being admitted. He presented two favorable character witnesses.
In In the Matter of Bleecker (Review Dept., 1990) 1 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 113, an attorney was actually suspended for 60 days for commingling his funds with his clients’ and a $274 misappropriation.
Respondent’s misconduct is even less egregious than Bleecker’s misconduct. Thus, in light of the mitigating factors discussed earlier, the recommended discipline for respondent is a two year suspension, stayed, with four years probation and thirty days actual suspension as a means to protect the public, maintain high professional standards, and preserve public confidence in the legal profession.
SIGNATURE OF THE PARTIES
Case Number(s): 07-O-13710
In the Matter of: Vladislav Viltman
By their signatures below, the parties and their counsel, as applicable, signify their agreement with each of the recitation and each of the terms and conditions of this Stipulation Re Facts, Conclusions of Law and Disposition.
Signed by:
Respondent: Vladislav Viltman
Date: October 6, 2008
Respondent’s Counsel: Jonathan Arons
Date: October 6, 2008
Deputy Trial Counsel: Allen Blumenthal
Date: October 6, 2008
Case Number(s): 07-O-13710
In the Matter of: Vladislav Viltman
Finding the stipulation to be fair to the parties and that it adequately protects the public, IT IS ORDERED that the requested dismissal of counts/charges, if any is GRANTED without prejudice, and:
checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED and the DISCIPLINE RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
<<not>> checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED AS MODIFIED as set forth below, and the DISCIPLINE IS RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
<<not>> checked. All Hearing dates are vacated.
The parties are bound by the stipulation as approved unless: 1) a motion to withdraw or modify the stipulation, filed within 15 days after service of this order, is granted; or 2) this court modifies or further modifies the approved stipulation. (See rule 135(b), Rules of Procedure.) The effective date of this disposition is the effective date of the Supreme Court order herein, normally 30 days after the file date. (See rule 9.18(a), California Rules of Court.)
Signed by:
Judge of the State Bar Court: Lucy Armendariz
Date: October 20, 2008
[Rule 62(b); Rules Proc.; Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a(4)]
I am a Case Administrator of the State Bar Court of California. I am over the age of eighteen and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to standard court practice, in the City and County of San Francisco, on October 22, 2008, I deposited a true copy of the following document(s):
STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION AND ORDER APPROVING
in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:
checked. by first-class mail, with postage thereon fully prepaid, through the United States Postal Service at San Francisco, California, addressed as follows:
JONATHAN IRWIN ARONS
LAW OFC JONATHAN I ARONS
101 HOWARD ST #310
SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94105
checked. by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of California addressed as follows:
ALLEN BLUMENTHAL, Enforcement, San Francisco
I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in San Francisco, California, on October 22, 2008.
Signed by:
Laine Silber
Case Administrator
State Bar Court