Case Number(s): 08-O-11212
In the Matter of: Mario Casillas, Bar # 187727, A Member of the State Bar of California, (Respondent).
Counsel For The State Bar: Diane J. Meyers, Bar # 146643
Counsel for Respondent: Bar #
Submitted to: Assigned Judge State Bar Court Clerk’s Office Los Angeles
Filed: March 16, 2010
<<not>> checked. PREVIOUS STIPULATION REJECTED
Note: All information required by this form and any additional information which cannot be provided in the space provided, must be set forth in an attachment to this stipulation under specific headings, e.g., "Facts," "Dismissals," "Conclusions of Law," "Supporting Authority," etc.
1. Respondent is a member of the State Bar of California, admitted March 24, 1997.
2. The parties agree to be bound by the factual stipulations contained herein even if conclusions of law or disposition are rejected or changed by the Supreme Court.
3. All investigations or proceedings listed by case number in the caption of this stipulation are entirely resolved by this stipulation and are deemed consolidated. Dismissed charge(s)/count(s) are listed under "Dismissals." The stipulation consists of 9 pages, not including the order.
4. A statement of acts or omissions acknowledged by Respondent as cause or causes for discipline is included under "Facts."
5. Conclusions of law, drawn from and specifically referring to the facts are also included under "Conclusions of Law".
6. The parties must include supporting authority for the recommended level of discipline under the heading "Supporting Authority."
7. No more than 30 days prior to the filing of this stipulation, Respondent has been advised in writing of any pending investigation/proceeding not resolved by this stipulation, except for criminal investigations.
8. Payment of Disciplinary Costs-Respondent acknowledges the provisions of Bus. & Prof. Code §§6086.10 & 6140.7. (Check one option only):
checked. costs added to membership fee for calendar year following effective date of discipline.
checked. costs to be paid in equal amounts prior to February 1 for the following membership years: 2011 and 2012 (hardship, special circumstances or other good cause per rule 284, Rules of Procedure
<<not>> checked. costs waived in part as set forth in a separate attachment entitled "Partial Waiver of Costs".
checked. costs entirely waived.
Respondent has no prior record of discipline since his admission to the State Bar in March 1997. Respondent was candid and cooperative with the State Bar and expressed his remorse for his misconduct. Respondent demonstrated recognition of wrongdoing by entering into this stipulation, thereby saving the resources of the State Bar. Considerable time has passed since the misconduct without further complaints against Respondent. Respondent experienced personal problems during his representation of his client which caused or contributed to his misconduct. As such, Respondent’s misconduct is deemed aberrational and not likely to be repeated.
G. SUPPORTING AUTHORITIES:
Standard 2.3, Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct ("standards") provides that the culpability of a member of an act of moral turpitude shall result in actual suspension or disbarment depending upon the extent to which the victim of the misconduct is harmed or misled and depending upon the magnitude of the act of misconduct and the degree to which it relates to the member’s acts within the practice of law. However, the standards, while entitled to great weight, do not mandate a specific discipline. The court is "not bound to follow the standards in talismanic fashion...," but the Supreme Court is "... permitted to temper the letter of the law with considerations peculiar to the offense and the offender." [Citations.] "...[A]lthough the standards were established as guidelines, ultimately, the proper recommendation of discipline rest[s] on a balanced consideration of the unique factors in each case. [Citations.] " (In the Matter of VanSickle (Review Dept. 2006) 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 980, 994.)
The discipline imposed by the Supreme Court in the following cases, involving acts of moral turpitude by attorneys and decided prior to the adoption of the standards, ranged from a reprimand to a public reproval: Mosesian v. State Bar (1972) 8 Cal.3d 60; Mushrush v. State Bar (1976) 17 Cal.3d 487; Davidson v. State Bar (1976) 17 Cal.3d 570; In re Cooper (1971) 5 Cal.3d 256; and DiSabatino v. State Bar (1980) 27 Cal.3d 159.
No significant harm resulted from Respondent’s misrepresentation about collecting settlement funds for Jimenez, as it did not result in resolution of the outstanding lien. The mitigating factors present and the lack of aggravating factors warrant deviation from the standards,
Attachment language (if any):
Respondent admits that the following facts are true and that he is culpable of the following violation:
FACTS:
1. In 2001, Gabriel Jimenez ("Jimenez") employed Respondent to represent him in a personal injury claim arising from a May 2001 incident. Jimenez received medical treatment by Pacific Hospital of Long Beach ("Pacific") for injuries related to the incident.
2. Respondent failed to preserve Jimenez’s personal injury claim by filing a lawsuit on his behalf before the statute of limitation expired due to his negligence. As a result, Respondent received no monetary recovery on behalf of Jimenez.
3. In or about September 2003, Jimenez informed Respondent that he had been contacted by Pacific for payment of its bill for the medical treatment related to the incident. Knowing that he had not filed lawsuit on behalf of Jimenez before the expiration of the statute of limitations, Respondent executed a lien in favor of Pacific and against any recovery he received on behalf of Jimenez on the claim (the "lien") in order to stave off Pacific’s collection efforts.
4. In or about September 2005, Interstate Debt Managers ("IDM"), the collection agency for Pacific, contacted Jimenez regarding Pacific’s outstanding bill. Jimenez informed Respondent of this contact by IDM.
5. On or about September 9, 2005, IDM sent a letter to Respondent. In the letter, IDM requested payment of the lien if the claim had settled.
6. On or about September 30, 2005, Respondent sent a letter to IDM In the letter, Respondent falsely represented that he had settled the claim for $3,100, and that the funds were allocated as follows: $900 for attorney fees, $900 for the client, and $1,300 for medical bills. Jimenez received a copy of the letter from IDM.
7. On or about March 22, 2008, after Jimenez submitted a complaint to the State Bar of California regarding the representation, Respondent sent a letter to Jimenez, explaining his letter to IDM. In the letter, Respondent acknowledged that he never settled Jimenez’s claim and that he sent the September letter to IDM in an attempt to negotiate a reduction of the hospital’s outstanding bill. Respondent further stated in the letter that his attempt failed, and added, "1 believed the provider would cease collection efforts if they knew there were minimal or no funds available for recovery." Respondent also expressed his remorse to Jimenez for his misconduct.
CONCLUSION OF LAW:
By falsely representing to IDM in the September letter that he had settled Jimenez’s claim for $3,100, and that the funds were allocated as follows: $900 for attorney fees, $900 for the client, and $1,300 for medical bills, Respondent wilfully committed an act involving moral turpitude, dishonesty or corruption, in wilful violation of Business and Professions Code section 6106.
SIGNATURE OF THE PARTIES
Case Number(s): 08-O-11212
In the Matter of: Mario Casillas
By their signatures below, the parties and their counsel, as applicable, signify their agreement with each of the recitation and each of the terms and conditions of this Stipulation Re Facts, Conclusions of Law and Disposition.
Signed by:
Respondent: Mario Casillas
Date: 3/8/10
Respondent’s Counsel:
Date:
Deputy Trial Counsel: Diane J. Meyers
Date: 3/9/10
Case Number(s): 08-O-11212
In the Matter of: Mario Casillas
Finding the stipulation to be fair to the parties and that it adequately protects the public, IT IS ORDERED that the requested dismissal of counts/charges, if any, is GRANTED without prejudice, and:
checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED and the DISCIPLINE RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
<<not>> checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED AS MODIFIED as set forth below, and the DISCIPLINE IS RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
<<not>> checked. All Hearing dates are vacated.
The parties are bound by the stipulation as approved unless: 1) a motion to withdraw or modify the stipulation, filed within 15 days after service of this order, is granted; or 2) this court modifies or further modifies the approved stipulation. (See rule 135 (b), Rules of Procedure.) The effective date of this disposition is the effective date of the Supreme Court order herein, normally 30 days after the file date. (See rule 9.18(a), California Rules of Court.)
Signed by:
Judge of the State Bar Court: Richard A. Platel
Date: 3-15-10
[Rule 62(b), Rules Proc.; Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a(4)]
I am a Case Administrator of the State Bar Court of California. I am over the age of eighteen and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to standard court practice, in the City and County of Los Angeles, on March 16, 2010, I deposited a true copy of the following document(s):
STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION AND ORDER APPROVING
in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:
checked. by first-class mail, with postage thereon fully prepaid, through the United States Postal Service at Los Angeles, California, addressed as follows:
MARIO CASILLAS
LAW OFC MARIO CASILLAS
812 W LAS TUNAS DR
SAN GABRIEL, CA 91776
checked. by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of California addressed as follows:
DIANE MEYERS, Enforcement, Los Angeles
I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in Los Angeles, California, on March 16, 2010.
Signed by:
Angela Owens-Carpenter
Case Administrator
State Bar Court