Case Number(s): 08-O-12594; 08-O-12752; 08-O-14022; 09-O-11936; 09-O-12070; 10-N-09199
In the Matter of: Eugene Wellington Matthews, Bar # 161396, A Member of the State Bar of California, (Respondent).
Counsel For The State Bar: Jean Cha, Deputy Trial Counsel
1149 S. Hill Street
Los Angeles, CA 90015
(213) 765-1000
Bar #228137
Counsel for Respondent: David A. Clare, Attorney at Law
444 W Ocean Blvd, Ste 800
Long Beach, CA 90802
(562) 624-2837
Bar #44971
Submitted to: Settlement Judge
<<not>> checked. PREVIOUS STIPULATION REJECTED
Note: All information required by this form and any additional information which cannot be provided in the space provided, must be set forth in an attachment to this stipulation under specific headings, e.g., "Facts," "Dismissals," "Conclusions of Law," "Supporting Authority," etc.
1. Respondent is a member of the State Bar of California, admitted December 9, 1992.
2. The parties agree to be bound by the factual stipulations contained herein even if conclusions of law or disposition are rejected or changed by the Supreme Court.
3. All investigations or proceedings listed by case number in the caption of this stipulation are entirely resolved by this stipulation and are deemed consolidated. Dismissed charge(s)/count(s) are listed under "Dismissals." The stipulation consists of 21 pages, not including the order.
4. A statement of acts or omissions acknowledged by Respondent as cause or causes for discipline is included under "Facts."
5. Conclusions of law, drawn from and specifically referring to the facts are also included under "Conclusions of Law".
6. The parties must include supporting authority for the recommended level of discipline under the heading "Supporting Authority."
7. No more than 30 days prior to the filing of this stipulation, Respondent has been advised in writing of any pending investigation/proceeding not resolved by this stipulation, except for criminal investigations.
8. Payment of Disciplinary Costs-Respondent acknowledges the provisions of Bus. & Prof. Code §§6086.10 & 6140.7. (Check one option only):
<<not>> checked. Until costs are paid in full, Respondent will remain actually suspended from the practice of law unless relief is obtained per rule 5.130, Rules of Procedure.
checked. Costs are to be paid in equal amounts prior to February 1 for the following membership years: FOUR BILLING CYCLES FOLLOWING THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE SUPREME COURT ORDER. (Hardship, special circumstances or other good cause per rule 5.132, Rules of Procedure.) If Respondent fails to pay any installment as described above, or as may be modified by the State Bar Court, the remaining balance is due and payable immediately.
<<not>> checked. Costs are waived in part as set forth in a separate attachment entitled "Partial Waiver of Costs".
<<not>> checked. Costs are entirely waived.
checked. (8) Emotional/Physical Difficulties: At the time of the stipulated act or acts of professional misconduct Respondent suffered extreme emotional difficulties or physical disabilities which expert testimony would establish was directly responsible for the misconduct. The difficulties or disabilities were not the product of any illegal conduct by the member, such as illegal drug or substance abuse, and Respondent no longer suffers from such difficulties or disabilities. Respondent suffered from depression which adversely impacted his practice from 2004 through 2007. This condition adversely impacted his ability to competently represent Golban, Garcia, and Ha. Respondent’s depression resulted in his heavy reliance on an inadequately small office staff. Thus, causing the management of his practice to become substantially impaired. (Std. ] .2(e)(iv).) Unfortunately, Julia Calvo, his paralegal, stole money from his office and client trust account from August 1, 2005 through November 30, 2007. Julio Calvo made a credit charge in the Seifert matter unbeknownst to Respondent. This betrayal was shocking and disturbing to Respondent. After discovering the theft, Respondent reported Calvo’s acts to the police and Calvo was subsequently prosecuted and convicted for felony grand theft and forgery. These emotional difficulties are recognized factors in mitigation. (In the Matter of Johnson (Review Dept. 1995) 3 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 233; In the Matter of Boyne (Review Dept. 1993) 2 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 389.) Respondent’s depression is under control with the assistance of a therapist who meets with Respondent weekly. (Std. 1.2(e) (viii).)
checked. (9) Severe Financial Stress: At the time of the misconduct, Respondent suffered from severe financial stress which resulted from circumstances not reasonably foreseeable or which were beyond his/her control and which were directly responsible for the misconduct. Respondent suffered from severe financial stress which resulted from circumstances not reasonably foreseeable or which were beyond his/her control. and which were directly responsible for the misconduct. Respondent suffered from the intervening criminal acts of his long-time trusted employee, Calvo, who tampered with and created confusion related to pending disbursements in Respondent’s client trust account. Near the end of Calvo’s employment, Calvo likely converted the Seifert disbursement checks to his own use. The violation related to Respondent’s trust account did not arise from corruption or venality on Respondent’s part, but rather from the intervening criminal act of a staff person. (Cf. Lawhorn v. State Bar (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1357, 1368.) Respondent has not been able to make restitution due to financial hardship but has agreed to make restitution as part of these proceedings.
IN THE MATTER OF: State Bar No.
STATE BAR COURT CASE NUMBER:
ATTACHMENT TO
STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION
IN THE MATTER OF: Eugene Wellington Matthews, 161396
CASE NUMBERS: 08-O-12594; 08-O-12752; 08-O-14022;
09-O-11936; 09-O-12070; 10-N-09199
Respondent EUGENE WELLINGTON MATTHEWS, admits the facts set forth in the
stipulation are true and that he is culpable of violations of the specified statutes and Rules of Professional Conduct.
(1) Case No. 08-O-12594 - THE ARREAGA MATTER
FACTS
1. On July 8, 2008, the State Bar opened an investigation, case no. 08-0
12594, pursuant to a complaint made against Respondent regarding Jose Arreaga (the "Arreaga matter").
2. On August 1, 2008, and August 18, 2008, a State Bar investigator mailed letters to
Respondent at his address of record regarding the Arreaga matter requesting that Respondent respond in writing to specific allegations of misconduct being investigated by the State Bar. Respondent received the letters but did not provide a response.
CONCLUSION OF LAW
3. By not providing a written response to the allegations in the Arreaga matter or
otherwise cooperating in the investigation of the Arreaga matter, Respondent failed to cooperate and participate in a disciplinary investigation pending against Respondent in wilful violation of Business and Professions Code section 60680).(2)
Case No. 08-O-12752 - THE GALBAN MATTER
FACTS
4. On October 4, 2006, Socorro Galban ("Galban") hired Respondent on a contingency
fee basis to pursue a personal injury and property damage matter following Galban’s automobile accident with a City of South Gate employee (the "personal injury matter"). Galban had no automobile insurance at the time of the accident and was therefore not entitled to recovery of non-economic damages such as pain and suffering; she was entitled to recover for economic damages such as medical bills, lost wages, future damages and out of pocket costs. Galban did have medical insurance which paid for her medical bills only.
5. On December 6, 2006, Respondent sent a letter to the City of South Gate confirming that he was representing Galban in the personal injury matter and requesting an update within the next week.
6. On April 16, 2007, Carl Warren & Co, the claims adjuster for the City of South Gate,
sent Respondent a letter informing him that Galban’s claim against the City of South Gate had been rejected. The April 16, 2007 letter stated that any civil action had to be. filed within six months of the date of the April 16, 2007 letter or by October 16, 2007.
7. On June 1, 2007, Respondent sent a letter to Galban informing her that the claim for
damages against South Gate had been rejected, and Respondent would be filing a lawsuit against the city within fourteen business days. Respondent did not file a lawsuit on Galban’s behalf at anytime.
8. Respondent did not tell Galban that he missed the October 16, 2007 deadline to file
the lawsuit against the City of South Gate.
9. On July 31, 2008, Galban sent a letter to Respondent regarding his failure to perform on her behalf. In the July 31, 2008 letter, Galban terminated Respondent’s services stating that she had only received two letters from Respondent and the last time she spoke to Respondent was on December 16, 2006. Respondent received the letter but did not respond.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
10. By not filing a lawsuit on Galban’s behalf prior to October 16, 2007 or at any time,
Respondent repeatedly failed to perform legal services with competence in wilful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3-110(A).
(3) Case No. 08-O-14022 - THE SEIFERT MATTER
11. On April 27, 2007, Jessica Seifert ("Jessica") and her mother, Mun, hired
Respondent to handle a property damage matter resulting from a water leak into Jessica’s apartment (the "property matter"). In April 2007, Jessica paid Respondent $2,500 in advanced legal fees for the property matter.
12. In June 2007, Respondent received an insurance draft from Intersinsurance
Exchange of the Automobile Club ("Automobile Club") made payable to Mun and Respondent in the amount of $2,078.
13. On June 15, 2007, Respondent endorsed the settlement draft and deposited the
$2,078 insurance draft in his client trust account at Union Bank of California, account no. xxxxxxx322 ("CTA").1
14. In August 2007, Respondent received a second insurance draft from the Automobile Club made payable to Mun and Respondent in the amount of $477.75.
15. On August 22, 2007, Respondent endorsed the $477.75 insurance draft and
deposited it into his CTA.
16. In September 2007, Respondent received a third insurance draft from the
Automobile Club made payable to Mun and Respondent in the amount of $930.
17. On September 18, 2007, Respondent endorsed the $930 insurance draft and
deposited it into his CTA.
18. At no time did Respondent tell Mun or Jessica that he received $3,485.75 in
insurance funds on their behalf.
19. As of November 2, 2007, Respondent had not disbursed any of the $3,485.75 in
insurance funds to Mun and Jessica or to anyone on their behalf and Respondent had a negative balance in his CTA.
The account number has been partially redacted due to privacy concerns.
20. On August 24, 2007, Respondent’s paralegal, Julio Calvo, charged an additional
$2,500 to Jessica’s credit card without her knowledge or consent. Respondent did not provide Jessica with an accounting or opportunity to dispute any charges.
21. On January 24, 2008, subsequent counsel, David K. Ng, sent Respondent a letter
advising him that Jessica had retained Ng and advising Respondent that he had been discharged. In the letter, Ng asked Respondent to forward Jessica’s complete file including original receipts and photographs required by the Automobile Club to make further payment to Jessica for property damage. The January 24, 2008 letter also contained a signed statement from Jessica discharging Respondent and asking that her entire file be transferred to Ng. Respondent received the January 24, 2008 letter but failed to respond and failed to turn over Jessica’s file. Thereafter, Jessica learned for the first time that Respondent had already cashed Automobile Club insurance
drafts without informing her.
22. On May 19, 2008, Jessica sent a letter to Respondent regarding her original file and
the three insurance checks issued by the Automobile Club. In the May 19, 2008 letter, Jessica told Respondent to forward her entire client file and requested the status of the funds forwarded by Automobile Club. Respondent received the May 19, 2008 letter but failed to respond and failed to turn over Jessica’s file.
23. On July 2, 2008, Jessica sent another letter to Respondent regarding his failure to
turn over her client file and his failure to respond to her May 19, 2008 letter. Jessica enclosed a copy of the May 19, 2008 letter. Respondent received the July 2, 2008 letter but failed to respond and failed to turn over Jessica’s file.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
24. By failing to competently supervise Julio Calvo and allowing him to charge
Jessica’s credit card $2,500 and not informing Jessica of the charge to her credit card,
Respondent was grossly negligent in wilful violation of Business and Professions Code section
6106.
25. By not notifying Jessica or Mun of the receipt of $2,078 on their behalf, by not
notifying Jessica or Mun of the receipt of $477.75 on their behalf and by not notifying Jessica or Mun of the receipt of $930 on their behalf, Respondent failed to notify a client promptly of the receipt of the client’s funds, securities, or other properties in wilful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 4-100(B)(1 ).
26. By failing to maintain $3,485.75 in insurance funds in his CTA on behalf of Mun
and Jessica, Respondent failed to maintain the balance of funds received for the benefit of a client and deposited in a bank account labeled "Trust Account," "Client’s Funds Account" or words of similar import in wilful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 4-100(A).
27. By not promptly returning the client file to Jessica despite her requests and despite
requests from Ng on Jessica’s behalf, Respondent failed to release promptly, upon termination of employment, to the client, at the request of the client, all the client papers and property in wilful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3-700(D)(1).
(4)
Case No. 09-O-11936 - THE GARCIA MATTER
FACTS
28. On January 23, 2008, Gumaro Garcia ("Garcia") hired Respondent to expunge his
criminal matter (the "expungement matter"). On January 23, 2008, Garcia paid Respondent
$500 in advanced legal fees for the expungement matter.
29. On May 19, 2008, Garcia called Respondent’s office seeking the status of his
expungement.
30. On May 20, 2008, Respondent delegated the case to an associate attorney who
attempted to file a petition for expungement on Garcia’s behalf. On August 20, 2008, the court rejected the petition because the conviction date on the petition was incorrect.
31. On September 23, 2008, Respondent’s associate attorney resubmitted the petition
for expungement. The court once again rejected the petition because Respondent’s office had listed the wrong criminal violation sections on the form. Thereafter, the associate attorney was instructed to file another amended petition but failed to do so; Respondent failed to adequately supervise his associate attorney’s work in this matter.
32. In April 2009, Garcia hired new counsel because he could not reach Respondent for a status update who subsequently filed a motion to reduce felony conviction on Garcia’s behalf and successfully had it reduced.
CONCLUSION OF LAW
33. Respondent’s office provided no services of value to Garcia in the expungement
matter in wilful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3-110(A).
(5) Case No. 09-O-12070 - THE HO MATTER
FACTS
34. On December 14, 2006, Grace Shuk-Ting Ho ("Ho") hired Respondent on a
contingency fee basis to represent her in a breach of contract matter.
35. On April 26, 2007, Respondent filed a lawsuit on behalf of plaintiffs entitled
Lawrence Law, Grace S.T. Ho v. Michael Chiu et. al., in Los Angeles County Superior Court, case no. BC370146 (the "breach of Contract action").
36. On July 23, 2007, opposing counsel wrote a letter to Respondent noting that the
plaintiff’s supplemental responses to discovery in the breach of contract action were overdue. Opposing counsel gave Respondent until August 11, 2007 to provide the responses or defendants would file a motion to compel. Respondent received the July 23, 2007 letter but failed to provide the supplemental responses.
37. On August 31, 2007, the defendants in the breach of contract action filed a motion
to compel further discovery responses to special interrogatories, form interrogatories and request
for production of documentation. Respondent was properly served with the motion to compel.
38. As of October 4, 2007, Respondent had not filed any opposition to the defendants’
motion to compel further responses. As a result, on October 4, 2007, the defendants filed a notice of non-opposition in the breach of contract action. Respondent received the notice.
39. On October 12, 2007, the court in the breach of contract action granted defendants’ motion to compel further discovery responses. The court ordered plaintiff to provide complete supplemental response within 30 days of the court’s October 12, 2007 hearing. In addition, the court ordered Respondent to pay $2,000 in sanctions to defense counsel within 60 days of the October 12, 2007 hearing or by December 11, 2007. Respondent received notice of the court’s orders.
40. Thereafter, defense counsel gave Respondent a series of extensions until January
18, 2008 to provide the supplemental discovery responses.
41. On January 28, 2008, defendants filed a motion to compel discovery responses.
42. On February 5, 2008, the court in the breach of contract action granted the
defendants’ motions to compel discovery responses. The court imposed sanctions in the amounts of $7,850 against both Respondent and plaintiff. Pursuant to the court’s February 5, 2008 order, the discovery responses were due from plaintiff within 10 days from the date of the order. In addition, the court ordered Respondent and plaintiff to pay the $7,850 in sanctions to defense counsel within 10 days of the court’s order. On February 8, 2008, Respondent was served with a Notice of Order After Hearing containing the court’s February 5, 2008 orders.
43. On March 13, 2008, the court held a hearing and ordered the previously ordered
sanctions paid by April 1, 2008.
44. Respondent failed to pay the sanctions by April 1, 2008 as ordered by the court.
CONCLUSION OF LAW
45. By failing to comply with the October 12, 2007 order to pay $2,000 in sanctions to
defense counsel within 60 days, by failing to comply with the February 5, 2008 order to pay $7,850 in sanctions in 10 days, and by failing to comply with the court’s March 13, 2008 order to pay all previously ordered sanctions by April 1, 2008, Respondent willfully disobeyed or violated orders of the court requiring him to do or forbear an act connected with or in the course of Respondent’s profession which he ought in good faith to do or forbear in wilful violation of Business and Professions Code section 6103.
(6) Case No. 10-N-09199 - TI-IE 9.20 MATTER
FACTS
46. On May 26, 2010, the California Supreme Court filed an order, identified as
S 181713 in the Matter of Eugene Wellington Matthews (the "Order"). The Order included a requirement that Respondent comply with rule 9.20, California Rules of Court, by performing the acts specified in subdivisions (a) and (c) within 30 and 40 days, respectively, after the effective date of the Order.
47. On May 26, 2010, the Clerk of the California Supreme Court served a copy of the
Order on Respondent. Respondent received the Order.
48. The Supreme Court Order became effective on June 25, 2010, thirty days after the
Order was filed. Thus, Respondent was ordered to comply with subdivision (a) of rule 9.20 of the California Rules of Court no later than on July 25, 2010, and was ordered to comply with rule 9.20(c), by filing a declaration under penalty of perjury regarding his compliance with rule 9.20(a) with the clerk of the State Bar Court by August 4, 2010.
49. On July 29, 2010, Respondent filed his declaration with the State Bar Court. In the
declaration, Respondent represented under penalty of perjury, by checking the boxes next to the pre-printed statements, that he had no clients and that he did not represent any clients in pending matters as of the date upon which the Order to comply with rule 9.20 was filed May 26, 2010. In addition, in the declaration, Respondent represented under penalty of perjury, that he had no papers or other property to which clients were entitled and had earned all fees paid to him.
50. As Respondent represented that he had no pending client matters, Respondent did
not check the box next to the pre-printed statement that he had complied with the requirements of rule 9.20(a)(4).
51. Respondent represented on his 9.20 declaration filed on July 29, 2010 that he had
no clients from the time the May 26, 2010 supreme court order was filed through the time he filed his 9.20 declaration with the court. However, Respondent was attorney of record in four client matters pending before the federal distinct court during that period of time and was therefore required to notify in writing opposing counsel, his clients of his actual suspension and file a copy of such notice with the court but he failed to do so prior to filing his 9.20 declaration. Respondent misunderstood his duties under the rule but his misunderstanding was not reasonable.
52. Subsequently, on September 23, 2010, in a matter pending in United States District Court, Central District of California entitled, USA v. Arana et. al., case number 2:09-cr-01210PA-2 (the "Flores matter"), the court scheduled a hearing for September 27, 2010 regarding Respondent’s suspension and his continued representation of Flores. On or September 23, 2010, the court in the Flores matter ordered that Respondent be prepared on September 27, 2010 to
provide evidence of his compliance with Rule 9.20 of the California Rules of Court.
53. On September 27, 2010, the court in the Flores matter removed Respondent as
counsel for Flores and appointed a deputy public defender as Flores’s counsel. It was at this time that Respondent learned that he was not in compliance with rule 9.20.
54. Respondent did not comply with rule 9.20(a)(4) with respect to the Flores matter, as Respondent did not notify opposing counsel or his client of his actual suspension and, consequently, did not file a copy of such notice with the court.
55. Respondent’s declaration filed on July 29, 2010 was materially inaccurate in that
Respondent remained as the attorney of record for the defendants in matters which were pending in United States District Court, Central District of California after the supreme court order was filed and after the effective date of his suspension.
56. On October 8, 2010, Respondent filed a supplemental 9.20 declaration with
corrections.
CONCLUSION OF LAW
57. By not complying with rule 9.20 with respect to four client matters and by filing the
declaration containing inaccuracies with the State Bar Court, Respondent willfully violated rule 9.20, California Rules of Court.
DISMISSALS.
The parties respectfully request the Court dismiss one alleged violation from the NDC in the interest of justice:
Case No. 08-O-12594, Count One, Alleged Violation Rule 3-110(A), Rules of Professional Conduct
Case No. 08-O-12594, Count Two, Alleged Violation Rule 3-700(D)(2), Rules of Professional Conduct
Case No. 08-O-12594, Count Three, Alleged Violation Rule 4-200(A), Rules of Professional Conduct
Case No. 08-O-12752, Count Six, Alleged Violation Section 6068(m), Business and Professions Code
Case No. 08-O-14022, Count Nine, Alleged Violation Section 6106, Business and Professions Code
Case No. 08-O-14022, Count Twelve, Alleged Violation Rule 4-100(A), Rules of Professional Conduct
Case No. 09-O-11936, Count Fourteen, Alleged Violation Rule 3-700(D)(2), Rules of Professional Conduct
Case No. 09-O-12070, Count Fifteen, Alleged Violation Rule 3-110(A), Rules of Professional Conduct
SUPPORTING AUTHORITY
The purpose of State Bar disciplinary proceedings is not to punish the attorney, but to protect the public, to preserve public confidence in the profession, and to maintain the highest possible professional standards for attorneys. (Chadwick v. State Bar (1989) 49 Cal.3d 103, 111; Cooper v. State Bar (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1016, 1025; Std. 1.3.)
Standard 2.4(b) of the Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct, Rules Proc. Of State Bar, Title IV, provides for reproval or suspension for failure to perform or communicate. Standard 2.3 provides that a violation of moral turpitude shall result in suspension or disbarment and a three-month actual suspension where a CTA dip is concerned. Standard 2.6 provides for suspension or disbarment for a violation of sections 6103 or 6068(i) of the Business and Professions Code. Standard 2.10 provides for reproval or suspension for a violation of a rule not set out in the standards. Standard 1.7(a) provides for an increase in discipline in subsequent
proceedings.
The standards are guidelines (Drociak v. State Bar (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1085, 1090; In the Matter of Koehler (Review Dept. 1991) 1 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 615, 628) and are afforded great weight (In re Silverton (2005) 36 Cal.4th 81, 91-92) but they are not applied in a talismanic fashion (In the Matter of Van Sickle (Review Dept. 2006) 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 980, 994). The
determination of discipline involves an analysis of the standards on balance with any mitigation and aggravation. (Std. 1.6(b); Segal v. State Bar (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1077, 1089; Snyder v. State Bar (1990) 49 Cal.3d 1302, 1310-11.)
The misconduct and mitigation here occurred during the same time period as the misconduct in Respondent’s prior disciplinary matter (In the Matter of Sklar (Review Dept. 1993) 2 Cal.State Bar Ct. Rptr. 602.) The technical violation of rule 9.20 of the California Rules of Court because Respondent was attorney of record and therefore "had" clients during the time he represented he did not "have" clients requires at least an 18 month actual suspension to protect the public.
Advance Law Group, APC, was run by attorney Wayani Taylor, during Respondent’s
suspension. Prior to that time, Respondent was attorney of record for four clients in federal district court criminal matters. Respondent was under the unreasonable mistaken belief that a formal substitution of counsel substituting Wayani Taylor in and Respondent out was not required during the period of his suspension because he thought that the clients were technically represented by Advance Law Group, APC. But an entity cannot represent a client. Attorneys represent clients. Respondent’s theory was not well thought out and his assumption was unreasonable. He would have only succeeded in having no clients had he filed substitutions in each pending matter. Although represented by counsel at the time, Respondent did not seek advice specifically in regard to federal criminal matters. Respondent did however seek advice
regarding superior court criminal matters and had handled those matters properly regarding 9.20 compliance prior to the filing of the Supreme Court order. During his actual suspension, Respondent did not actually practice law.
Typically, a violation ofrnle 9.20 results in disbarment. (Lydon v. State Bar (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1181, 1187; Powers v. State Bar (1988) 44 Cal.3d 337, 341.) In this rare set of circumstances where Respondent due to his honest belief that he did not have clients at the time he filed the 9.20 declaration and upon learning of his mistaken belief supplemented his 9.20 declaration with the correct notice a deviation from disbarment is available. (Shapiro v. State Bar (1990) 51 Cal.3d 251 .) Respondent acknowledges his shrtcomings in 2010 and understands this second chance at rule 9.20 compliance, if violated, means his disbarment.
PENDING PROCEEDINGS.
The disclosure date referred to on page two, paragraph A.(7), was April 27, 2011.
COSTS OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS.
Respondent acknowledges that he was informed that as of April 27, 2011, the estimated prosecution costs in this matter are approximately $8,536.28.00. Respondent acknowledges that this figure is an estimate only and that it might not include State Bar Court costs (see Bus. & Prof. Code section 6068.10(c)) or taxable costs (see C.C.P. section 1033.5(a)), which will be included in any final cost assessment. Respondent further acknowledges that if this stipulation is
rejected or if relief from the stipulation is granted, the costs may increase due to further
proceedings. Note that if Respondent fails to pay any installment of disciplinary costs within the time provided herein or as may be modified by the State Bar Court pursuant to section 6086.10, subdivision(c), the remaining balance of the costs is due and payable immediately unless relief has been granted under the Rules of Procedure of the State Bar of California (Rules Proc. of State Bar, rule 5.130 (old rule 286)). Payment of costs is enforceable as provided in Business and Professions Code section 6140.7 and as a money judgment.
Case Number(s): 161396 08-O-12594~ 08-O-12752; 08-O-14022;
09-O-11936; 09-O-12070; 10-N-09199
In the Matter of: Eugene Wellington Matthews
<<not>> checked. a. Unless Respondent has been terminated from the Lawyer Assistance Program (“LAP”) prior to respondent’s successful completion of the LAP, respondent must comply with all provisions and conditions of respondent’s Participation Agreement with the LAP and must provide an appropriate waiver authorizing the LAP to provide the Office of Probation and this court with information regarding the terms and conditions of respondent’s participation in the LAP and respondent’s compliance or non-compliance with LAP requirements. Revocation of the written waiver for release of LAP information is a violation of this condition. However, if respondent has successfully completed the LAP, respondent need not comply with this condition.
checked. b. Respondent must obtain psychiatric or psychological help/treatment from a duly licensed psychiatrist, psychologist, or clinical social worker at respondent’s own expense a minimum of three times per month and must furnish evidence to the Office of Probation that respondent is so complying with each quarterly report. Help/treatment should commence immediately, and in any event, no later than thirty (30) days after the effective date of the discipline in this matter. Treatment must continue for days or months or four years or, the period of probation or until a motion to modify this condition is granted and that ruling becomes final.
If the treating psychiatrist, psychologist, or clinical social worker
determines that there has been a substantial change in respondent’s condition,
respondent or Office of the Chief Trial Counsel may file a motion for
modification of this condition with the Hearing Department of the State Bar
Court, pursuant to rule 5.300 of the Rules of Procedure of the State Bar. The
motion must be supported by a written statement from the psychiatrist,
psychologist, or clinical social worker, by affidavit or under penalty of
perjury, in support of the proposed modification.
<<not>> checked. c. Upon the request of the Office of Probation, respondent must provide the Office of Probation with medical waivers and access to all of respondent’s medical records. Revocation of any medical waiver is a violation of this condition. Any medical records obtained by the Office of Probation are confidential and no information concerning them or their contents will be given to anyone except members of the Office of Probation, Office of the Chief Trial Counsel, and the State Bar Court, who are directly involved with maintaining, enforcing or adjudicating this condition.
Other:
Case Number(s): 08-12594, et al.
In the Matter of: Eugene Wellington Matthews
a. Restitution
checked. Respondent must pay restitution (including the principal amount, plus interest of 10% per annum) to the payee(s) listed below. If the Client Security Fund (“CSF”) has reimbursed one or more of the payee(s) for all or any portion of the principal amount(s) listed below, Respondent must also pay restitution to CSF in the amount(s) paid, plus applicable interest and costs.
1. Payee: Jessica Seifert
Principal Amount: $3, 485.75
Interest Accrues From: 11/2/2007
2. Payee: Jessica Seifert
Principal Amount: $2,500.00
Interest Accrues From: 8/24/2007
3. Payee: Gumaro Garcia
Principal Amount: $500.00
Interest Accrues From 1/23/2008
4. Payee: Grace Shuk-Ting Ho
Principal Amount: $5,925.00
Interest Accrues From: 4/1/2008
<<not>> checked. Respondent must pay above-referenced restitution and provide satisfactory proof of payment to the Office of Probation not later than .
<<not>> checked. Respondent must pay the above-referenced restitution on the payment schedule set forth below. Respondent must provide satisfactory proof of payment to the Office of Probation with each quarterly probation report, or as otherwise directed by the Office of Probation. No later than 30 days prior to the expiration of the period of probation (or period of reproval), Respondent must make any necessary final payment(s) in order to complete the payment of restitution, including interest, in full.
1. Payee/CSF (as applicable)
Minimum Payment Amount
Payment Frequency
2. Payee/CSF (as applicable)
Minimum Payment Amount
Payment Frequency
3. Payee/CSF (as applicable)
Minimum Payment Amount
Payment Frequency
4. Payee/CSF (as applicable)
Minimum Payment Amount
Payment Frequency
<<not>> checked. If Respondent fails to pay any installment as described above, or as may be modified by the State Bar Court, the remaining balance is due and payable immediately.
<<not>> checked.
1. If Respondent possesses client funds at any time during the period covered by a required quarterly report, Respondent must file with each required report a certificate from Respondent and/or a certified public accountant or other financial professional approved by the Office of Probation, certifying that:
a. Respondent has maintained a bank account in a bank authorized to do business in the State of California, at a branch located within the State of California, and that such account is designated as a “Trust Account” or “Clients’ Funds Account”;
b. Respondent has kept and maintained the following:
i. A written ledger for each client on whose behalf funds are held that sets forth:
1. the name of such client;
2. the date, amount and source of all funds received on behalf of such client;
3. the date, amount, payee and purpose of each disbursement made on behalf of such client; and,
4. the current balance for such client.
ii. a written journal for each client trust fund account that sets forth:
1. the name of such account;
2. the date, amount and client affected by each debit and credit; and,
3. the current balance in such account.
iii. all bank statements and cancelled checks for each client trust account; and,
iv. each monthly reconciliation (balancing) of (i), (ii), and (iii), above, and if there are any differences between the monthly total balances reflected in (i), (ii), and (iii), above, the reasons for the differences.
c. Respondent has maintained a written journal of securities or other properties held for clients that specifies:
i. each item of security and property held;
ii. the person on whose behalf the security or property is held;
iii. the date of receipt of the security or property;
iv. the date of distribution of the security or property; and,
v. the person to whom the security or property was distributed.
2. If Respondent does not possess any client funds, property or securities during the entire period covered by a report, Respondent must so state under penalty of perjury in the report filed with the Office of Probation for that reporting period. In this circumstance, Respondent need not file the accountant’s certificate described above.
3. The requirements of this condition are in addition to those set forth in rule 4-100, Rules of Professional Conduct.
checked. Within one (1) year of the effective date of the discipline herein, Respondent must supply to the Office of Probation satisfactory proof of attendance at a session of the Ethics School Client Trust Accounting School, within the same period of time, and passage of the test given at the end of that session.
Case Number(s): 08-O-12594
In the Matter of: Eugene Wellington Matthews
By their signatures below, the parties and their counsel, as applicable, signify their agreement with each of the recitation and each of the terms and conditions of this Stipulation Re Facts, Conclusions of Law and Disposition.
Signed by:
Respondent: Eugene Wellington Matthews
Date: April 28, 2011
Respondent’s Counsel: Dave Clare
Date: April 28, 2011
Deputy Trial Counsel: Jean Cha
Date: April 29, 2011
Case Number(s): 08-O-12594
In the Matter of: Eugene Wellington Matthews
Finding the stipulation to be fair to the parties and that it adequately protects the public, IT IS ORDERED that the requested dismissal of counts/charges, if any is GRANTED without prejudice, and:
<<not>> checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED and the DISCIPLINE RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED AS MODIFIED as set forth below, and the DISCIPLINE IS RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
<<not>> checked. All Hearing dates are vacated.
The parties are bound by the stipulation as approved unless: 1) a motion to withdraw or modify the stipulation, filed within 15 days after service of this order, is granted; or 2) this court modifies or further modifies the approved stipulation. (See rule 5.58 (E) & (F), Rules of Procedure.) The effective date of this disposition is the effective date of the Supreme Court order herein, normally 30 days after the file date. (See rule 9.18(a), California Rules of Court.)
Signed by:
Judge of the State Bar Court: Richard A. Honn
Date: May 4, 2011
[Rules Proc. of State Bar; Rule 5.27(B); Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a(4)]
I am a Case Administrator of the State Bar Court of California. I am over the age of eighteen and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to standard court practice, in the City and County of Los Angeles, on May 5, 2011, I deposited a true copy of the following document(s):
STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
DISPOSITION AND ORDER APPROVING
in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:
checked. by first-class mail, with postage thereon fully prepaid, through the United States Postal Service at Los Angeles, California, addressed as follows:
DAVID ALAN CLARE
DAVID A CLARE, ATTORNEY AT LAW
444W OCEAN BLVD STE 800
LONG BEACH, CA 90802
checked. by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of California addressed as follows:
Jean Hee Cha, Enforcement, Los Angeles
I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in Los Angeles, California, on May 5, 2011.
Signed by:
Cristina Potter
Case Administrator
State Bar Court