Case Number(s): 08-O-14551
In the Matter of: Jaime V. Stringfield, Bar # 179846, A Member of the State Bar of California (Respondent)
Counsel for The State Bar: Robert Henderson, Deputy Trial Counsel 180 Howard St., San Francisco, CA 94105, Bar # 173205
Counsel for Respondent: Jonathan Arons, 221 Main St., Suite 740, San Francisco, CA 94105, (415) 957-1818, Bar # 111257
Submitted to: State Bar Court Clerk’s Office San Francisco
Filed: February 14, 2012
<<not>> checked. PREVIOUS STIPULATION REJECTED
Note: All information required by this form and any additional information which cannot be provided in the space provided, must be set forth in an attachment to this stipulation under specific headings, e.g., "Facts," "Dismissals," "Conclusions of Law," "Supporting Authority," etc.
1. Respondent is a member of the State Bar of California, admitted December 1, 1995.
2. The parties agree to be bound by the factual stipulations contained herein even if conclusions of law or disposition are rejected or changed by the Supreme Court.
3. All investigations or proceedings listed by case number in the caption of this stipulation are entirely resolved by this stipulation and are deemed consolidated. Dismissed charge(s)/count(s) are listed under "Dismissals." The stipulation consists of 10 pages, not including the order.
4. A statement of acts or omissions acknowledged by Respondent as cause or causes for discipline is included under "Facts."
5. Conclusions of law, drawn from and specifically referring to the facts are also included under "Conclusions of Law".
6. The parties must include supporting authority for the recommended level of discipline under the heading "Supporting Authority."
7. No more than 30 days prior to the filing of this stipulation, Respondent has been advised in writing of any pending investigation/proceeding not resolved by this stipulation, except for criminal investigations.
8. Payment of Disciplinary Costs-Respondent acknowledges the provisions of Bus. & Prof. Code §§6086.10 & 6140.7. (Check one option only):
<<not>> checked. Until costs are paid in full, Respondent will remain actually suspended from the practice of law unless relief is obtained per rule 5.130, Rules of Procedure.
checked. Costs are to be paid in equal amounts prior to February 1 for the following membership years: 2013 and 2014. (Hardship, special circumstances or other good cause per rule 5.132, Rules of Procedure.) If Respondent fails to pay any installment as described above, or as may be modified by the State Bar Court, the remaining balance is due and payable immediately.
<<not>> checked. Costs are waived in part as set forth in a separate attachment entitled "Partial Waiver of Costs".
<<not>> checked. Costs are entirely waived.
(Effective January 1, 2011)
Actual Suspension
IN THE MATTER OF: JAIME V. STRINGFIELD, State Bar No. 179846
STATE BAR COURT CASE NUMBER: 08-O-14551
Respondent admits that the following facts are true and that she is culpable of violations of the specified statutes and/or Rules of Professional Conduct.
Case No. 08-O-14551 (Complainant: Michael Kresser)
1. Michael Kerkeles aka Michael Kerk ("Kerkeles") allegedly sexually assaulted a
developmentally delayed adult identified as Jane Doe. The alleged victim had the mental maturity of approximately a 7-year-old child.
2. On March 15, 2005, Jane Doe’s mother reported the possible assault on her daughter to the police. Due to Jane Doe’s mental immaturity the police had difficulty identifying an accurate timeline, location of the alleged assault, and nature of the acts committed. However, the acts were to have taken place on a blanket in Kerkeles’ garage.
3. On May 4, 2005, the police conducted a search and recovered a blanket, believed to be the one described by Jane Doe. Subsequently the police created a "ruse" crime lab report indicating that Kerkeles’ semen had been identified on the blanket. The "ruse" report was dated May 4, 2005. The actual report, dated July 14, 2005, revealed no semen on the blanket. Both reports were provided to the District Attorney’s office.
4. The District Attorney’s office produced both the "ruse" report and the actual report to defense counsel.
5. In November 2005, Respondent worked as a Deputy District Attorney with the Santa Clara District Attorney’s Office. In November 2005, respondent was assigned the prosecution of Kerkeles.
6. On November 10, 2005, defense counsel wrote respondent and requested all records of the Crime Lab that related to the two reports. Respondent replied that the request for records was too vague. Defense counsel did not continue to pursue the Crime Lab records at that time. Respondent did not at that time request the information from the lab which supported the two reports. Had respondent contacted the lab, she would have known the "ruse" report had been produced to defense counsel.
7. On March 22, 2006, and June 30, 2006, preliminary hearings took place in the Kerkeles prosecution. On both occasions Jane Doe testified in such a fashion that the judge declined to find her as a competent witness. Kerkeles was not held to answer.
8. On July 19, 2006, a third preliminary hearing took place. Prior to the preliminary hearing respondent reviewed her file and noted the "ruse" report. Respondent also noted the legitimate report, but paid it scant attention as it did not support her position. At the hearing, the officer that conducted the search had a copy of the "ruse" report. Respondent elicited testimony from the officer regarding the contents of the "ruse" report. The officer’s testimony was that semen had been found on the blanket. Based on the officer’s testimony the court found probable cause and held Kerkeles to answer. Defense counsel asserts that prior to and during the preliminary hearing defense counsel did not know that the "ruse" report had been fabricated. Had respondent noted the discrepancy between the two reports and then contacted the lab, she would have discovered that the "ruse" report had been produced to defense counsel.
9. Following the preliminary hearing defense counsel contacted the lab on at least two occasions to attempt to discover why the two reports conflicted. Eventually defense counsel discovered that the "ruse" report had been fabricated. Upon learning of the fabrication, defense counsel raised with respondent numerous issues regarding the preliminary hearing.
10. On October 11, 2006, respondent informed the police officer that testified regarding the report that the crime lab had told her that they had no record of such a report. Respondent also informed her supervisor of the "ruse" report’s use at the preliminary hearing. Respondent asserts that on that same date she contacted defense counsel regarding the "ruse" report and notified him of the nature of the "ruse" report.
11. On November 20, 2006, respondent offered a plea deal to Kerkeles.
12. On December 4, 2006, defense counsel informed respondent of his intention to move for dismissal based in part on the false report. On December 6, 2006, the District Attorney’s office dismissed charges against Kerkeles.
13. Respondent had possession of and reviewed both reports prior to the July 19, 2006, preliminary hearing.
14. The "ruse" report listed the crime lab analyst as Rebecca Roberts. The lab had no such employee. The "ruse" report was dated the same day of the search. A DNA report typically took several days to obtain. Had respondent ever contacted the lab to inquire about the discrepancy between the two reports, the timing of the two reports, and the identity of the two lab analysts, she would have discovered that the "ruse" report had been produced to defense counsel.
15. Respondent was grossly negligent when reviewing the reports and subsequently eliciting testimony from the officer based on the "ruse" report.
16. By using the ruse report at the preliminary hearing, and by eliciting testimony from the police officer, which was based on the "ruse" report, respondent misled the judge by a false statement of fact, in willful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 5-200(B).
The disclosure date referred to, on page 2, paragraph A(7), was January 30, 2012.
Nolan v. State Bar (1965) 63 Cal.2d 298 -Nolan, a deputy district attorney, aided in the removal of names from a prospective juror list to favor only pro-prosecution witnesses. Nolan received 30-days actual suspension.
Price v. State Bar (1982) 30 Cal.3d 537 - Price suppressed written evidence, altered the suppressed evidence and then introduced the altered writing at trial to protect the credibility of his witness. After the defense discovered the altered evidence, Price made a deal with the defendant that Price would seek a more favorable sentence for the defendant if the defendant agreed not to appeal. Price admitted that he made the deal with the defendant to avoid the disclosure of his misconduct. Price had no prior record of discipline, cooperated with the State Bar, had been under emotional distress due to a heavy case load, had asked for a reduced workload, but was denied the request, presented 7 good character witnesses and showed rehabilitation through testimony from a psychiatrist. Price received a two-year actual
suspension.
Standard 2.3 - Culpability of a member of an act of moral turpitude, fraud or intentional dishonesty toward a court, client or another person or of concealment of a material fact to a court, client or another person shall result in actual suspension or disbarment depending upon the extent to which the victim of the misconduct is harmed or misled and depending upon the magnitude of the act of misconduct and the degree to which it relates to the member’s acts within the practice of law.
Respondent acknowledges that the Office of the Chief Trial Counsel has informed respondent that as of January 30, 2012, the prosecution costs in this matter are $2,797. Respondent further acknowledges that should this stipulation be rejected or should relief from the stipulation be granted, the costs in this matter may increase due to the cost of further proceedings.
Case Number(s): 08-O-14551
In the Matter of: Jaime V. Stringfield
By their signatures below, the parties and their counsel, as applicable, signify their agreement with each of the recitation and each of the terms and conditions of this Stipulation Re Facts, Conclusions of Law and Disposition.
Signed by:
Respondent: Jaime V. Stringfield
Date: January 31, 2012
Respondent’s Counsel: Jonathan Arons
Date: January 31, 2012
Deputy Trial Counsel: Robert A. Henderson
Date: January 31, 2012
ACTUAL
SUSPENSION ORDER
Case Number(s): 08-O-14551
In the Matter of: Jaime V. Stringfield
Finding the stipulation to be fair to the parties and that it adequately protects the public, IT IS ORDERED that the requested dismissal of counts/charges, if any is GRANTED without prejudice, and:
checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED and the DISCIPLINE RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
<<not>> checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED AS MODIFIED as set forth below, and the DISCIPLINE IS RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
checked. All Hearing dates are vacated.
The parties are bound by the stipulation as approved unless: 1) a motion to withdraw or modify the stipulation, filed within 15 days after service of this order, is granted; or 2) this court modifies or further modifies the approved stipulation. (See rule 5.58 (E) & (F), Rules of Procedure.) The effective date of this disposition is the effective date of the Supreme Court order herein, normally 30 days after the file date. (See rule 9.18(a), California Rules of Court.)
Signed by:
Judge of the State Bar Court: Lucy Armendariz
Date: February 13, 2012
(Effective January 1, 2011)
Actual Suspension Order
[Rules Proc. of State Bar; Rule 5.27(B); Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a(4)]
I am a Case Administrator of the State Bar Court of California. I am over the age of eighteen and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to standard court practice, in the City and County of San Francisco, on February 14, 2012, I deposited a true copy of the following document(s):
STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION AND
ORDER APPROVING
in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:
checked. by first-class mail, with postage thereon fully prepaid, through the United States Postal Service at San Francisco, California, addressed as follows:
JONATHAN IRWIN ARONS
LAW OFC JONATHAN I ARONS
221 MAIN ST STE 740
SAN FRANCISCO, CA 91405
checked. by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of California addressed as follows:
ROBERT A. HENDERSON, Enforcement, San Francisco
I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in San Francisco, California, on February 14, 2012.
Signed by:
Mazie Yip
Case Administrator
State Bar Court