Case Number(s): 09-O-15713-RAH
In the Matter of: Jack R. Willis Bar #43789 A Member of the State Bar of California, (Respondent).
Counsel For The State Bar: Anthony J. Garcia, Deputy Trial Counsel
State Bar of California
1149 South Hill Street
Los Angeles, CA 90015
(213) 765-1089
Bar #171419
Counsel for Respondent: In Pro Per Respondent
Jack R. Willis
7095 Hollywood Blvd. Suite 806
Los Angeles, CA 90028
(323) 876-4700
Bar # 43789
Submitted to: Assigned Judge, State Bar Court Clerk’s Office Los Angeles
Filed: October 2, 2012
<<not>> checked. PREVIOUS STIPULATION REJECTED
Note: All information required by this form and any additional information which cannot be provided in the space provided, must be set forth in an attachment to this stipulation under specific headings, e.g., "Facts," "Dismissals," "Conclusions of Law," "Supporting Authority," etc.
1. Respondent is a member of the State Bar of California, admitted January 9, 1969.
2. The parties agree to be bound by the factual stipulations contained herein even if conclusions of law or disposition are rejected or changed by the Supreme Court.
3. All investigations or proceedings listed by case number in the caption of this stipulation are entirely resolved by this stipulation and are deemed consolidated. Dismissed charge(s)/count(s) are listed under "Dismissals." The stipulation consists of 13 pages, not including the order.
4. A statement of acts or omissions acknowledged by Respondent as cause or causes for discipline is included under "Facts."
5. Conclusions of law, drawn from and specifically referring to the facts are also included under "Conclusions of Law".
6. The parties must include supporting authority for the recommended level of discipline under the heading "Supporting Authority."
7. No more than 30 days prior to the filing of this stipulation, Respondent has been advised in writing of any pending investigation/proceeding not resolved by this stipulation, except for criminal investigations.
8. Payment of Disciplinary Costs-Respondent acknowledges the provisions of Bus. & Prof. Code §§6086.10 & 6140.7. (Check one option only):
checked. Costs are awarded to the State Bar.
<<not>> checked. Costs are waived in part as set forth in a separate attachment entitled "Partial Waiver of Costs".
<<not>> checked. Costs are entirely waived.
9.
ORDER OF INACTIVE ENROLLMENT:
The parties are aware that if this stipulation is approved, the judge will
issue an order of inactive enrollment under Business and Professions Code
section 6007, subdivision (c)(4), and Rules of Procedure of the State Bar, rule
5.111(D)(1).
IN THE MATTER OF: JACK R. WILLIS
CASE NUMBER: 09-O-15713-RAH
FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Respondent admits that the following facts are true and that he is culpable of violations of the specified statutes and/or Rules of Professional Conduct.
Case No. 09-O-15713-RAH (Complainants: Harold and Idell Goldstein)
FACTS:
1. In November 2004, Harold Goldstein (Harold) and Idell Goldstein (Idell) (collectively, the Goldsteins) employed Respondent to represent them in a personal injury matter related to a November 5, 2004, automobile accident. The parties agreed that Respondent would represent the Goldsteins on a contingent fee basis.
2. The at-fault party was represented by Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co. (Fireman’s).
3. In October 2006, Respondent and Fireman’s settled Harold’s claim for $10,000 and Idell’s claim for $100,000. Fireman’s mailed the settlement drafts to Respondent. Respondent received the settlement drafts.
4. Blue Cross of California (Blue Cross) had a lien totaling $5,496.11 against Idell’s settlement funds, and Medicare had a lien totaling $42,502.49, against Idell’s settlement funds.
5. On October 24, 2006, Respondent deposited Harold’s $10,000 settlement draft, and Idell’s $100,000 settlement draft into Respondent’s client trust account at Wells Fargo Bank, account no. xxxxxx4091 (CTA) (The bank account numbers are redacted for privacy.) 6. Respondent did not inform the Goldsteins that he received their settlement drafts in October 2006. The Goldsteins did not endorse the settlement drafts before they were deposited into Respondent’s CTA.
7. Respondent did not inform the Goldsteins that he had received their settlement funds until March 2009.
8. Respondent was entitled to retain $40,000 as fees and $5,488.36 as costs from Idell’s settlement funds. Therefore, Respondent was required to maintain $54,511.64 of Idell’s funds in his CTA.
9. Respondent was entitled to retain $4,000 as fees from Harold’s settlement funds. Therefore, Respondent was required to maintain $6,000 of Harold’s funds in his CTA.
10. In total, Respondent was required to maintain a total of $60,511.64 of the Goldstein’s settlement funds in his CTA.
11. On January 29, 2007, Respondent transferred the Goldsteins’ settlement funds and an additional sum of $5,488.36 (totaling $66,000) from his CTA to a new account at Mirae Bank, account no. xxx0119 (Mirae account).
12. The Mirae account was not a client trust account, but Respondent designated it as a "special trust account" and a "Business Super Now Account." The Mirae account was an interest-bearing account, but was not labeled as a trust account held in Respondent’s name solely on behalf of the Goldsteins.
13. On April 19, 2007, Respondent disbursed $50,000 from the Mirae account and used it to open another account at Mirae bank, account no. xxx1632 (the "second Mirae account"). Respondent designated the second Mirae account as a "special trust account" and a "Business Money Market Account."
I4. On April I9, 2007, $I6,193.14 remained in the Mirae account.
15. On February 8, 2008 Respondent was required to maintain a total of $60,511.64 of the Goldstein’s settlement funds. On February 8, 2008, the balance in the Mirae account was $1,788.49, and the balance in the second Mirae account was $51,567.81.
16. As of February 8, 2008, Respondent had misappropriated $7,155.34 of the Goldsteins’ funds.
17. On September 8, 2008, Respondent transferred $24,868.46 from the second Mirae account into the Mirae account. After the transfer, the balance in the Mirae account was $33,700.48.
18. On September 8, 2008, Respondent issued check number 1065 from the Mirae account to Medicare for $22,594.96 on Idell’s behalf. Medicare agreed to accept $22,594.96 as full payment of its lien.
19. Respondent was delayed in his ability to negotiate Idell’s Medicare lien because he was unable to locate the proper party with whom to negotiate the lien.
20. After disbursing 22,594.96 to Medicare on Idell’s behalf, Respondent was required to maintain $37,916.68 of the Goldstein’s funds.
21. On October 10, 2008, Respondent issued check number 1073 from the Mirae account, in the amount of $1,500, to Meridian Resource Company (Meridian), on Idell’s behalf. Meridian was the agent for Blue Cross. Meridian agreed to accept $1,500 as full payment of the Blue Cross lien.
22. After disbursing $1,500 to Meridian on Idell’s behalf, Respondent was required to maintain $36,416.68 of the Goldsteins’ funds.
23. On January 5, 2009, the balance in the Mirae account was $-958.22 and the balance in the second Mirae account on January 5, 2009 was $26,141.87.
24. As of January 5, 2009, Respondent had misappropriated $11,233.03 of the Goldsteins’ funds.
25. In March 2009, Harold contacted Respondent and requested that Respondent disburse the Goldsteins’ settlement funds to them.
26. In March 2009, Respondent provided an accounting to Idell for her $100,000 settlement. Respondent’s accounting showed that he was entitled to retain $45,488.36 as reimbursement for legal fees and costs, that he paid $24,094.96 to Idell’s lienholders, and that he was required to disburse $30,416.68 to Idell.
27. On April 7, 2009, Respondent issued check no. 1119 from the Mirae account to Idell for $30,416.68 as her portion of the $100,000 settlement. That same day Respondent issued check No. 1120 from the Mirae account to Harold for $6,000 as his portion of the $10,000 settlement.
28. On April 14, 2009, check numbers 1119 and 1120 were paid from the Mirae account.
Respondent had deposited sufficient funds from other sources to enable Mirae bank to pay the checks that Respondent wrote to Idell and Harold.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
29. By misappropriating $7,155.34 and $11,233.03, respectively, of the Goldstein’s funds, Respondent committed an act or acts involving moral turpitude, dishonesty or corruption in willful violation of California Business and Professions Code section 6106.
30. By removing the Goldsteins’ funds from his client trust account and putting them into the Mirae accounts, Respondent failed to maintain funds in a client trust account in willful violation of California Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 4-100(A).
31. By receiving the Goldsteins funds in October 2006, and not informing the Goldsteins that he had received their funds until March 2009, Respondent failed to keep a client reasonably informed of significant developments in a matter in which Respondent had agreed to provide legal services in willful violation of California Business and Professions Code section 6068(m).
Case No. 09-0-15713-RAH (Complainants: F. Adineh)
FACTS:
32. In April 2009, Respondent represented F. Adineh (Adineh) in a personal injury matter.
33. In April 2009, Respondent settled Adineh’s personal injury matter. On April 2, 2009, Respondent deposited a $35,000 settlement draft he received on behalf of Adineh into the Mirae account.
34. On April 8, 2008, Respondent deposited a $2,500 settlement draft he that he had received on behalf of Adineh, payable to Adineh and Respondent, into the Mirae account.
35. On May 13, 2009, Respondent disbursed $2,000 to Adineh from the Mirae account.
36. On July 17, 2009, Respondent deposited a $15,000 settlement draft he that he had received on behalf of Adineh, payable to Adineh and Respondent, into the Mirae account.
37. By July 17, 2009, Respondent had received a total of $52,500 in funds on Adineh’s behalf. Respondent had previously disbursed $2000 to Adineh, and was entitled to retain $28,213.34 as his share of Adineh’s funds. Respondent was required to maintain the balance of Adineh’s settlement funds, $22,286.66, in his client trust account.
38. On July 31, 2009, the balance in the Mirae account was $5,691.73.
39. Respondent dishonestly, or with gross negligence misappropriated Adineh’s funds.
40. On September 4, 2009, Respondent disbursed $26,213.34 to Adineh. This included the sum that Respondent was holding for Adineh, and an additional sum of $3,926.68.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
41. By misappropriating $16,594.93 of the Adineh’s funds, Respondent committed an act involving moral turpitude, dishonesty or corruption in willful violation of California Business and Professions Code section 6106.
42. By depositing Adineh’s funds into the Mirae account and not into a client trust account, Respondent failed to maintain funds in a client trust account in willful violation of California Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 4-100(A).
ADDITIONAL FACTS RE: AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES.
Prior Record of Discipline: Respondent has two prior records of discipline:
On September 2, 1992, in Supreme Court case no. S027362, Respondent was suspended for 60 days,
stayed, for the following misconduct in the following four (4) cases:
Case no. 85-0-14505: Respondent acquired an adverse interest in his client’s property in violation of former California Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 5-101.
Case no. 89-0-16776: Respondent abandoned a client and failed to promptly pay settlement funds to a client in willful violation of California Rules of Professional Conduct, rules 4-100(B)(4) and 3-700(A)(2).
Case no. 91-O-337: Respondent failed to perform in a client matter and failed to pay a court-ordered sanction in willful violation of California Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-110(A) and former California Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 6-101 (A)(2).
Case no 91-O-2915: Respondent failed to return a client’s file and failed to provide an accounting to the client in willful violation of California Rules of Professional Conduct, rules 3-700(D)(1) and 4-100(B).
On July 28, 1999, the Supreme Court, in case no. S077493, suspended Respondent for 60 days in a matter involving the following misconduct:
Case no. 92-O-17879: Respondent made material misrepresentations to opposing counsel in violation of California Business and Professions Code sections 6068(d) and 6106.
Harm
In both of the matters involved in this stipulation, Respondent misappropriated client funds. His actions harmed his clients.
Multiple Acts
Respondent’s misconduct evidences of multiple acts of misconduct.
ADDITIONAL MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
Pre-trial Stipulation
Respondent is receiving mitigation for entering into a full stipulation with the Office of the Chief Trial Counsel prior to trial in case no 09-0-15713-RAH, thereby preserving State Bar Court time and resources. (In the Matter of Downey (Review Dept. 2009) 5 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr 189,195; In the Matter of Johnson (Review Dept. 2000) 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 179, 190; see also Silva-Vidor v. State Bar (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1071, 1079.)
Pro-Bono Work
Respondent is receiving mitigation for his pro-bono work in the Los Angeles Superior Court, where Respondent has been a volunteer in the court’s ADR program since 1995. (In the Matter of Respondent K (Review Dept. 1993) 2 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 335,339.)
AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING DISCIPLINE
The Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct provide a "process of fixing discipline" pursuant to a set of written principles to "better discharge the purposes of attorney discipline as announced by the Supreme Court." (Rules Proc. of State Bar, tit. IV, Stds. for Atty. Sanctions for Prof. Misconduct, Introduction (all further references to standards are to this source).) The primary purposes of disciplinary proceedings and of the sanctions imposed are "the protection of the public, the courts and the legal profession; the maintenance of high professional standards by attorneys and the preservation of public confidence in the legal profession." (In re Morse (1995) 11 Cal.4th 184, 205; std 1.3.)
Although not binding, the standards are entitled to "great weight" and should be followed "whenever possible" in determining level of discipline. (In re Silverton (2005) 36 Cal.4th 81, 92, quoting In re Brown (1995) 12 Cal.4u’ 205, 220 and In re Young (1989) 49 Cal.3d 257, 267, fn. 11.) Adherence to the standards in the great majority of cases serves the valuable purpose of eliminating disparity and assuring consistency, that is, the imposition of similar attorney discipline for instances of similar attorney misconduct. (In re Naney (1990) 51 Cal.3d 186, 190.) Any discipline recommendation different from that set forth in the applicable standards should clearly explain the reasons for the deviation. (Blair v. State Bar (1989) 49 Cal.3d 762, 776, fn. 5.)
Respondent admits to committing five acts of professional misconduct. Standard 1.6 (a) requires that where a Respondent acknowledges two or more acts of misconduct, and different sanctions are prescribed by the standards that apply to those acts, the sanction imposed shall be the more or most severe prescribed in the applicable standards.
The most severe sanction applicable to Respondent’s misconduct is found in standard 2.2(a) which applies to Respondent’s violation(s) of California Business and Professions Code section 6106 (misappropriation).
Standard 2.2(a) states that culpability of a member of a willful misappropriation of entrusted funds or property shall result in disbarment. Only if the amount of funds or property misappropriated is insignificantly small or if the most compelling mitigating circumstances clearly predominate, shall disbarment not be imposed. In those latter cases, the discipline shall not be less that a one-year actual suspension, irrespective of mitigating circumstances.
Although standard 2.2(a) is "a guideline rather than.., an inflexible rule" (Lipson v. State Bar (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1010, 1022), misappropriation generally warrants disbarment in the absence of clearly mitigating circumstances. (Kelly v. State Bar (1988) 45 Cal.3d 649, 656 ["Misappropriation of client trust funds has long been viewed as a particularly serious ethical violation. [Citations.]")
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that disbarment is the usual discipline for the willful misappropriation of client funds (See, Grim v. State Bar (1991) 53 Cal.3d 21; Edwards v. State Bar (1990) 52 Cal.3d 28, 37; Howard v. State Bar (1990) 51 Cal.3d 215, 221; and Chang v. State Bar (1989) 49 Cal.3d 114, 128).)
In this matter, Respondent has misappropriated client funds in two separate matters. In the Goldstein matter Respondent misappropriated $11,233, and in the Adineh matter Respondent misappropriated $16,594. In total Respondent misappropriated $27,827. This fact alone indicates that the appropriate discipline in this matter is disbarment.
In addition, Respondent has two prior disciplines. His prior disciplines involve serious breaches of his ethical duties to his clients and to the profession. Because this is Respondent’s third discipline, Standard 1.7(b) states that the degree of discipline in this proceeding shall be disbarment unless the most compelling circumstances clearly mitigate.
PENDING PROCEEDINGS.
The disclosure date referred to, on page 2, paragraph A(7), was September 24, 2012.
COSTS OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS.
Respondent acknowledges that the Office of the Chief Trial Counsel has informed respondent that as of September 20, 2012, the prosecution costs in this matter are $5,838. Respondent further acknowledges that should this stipulation be rejected or should relief from the stipulation be granted, the costs in this matter may increase due to the cost of further proceedings.
WAIVER OF VARIANCE BETWEEN NOTICE OF DISCIPLINARY CHARGES AND
STIPULATED FACTS AND CULPABILITY.
The parties waive any variance between the Notice of Disciplinary Charges filed in this matter, and the facts and/or conclusions of law obtained in this stipulation. Additionally, the parties waive the issuance of an amended Notice of Disciplinary Charges. The parties further waive the right to the filing of a Notice of Disciplinary Charges and to a formal hearing on any charge not included in the pending Notice of Disciplinary Charges.
Case Number(s): 09-O-15713
In the Matter of: Jack R. Willis
By their signatures below, the parties and their counsel, as applicable, signify their agreement with each of the recitation and each of the terms and conditions of this Stipulation Re Facts, Conclusions of Law and Disposition.
Signed by:
Respondent: Jack R. Willis
Date: 9-24-12
Respondent’s Counsel:
Date:
Deputy Trial Counsel: Anthony J. Garcia
Date: 9-24-12
Case Number(s): 09-O-15713
In the Matter of: Jack R. Willis
Finding the stipulation to be fair to the parties and that it adequately protects the public, IT IS ORDERED that the requested dismissal of counts/charges, if any is GRANTED without prejudice, and:
checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED and the DISCIPLINE RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
<<not>>checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED AS MODIFIED as set forth below, and the DISCIPLINE IS RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
<<not>>checked. All Hearing dates are vacated.
The parties are bound by the stipulation as approved unless: 1) a motion to withdraw or modify the stipulation, filed within 15 days after service of this order, is granted; or 2) this court modifies or further modifies the approved stipulation. (See rule 5.58 (E) & (F), Rules of Procedure.) The effective date of this disposition is the effective date of the Supreme Court order herein, normally 30 days after the file date. (See rule 9.18(a), California Rules of Court.)
Respondent Jack R. Willis is ordered transferred to involuntary inactive status pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 6007, subdivision (c)(4). Respondent’s inactive enrollment will be effective three (3) calendar days after this order is served by mail and will terminate upon the effective date of the Supreme Court’s order imposing discipline herein, or as provided for by rule 5.111(D)(2) or the Rules of Procedure of the State Bar of California, or as otherwise ordered by the Supreme Court pursuant to its plenary jurisdiction.
Signed by:
Judge of the State Bar Court: Richard A. Platel
Date: 10-1-12
[Rules Proc. of State Bar; Rule 5.27(B); Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a(4)]
I am a Case Administrator of the State Bar Court of California. I am over the age of eighteen and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to standard court practice, in the City and County of Los Angeles on October 2, 2012, I deposited a true copy of the following document(s):
STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION AND ORDER APPROVING
in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:
checked. by first-class mail, with postage thereon fully prepaid, through the United States Postal Service at Los Angeles, California, addressed as follows:
JACK R WILLIS ESQ.
JACK R. WILLIS
7095 HOLLYWOOD BLVD STE 806
LOS ANGELES, CA 90028
checked. by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of California addressed as follows:
Anthony J. Garcia, Enforcement, Los Angeles
I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in Los Angeles, California, on October 2, 2012.
Signed by: Paul Barona
Case Administrator
State Bar Court