Case Number(s): 09-O-16744, 09-O-18113, 10-O-01911, 10-O-02309, 10-O-02453, 10-O-04712, 10-O-05792 and 10-O-06947
In the Matter of: Kelly D. Christensen, Bar # 182620, A Member of the State Bar of California, (Respondent).
Counsel For The State Bar: Monique T. Miller, Office of the Chief Trial Counsel
1149 South Hill Street
Los Angeles, CA 90015-2299
(213) 765-1486
Bar # 212469,
Counsel for Respondent: In Pro Per Respondent
Kelly D. Christensen
7757 Dancy Road
San Diego, CA 92126
(858) 863-6575
Bar # 182620
Submitted to: State Bar Court Clerk’s Office San Francisco.
<<not>> checked. PREVIOUS STIPULATION REJECTED
Note: All information required by this form and any additional information which cannot be provided in the space provided, must be set forth in an attachment to this stipulation under specific headings, e.g., "Facts," "Dismissals," "Conclusions of Law," "Supporting Authority," etc.
1. Respondent is a member of the State Bar of California, admitted June 12, 1996.
2. The parties agree to be bound by the factual stipulations contained herein even if conclusions of law or disposition are rejected or changed by the Supreme Court.
3. All investigations or proceedings listed by case number in the caption of this stipulation are entirely resolved by this stipulation and are deemed consolidated. Dismissed charge(s)/count(s) are listed under "Dismissals." The stipulation consists of 17 pages, not including the order.
4. A statement of acts or omissions acknowledged by Respondent as cause or causes for discipline is included under "Facts."
5. Conclusions of law, drawn from and specifically referring to the facts are also included under "Conclusions of Law".
6. The parties must include supporting authority for the recommended level of discipline under the heading "Supporting Authority."
7. No more than 30 days prior to the filing of this stipulation, Respondent has been advised in writing of any pending investigation/proceeding not resolved by this stipulation, except for criminal investigations.
8. Payment of Disciplinary Costs-Respondent acknowledges the provisions of Bus. & Prof. Code §§6086.10 & 6140.7. (Check one option only):
<<not>> checked. Until costs are paid in full, Respondent will remain actually suspended from the practice of law unless relief is obtained per rule 5.130, Rules of Procedure.
checked. Costs are to be paid in equal amounts prior to February 1 for the following membership years: 2012 & 2013 (Hardship, special circumstances or other good cause per rule 5.132, Rules of Procedure.) If Respondent fails to pay any installment as described above, or as may be modified by the State Bar Court, the remaining balance is due and payable immediately.
<<not>> checked. Costs are waived in part as set forth in a separate attachment entitled "Partial Waiver of Costs".
<<not>> checked. Costs are entirely waived.
Admitted to the practice of law on June 12, 1996, Respondent has been practicing for 15 years without a prior record discipline.
Case Number(s): 09-O-16744; 09-O-18113; 10-O-01911; 10-O-02309; 10-O-02453; 10-O-04712; 10-O-05792; and 10-O-06947
In the Matter of: Kelly David Christensen
a. Restitution
checked. Respondent must pay restitution (including the principal amount, plus interest of 10% per annum) to the payee(s) listed below. If the Client Security Fund (“CSF”) has reimbursed one or more of the payee(s) for all or any portion of the principal amount(s) listed below, Respondent must also pay restitution to CSF in the amount(s) paid, plus applicable interest and costs.
1. Payee: See Attachment
Principal Amount: See Attachment
Interest Accrues From: See Attachment
2. Payee:
Principal Amount:
Interest Accrues From:
3. Payee:
Principal Amount:
Interest Accrues From:
4. Payee:
Principal Amount:
Interest Accrues From:
<<not>> checked. Respondent must pay above-referenced restitution and provide satisfactory proof of payment to the Office of Probation not later than
<<not>> checked. Respondent must pay the above-referenced restitution on the payment schedule set forth below. Respondent must provide satisfactory proof of payment to the Office of Probation with each quarterly probation report, or as otherwise directed by the Office of Probation. No later than 30 days prior to the expiration of the period of probation (or period of reproval), Respondent must make any necessary final payment(s) in order to complete the payment of restitution, including interest, in full.
1. Payee/CSF (as applicable)
Minimum Payment Amount
Payment Frequency
2. Payee/CSF (as applicable)
Minimum Payment Amount
Payment Frequency
3. Payee/CSF (as applicable)
Minimum Payment Amount
Payment Frequency
4. Payee/CSF (as applicable)
Minimum Payment Amount
Payment Frequency
<<not>> checked. If Respondent fails to pay any installment as described above, or as may be modified by the State Bar Court, the remaining balance is due and payable immediately.
<<not>> checked.
1. If Respondent possesses client funds at any time during the period covered by a required quarterly report, Respondent must file with each required report a certificate from Respondent and/or a certified public accountant or other financial professional approved by the Office of Probation, certifying that:
a. Respondent has maintained a bank account in a bank authorized to do business in the State of California, at a branch located within the State of California, and that such account is designated as a “Trust Account” or “Clients’ Funds Account”;
b. Respondent has kept and maintained the following:
i. A written ledger for each client on whose behalf funds are held that sets forth:
1. the name of such client;
2. the date, amount and source of all funds received on behalf of such client;
3. the date, amount, payee and purpose of each disbursement made on behalf of such client; and,
4. the current balance for such client.
ii. a written journal for each client trust fund account that sets forth:
1. the name of such account;
2. the date, amount and client affected by each debit and credit; and,
3. the current balance in such account.
iii. all bank statements and cancelled checks for each client trust account; and,
iv. each monthly reconciliation (balancing) of (i), (ii), and (iii), above, and if there are any differences between the monthly total balances reflected in (i), (ii), and (iii), above, the reasons for the differences.
c. Respondent has maintained a written journal of securities or other properties held for clients that specifies:
i. each item of security and property held;
ii. the person on whose behalf the security or property is held;
iii. the date of receipt of the security or property;
iv. the date of distribution of the security or property; and,
v. the person to whom the security or property was distributed.
2. If Respondent does not possess any client funds, property or securities during the entire period covered by a report, Respondent must so state under penalty of perjury in the report filed with the Office of Probation for that reporting period. In this circumstance, Respondent need not file the accountant’s certificate described above.
3. The requirements of this condition are in addition to those set forth in rule 4-100, Rules of Professional Conduct.
<<not>> checked. Within one (1) year of the effective date of the discipline herein, Respondent must supply to the Office of Probation satisfactory proof of attendance at a session of the Ethics School Client Trust Accounting School, within the same period of time, and passage of the test given at the end of that session.
ATTACHMENT TO FINANCIAL CONDITIONS
RESTITUTION
Payee: |
Bee Lee Tan, |
Sfg Principal Amount |
$2,000, |
Interest Accrues From: |
October 1, 2009 |
|
Payee: |
Cornelio Laureta, |
Principal Amount: |
$2,750, |
Interest Accrues From: |
November 1, 2009 |
|
Payee: |
Jorge Perez, |
Principal Amount: |
$3,500, |
Interest Accrues From: |
October 1, 2009 |
|
Payee: |
Marian Lee, |
Principal Amount: |
$996.50, |
Interest Accrues From: |
October 1, 2009 |
|
Payee: |
Dan Antonioli, |
Principal Amount: |
$2,000, |
Interest Accrues From: |
July 1, 2009 |
|
Payee: |
Michael Stalnaker, |
Principal Amount: |
$3,500, |
Interest Accrues From: |
January 1, 2010 |
|
Payee: |
James Harris, |
Principal Amount: |
$1,750, |
Interest Accrues From: |
January 1, 2010 |
|
Case Number(s): 09-O-16744, 09-O-18113, 10-O-02309, 10-O-02453, 10-O-01911, 10-O-04712, 10-O-05792 and 10-O-06947
In the Matter of: Kelly D. Christensen
Nolo Contendere Plea Stipulations to Facts, Conclusions of Law, and Disposition
The terms of pleading nolo contendere are set forth in the Business and Professions Code and the Rules of Procedures of the State Bar. The applicable provisions are set forth below:
Business and Professions Code § 6085.5 Disciplinary Charges; Pleas to Allegations
There are three kinds of pleas to the allegations of a notice of disciplinary charges or other pleading which initiates a disciplinary proceeding against a member:
(a) Admission of culpability.
(b) Denial of culpability.
(c) Nolo contendere, subject to the approval of the State Bar Court. The court shall ascertain whether the member completely understands that a plea of nolo contendere will be considered the same as an admission of culpability and that, upon a plea of nolo contendere, the court will find the member culpable. The legal effect of such a plea will be the same as that of an admission of culpability for all purposes, except that the plea and any admissions required by the court during any inquiry it makes as to the voluntariness of, or the factual basis for, the pleas, may not be used against the member as an admission in any civil suit based upon or growing out of the act upon which the disciplinary proceeding is based.
Rules of Procedure of the State Bar, rule 5.56. Stipulations to Facts, Conclusions of Law, and Disposition
“(A) Contents. A proposed stipulation to facts, conclusions of law, and disposition must comprise:
[¶] . . . [¶]
(5) a statement that the member either:
(a) admits the truth of the facts comprising the stipulation and admits culpability for misconduct; or
(b) pleads nolo contendere to those facts and misconduct;
[¶] . . . [¶]
(B) Plea of Nolo Contendere. If the member pleads nolo contendere, the stipulation must also show that the member understands that the plea is treated as an admission of the stipulated facts and an admission of culpability.”
I, the Respondent in this matter, have read the applicable provisions of Business and Professions Code section 6085.5 and rule 5.56 of the Rules of Procedure of the State Bar. I plead nolo contendere to the charges set forth in this stipulation and I completely understand that my plea will be considered the same as an admission of culpability except as stated in Business and Professions Code section 6085.5(c).
Signed by:
Respondent: Kelly D. Christensen
Date: September 15, 2011
IN THE MATTER OF: Kelly David Christensen, State Bar No. 182620
STATE BAR COURT CASE NUMBER: 09-O-16744, 09-O-18113, 10-O-01911, 10-O-02309, 10-O-02453, 10-O-04712, 10-O-05792 and 10-O-06947
FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
Respondent admits that the following facts are true and that he is culpable of violations of the specified statutes and/or Rules of Professional Conduct.
Case No. 09-O-16744 (Complainant: Bee Lee Tan)
FACTS:
1. At all times relevant herein, Respondent was the owner of Financial Solutions Law Group ("FSLG").
2. On February 25, 2009, Bee Lee Tan ("Tan"), signed a retainer agreement with FSLG. The retainer agreement provided that the client would be entitled to a refund of up to 50% less any incidental expenses, should a financial institution decline all of the loan modification requests made on behalf of the client.
3. On February 25, 2009, Tan paid $2,000 advanced fees for Respondent’s legal services.
4. Thereafter, FSLG failed to perform any service of value to Tan. Respondent did not earn the $2,000 paid by Tan.
5. On September 11, 2009, Tan sent an email to FSLG, requesting a full refund.
6.To date, Tan has not been refunded any portion of the $2,000 advanced fees.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
7. By not providing competent legal services to Tan, Respondent intentionally, recklessly, or repeatedly failed to perform legal services with competence, in violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-110(A).
8. By not refunding any portion of the $2,000 advanced fees, Respondent failed to promptly refund any part of a fee paid in advance that has not been earned, in violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-700(D)(2).
Case No. 09-O-18113 (Complainant: Cornelio Laureta)
FACTS:
9. On April 23, 2009, Comelio Laureta ("Laureta"), signed a retainer agreement with FSLG. The retainer agreement provided that the client would be entitled to a refund of up to 50% less any incidental expenses, should a financial institution decline all of the loan modification requests made on behalf of the client.
10. Between April 23 and September 1, 2009, Laureta paid $2,750 advanced fees for Respondent’s legal services.
11. Thereafter, FSLG failed to perform any service of value to Laureta. Respondent did not earn the $2,750 paid by Laureta.
12. On October 5, 2009, Laureta sent an email to FSLG, requesting a full refund.
13. To date, Laureta has not been refunded any portion of the $2,750 advanced fees.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
14. By not providing competent legal services to Laureta, Respondent intentionally, recklessly, or repeatedly failed to perform legal services with competence, in violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-110(A).
15. By not refunding any portion of the $2,750 advanced fees, Respondent failed to promptly refund any part of a fee paid in advance that has not been earned, in violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-700(D)(2).
Case No. 10-O-01911 (Complainant: Jorge Perez)
FACTS
16. On January 30, 2009, Jorge Perez ("Perez"), a resident of Maryland, paid FSLG $3,500 advanced fees, retaining Respondent’s legal services.
17. On September 25, 2009, FSLG sent Perez a letter informing him that a loan modification had been sent to his lender and that the quickest way for Perez to learn about the status of his modification request would be to directly call the lender.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
18. By providing legal services in Maryland where Respondent is not licensed to practice law, Respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, in violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 1-300(B).
19. By accepting legal fees in a jurisdiction where Respondent is not authorized to practice, Respondent collected an illegal fee, in violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 4-200(A).
Case No. 10-O-02309 (Complainant: Marian Lee)
FACTS:
20. On June 30, 2009, Marian Lee ("Lee"), a resident of North Carolina, paid FSLG an initial advance of $480.75, retaining Respondent’s legal services.
21. On August 10, 2009, Lee paid an additional $498.50 to FSLG.
22. On September 14, 2009, FSLG informed Lee that she still owed $498.00 to FSLG.
23. On September 21, 2009, FSLG informed Lee that she need not pay the $498.00 still owed to FSLG and that her loan modification was denied by the lender.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
24. By providing legal services in North Carolina where Respondent is not licensed to practice law, Respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, in violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 1-300(B).
25. By accepting legal fees in a jurisdiction where Respondent is not authorized to practice, Respondent collected an illegal fee, in violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 4-200(A).
Case No. 10-O-02453 (Complainant: Randy Hunwardsen )
FACTS:
26. In March 2009, Randy Hundwardsen ("Hundwardsen") searched the Intemet for help available regarding loan modification of the mortages on Hundwardsen’s two properties.
27. On June 15, 2009, Randy Hundwardsen ("Hundwardsen"), signed a retainer agreement with FSLG, retaining Respondent’s legal services. The retainer agreement provided that the client would be entitled to a refund of up to 50% less any incidental expenses, should a financial institution decline all of the loan modification requests made on behalf of the client.
28. Between March 2 and June 2, 2009, Hundwardsen paid $6,000 advanced fees to FSLG.
29. Between July 30 and November 10, 2009, FSLG communicated with Provident Funding and ASC, the lenders on Hundwardsen’s two properties.
30. On November 2, 2009, FSLG learned that ASC denied the loan modification request submitted on behalf of Hundwardsen.
31. On November 17, 2009, Hundwardsen called FSLG regarding his loan modifications. FSLG recommended that Hundwardsen directly contacted the lenders.
32. On November 18, 2009, FSLG learned that Provident Funding denied the loan modification request submitted on behalf of Hundwardsen.
33. On November 18, 2009, FSLG sent Hundwardsen a letter acknowledging that it was mistaken in its "assumptions about the time and costs involved in negotiating a loan workout" and stating that FSLG no longer had "the resources to call the lenders; sit on hold; go through the process of verifying that we are working for you, only to be told that [the client’s] request is still in review."
34. In December 2009 and January 2010, Hundwardsen mailed FSLG at least three requests for a refund of the $6,000 advanced fees. FSLG offered a partial refund of $647.00 which Hundwardsen rejected.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
35. By offering a $647.00 refund without providing to the client appropriate accounts of all funds paid by the client, Respondent failed to render appropriate accounts to a client regarding all funds coming into Respondent’s possession, perform, in willful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 4-100(B)(3).
Case No. 10-O-04712 (’Complainant: Dan Antonioni)
FACTS:
36. On June 3, 2009, Dan Antonioni ("Antonioni") paid $2,500 advanced fees to FSLG, retaining Respondent’s legal services.
37. Thereafter, FSLG failed to perform any service of value to Antonioni. Respondent did not earn the $2,500 paid by Antonioni.
38.On January 25,2011, Antonioni obtained a small claims judgment of $2,500 and $86 costs against Respondent.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
39. By not providing competent legal services to Antonioni, Respondent intentionally, recklessly, or Repeatedly failed to perform legal services with competence, in violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-110(A).
40. By not refunding the $2,500 advanced fees, Respondent failed to promptly refund any part of a fee paid in advance that has not been earned, in violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-700(D)(2).1 [Footnote 1: in May and June 2011, Respondent refunded Antonioni a total of $500.00.]
Case No. 10-O-05792 (Complainant: Michael Stalnaker)
FACTS:
41. In May 2009, Michael Stalnaker ("Stalnaker"), a resident of Florida, paid FSLG $3,500 advanced fees, retaining Respondent’s legal services.
42. On November 18, 2009, FSLG sent Stalnaker a letter acknowledging that it was mistaken in its "assumptions about the time and costs involved in negotiating a loan workout" and stating that FSLG no longer had "the resources to call the lenders; sit on hold; go through the process of verifying that we are working for you, only to be told that [the client’s] request is still in review."
43. In December 2009, Stalnaker emailed Respondent several requests for a refund.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
44. By providing legal services in Florida where Respondent is not licensed to practice law, Respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, in violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 1-300(B).
45. By accepting legal fees in a jurisdiction where Respondent is not authorized to practice, Respondent collected an illegal fee, in violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 4-200(A).
Case No. 10-O-06947 (Complainant: James Harris)
FACTS:
46. In June 2009, James Harris ("Harris"), a resident of Florida, paid FSLG $1,750 advanced fees, retaining Respondent’s legal services.
47. On November 18, 2009, FSLG sent Harris a letter acknowledging that it was mistaken in its "assumptions about the time and costs involved in negotiating a loan workout" and stating that FSLG no longer had "the resources to call the lenders; sit on hold; go through the process of verifying that we are working for you, only to be told that [the client’s] request is still in review."
48. In December 2009, Harris mailed Respondent a request for a refund.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
49. By providing legal services in Florida where Respondent is not licensed to practice law, Respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, in violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 1-300(B).
50. By accepting legal fees in a jurisdiction where Respondent is not authorized to practice, Respondent collected an illegal fee, in violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 4-200(A).
AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING DISCIPLINE.
Standards Pertaining to Sanctions for Professional Misconduct:
Standard 2.2(b): Culpability of a member of a violation of rule 4-100, Rules of Professional Conduct, not resulting in the wilful misappropriation of entrusted funds, shall result in at least a three month actual suspension from the practice of law, irrespective of mitigating circumstances.
Standard 2.4(b): Culpability of a member of wilfully failing to perform in matters nor demonstrating a pattern of misconduct shall result in reproval or suspension depending upon the extent of the misconduct and the harm to the client.
Standard 2.10: Culpability of a member of a violation of any provision of the Business and Professions Code not specified in these standards or of a willful violation of any Rule of Professional Conduct not specified in these standards shall result in reproval or suspension according to the gravity of the offense or the harm, if any, to the victim, with due regard to the purposes of imposing discipline set forth in standard 1.3.
Case Law:
In the Matter of Riley (1994) 3 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 91, the Review Department noted that Standard 2.7, proposing a six-month actual suspension, does not apply by its own terms, since Riley’s violation of former rule 2-107 involved the collection of an illegal fee, but not an unconscionable fee. [See FN28]
FEE ARBITRATION CONDITION IN CASE NO. 10-O-02453 (Complainant: Randy Hunwardsen )
Within 120 days from the effective date of the discipline herein, Respondent hereby agrees to:
(i) Send to Randy Hundwardsen a letter, notifying him that Respondent is required by court order to initiate, pay for, and participate in Mandatory Fee Arbitration. The purpose of the arbitration is to determine whether Respondent had earned all fees and/or costs paid by the client to Respondent.
(ii) Mail a request for Arbitration of a Fee Dispute with the filing fee [5% of the disputed amount] to the applicable Mandatory Fee Arbitration ("FA") Program. The FA Program will notify Randy Hundwardsen of Respondent’s initiation of a fee arbitration and the client will have thirty (30) days to communicate his agreement to arbitrate to the FA Program.
(iii) Abide by any final arbitration award.
(iv) Respondent shall provide proof of compliance with this condition to the State Bar’s Office of Probation.
PENDING PROCEEDINGS.
The disclosure date referred to, on page 2, paragraph A(7), was September 12, 2011.
COSTS OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS.
Respondent acknowledges that the Office of the Chief Trial Counsel has informed Respondent that as of September 1, 2011, the prosecution costs in this matter are $9,933.00. Respondent further acknowledges that should this stipulation be rejected or should relief from the stipulation be granted, the costs in this matter may increase due to the cost of further proceedings.
Case Number(s): 09-O-16744, 09-O-18113, 10-O-01911, 10-O-02309, 10-O-02453, 10-O-04712, 10-O-05792 and 10-O-06947
In the Matter of: Kelly David Christensen
By their signatures below, the parties and their counsel, as applicable, signify their agreement with each of the recitation and each of the terms and conditions of this Stipulation Re Facts, Conclusions of Law and Disposition.
Signed by:
Respondent: Kelly D. Christensen
Date: September 15, 2011
Respondent’s Counsel:
Date:
Deputy Trial Counsel: Monique T. Miller
Date: September 15, 2011
Case Number(s): 09-O-16744, 09-O-18113, 10-O-01911, 10-O-02309, 10-O-02453, 10-O-04712, 10-O-05792 and 10-O-06947
In the Matter of: Kelly David Christensen
Finding the stipulation to be fair to the parties and that it adequately protects the public, IT IS ORDERED that the requested dismissal of counts/charges, if any is GRANTED without prejudice, and:
<<not>> checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED and the DISCIPLINE RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED AS MODIFIED as set forth below, and the DISCIPLINE IS RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
checked. All Hearing dates are vacated.
l. At p. 2, item A.(8): installment costs are payable in 2013 and 2014;
2. At p. 4, item D.(3)(a): change three months to 90 days; and
3. At p. 6, item F.(3): delete the conditional compliance with rule 9.20 of the California Rules of Court and, instead, place an "x" in the box at p. 6, item F.(2) recommending compliance with said rule.
The parties are bound by the stipulation as approved unless: 1) a motion to withdraw or modify the stipulation, filed within 15 days after service of this order, is granted; or 2) this court modifies or further modifies the approved stipulation. (See rule 5.58 (E) & (F), Rules of Procedure.) The effective date of this disposition is the effective date of the Supreme Court order herein, normally 30 days after the file date. (See rule 9.18(a), California Rules of Court.)
Signed by:
Judge of the State Bar Court: Lucy Armendariz
Date: September 28, 2011
[Rules Proc. of State Bar; Rule 5.27(B); Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a(4)]
I am a Case Administrator of the State Bar Court of California. I am over the age of eighteen and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to standard court practice, in the City and County of San Francisco, on September 28, 2011, I deposited a true copy of the following document(s):
STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION AND ORDER APPROVING
in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:
checked. by first-class mail, with postage thereon fully prepaid, through the United States Postal Service at San Franscisco, California, addressed as follows:
Kelly D. Christensen
7757 Dancy Rd.
San Diego, CA 92126
checked. by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of California addressed as follows:
MONIQUE T. MILLER, Enforcement, Los Angeles
I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in San Francisco, California, on September 28, 2011.
Signed by:
Bernadette C.O. Molina
Case Administrator
State Bar Court