Case Number(s): 10-O-05781, 10-O-06909;10-O-09787; 10-O-10211;11-O-10459; 11-O-10585;11-O-13786; 11-O-18213
In the Matter of: David John Ruyle, Jr., Bar # 234569, A Member of the State Bar of California, (Respondent).
Counsel For The State Bar: Rosalba L. Gutierrez, Deputy Trial Counsel, 1149 S. Hill Street, Los Angeles, CA 90015, 213-765-1671, Bar # 270469
Counsel for Respondent: Arthur Margolis, Margolis and Margolis LLP, 2000 Riverside Drive
Los Angeles, CA 90039, Bar # 57703
Submitted to: Settlement Judge of State Bar Court Clerk’s Office Los Angeles
Filed: January 11, 2012
<<not>> checked. PREVIOUS STIPULATION REJECTED
Note: All information required by this form and any additional information which cannot be provided in the space provided, must be set forth in an attachment to this stipulation under specific headings, e.g., "Facts," "Dismissals," "Conclusions of Law," "Supporting Authority," etc.
1. Respondent is a member of the State Bar of California, admitted December 9, 2004.
2. The parties agree to be bound by the factual stipulations contained herein even if conclusions of law or disposition are rejected or changed by the Supreme Court.
3. All investigations or proceedings listed by case number in the caption of this stipulation are entirely resolved by this stipulation and are deemed consolidated. Dismissed charge(s)/count(s) are listed under "Dismissals." The stipulation consists of 18 pages, not including the order.
4. A statement of acts or omissions acknowledged by Respondent as cause or causes for discipline is included under "Facts."
5. Conclusions of law, drawn from and specifically referring to the facts are also included under "Conclusions of Law".
6. The parties must include supporting authority for the recommended level of discipline under the heading "Supporting Authority."
7. No more than 30 days prior to the filing of this stipulation, Respondent has been advised in writing of any pending investigation/proceeding not resolved by this stipulation, except for criminal investigations.
8. Payment of Disciplinary Costs-Respondent acknowledges the provisions of Bus. & Prof. Code §§6086.10 & 6140.7. (Check one option only):
<<not>> checked. Until costs are paid in full, Respondent will remain actually suspended from the practice of law unless relief is obtained per rule 5.130, Rules of Procedure.
checked. Costs are to be paid in equal amounts prior to February 1 for the following membership years: three (3) billing cycles following the effective date of the Supreme Court Order. (Hardship, special circumstances or other good cause per rule 5.132, Rules of Procedure.) If Respondent fails to pay any installment as described above, or as may be modified by the State Bar Court, the remaining balance is due and payable immediately.
<<not>> checked. Costs are waived in part as set forth in a separate attachment entitled "Partial Waiver of Costs".
<<not>> checked. Costs are entirely waived.
(Effective January 1, 2011)
Actual Suspension
Case Number(s): (Inv. Nos.)10-O-05781; 10-O-06909; 10-O-09787; 10-O-10211; 11-O-10459;11-O-10585;11-O-13786;11-O-1823.3
In the Matter of: David John Ruyle, Jr.
a. Restitution
checked. Respondent must pay restitution (including the principal amount, plus interest of 10% per annum) to the payee(s) listed below. If the Client Security Fund (“CSF”) has reimbursed one or more of the payee(s) for all or any portion of the principal amount(s) listed below, Respondent must also pay restitution to CSF in the amount(s) paid, plus applicable interest and costs.
1. Payee: Judy Fair
Principal Amount: $3,000
Interest Accrues From: April 15, 2010
2. Payee: Victor Zatsepin
Principal Amount: $1,000
Interest Accrues From: March 15, 2010
3. Payee: Enrique Rodriguez
Principal Amount: $3,000
Interest Accrues From: February 15, 2010
4. Payee: Jill Edwards
Principal Amount: $4,5000
Interest Accrues From: March 15, 2010
5. Payee: Carlie Cole
Principal Amount: $2,000
Interest Accrues From: September 2010
6. Payee: Marsha Lamb
Principal Amount: $3,000
Interest Accrues From: April 15, 2010
7. Payee: Doug Kohlhagen
Principal Amount: $6,000
8. Payee: Gina Toth-Beeker
Principal Amount: $3,000
Interest Accrues From: February 2010
checked. Respondent must pay above-referenced restitution and provide satisfactory proof of payment to the Office of Probation not later than thirty (30) days from the effective of the discipline herein
<<not>> checked. Respondent must pay the above-referenced restitution on the payment schedule set forth below. Respondent must provide satisfactory proof of payment to the Office of Probation with each quarterly probation report, or as otherwise directed by the Office of Probation. No later than 30 days prior to the expiration of the period of probation (or period of reproval), Respondent must make any necessary final payment(s) in order to complete the payment of restitution, including interest, in full.
1. Payee/CSF (as applicable)
Minimum Payment Amount
Payment Frequency
2. Payee/CSF (as applicable)
Minimum Payment Amount
Payment Frequency
3. Payee/CSF (as applicable)
Minimum Payment Amount
Payment Frequency
4. Payee/CSF (as applicable)
Minimum Payment Amount
Payment Frequency
<<not>> checked. If Respondent fails to pay any installment as described above, or as may be modified by the State Bar Court, the remaining balance is due and payable immediately.
<<not>> checked.
1. If Respondent possesses client funds at any time during the period covered by a required quarterly report, Respondent must file with each required report a certificate from Respondent and/or a certified public accountant or other financial professional approved by the Office of Probation, certifying that:
a. Respondent has maintained a bank account in a bank authorized to do business in the State of California, at a branch located within the State of California, and that such account is designated as a “Trust Account” or “Clients’ Funds Account”;
b. Respondent has kept and maintained the following:
i. A written ledger for each client on whose behalf funds are held that sets forth:
1. the name of such client;
2. the date, amount and source of all funds received on behalf of such client;
3. the date, amount, payee and purpose of each disbursement made on behalf of such client; and,
4. the current balance for such client.
ii. a written journal for each client trust fund account that sets forth:
1. the name of such account;
2. the date, amount and client affected by each debit and credit; and,
3. the current balance in such account.
iii. all bank statements and cancelled checks for each client trust account; and,
iv. each monthly reconciliation (balancing) of (i), (ii), and (iii), above, and if there are any differences between the monthly total balances reflected in (i), (ii), and (iii), above, the reasons for the differences.
c. Respondent has maintained a written journal of securities or other properties held for clients that specifies:
i. each item of security and property held;
ii. the person on whose behalf the security or property is held;
iii. the date of receipt of the security or property;
iv. the date of distribution of the security or property; and,
v. the person to whom the security or property was distributed.
2. If Respondent does not possess any client funds, property or securities during the entire period covered by a report, Respondent must so state under penalty of perjury in the report filed with the Office of Probation for that reporting period. In this circumstance, Respondent need not file the accountant’s certificate described above.
3. The requirements of this condition are in addition to those set forth in rule 4-100, Rules of Professional Conduct.
<<not>> checked. Within one (1) year of the effective date of the discipline herein, Respondent must supply to the Office of Probation satisfactory proof of attendance at a session of the Ethics School Client Trust Accounting School, within the same period of time, and passage of the test given at the end of that session.
(Effective January 1, 2011)
Financial Conditions
IN THE MATTER OF: David John Ruyle, Jr. (SBN: 234569)
CASE NUMBER(S): Inv. Nos: 10-O-05781, 10-O-06909; 10-O-09787, 10-O-10211; 11-O-10459; 11-O-10585, 11-O-13786; 11-O-18213
Respondent admits that the following facts are true and that he is culpable of violations of the specified statutes and/or Rules of Professional Conduct.
1. The laws of the State of Pennsylvania, including the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct, prohibit attorneys not licensed in Pennsylvania from practicing law in Pennsylvania subject to several limited exceptions.
2. Respondent is not presently, and never has been, admitted to practice law in the State of Pennsylvania and Respondent was not otherwise entitled to practice law in the State of Pennsylvania during the relevant time period.
3. On September 7, 2009, Respondent accepted the representation of Judy Fair ("Fair"), a resident of Pennsylvania, in order to negotiate and obtain a home mortgage loan modification for her Pennsylvania residential property.
4. Between September 7, 2009 and November 16, 2009, Fair paid Respondent advanced fees totaling $3,000.
5. From November 2009 through April 2010, Respondent and agents acting on behalf of Respondent negotiated with Fair’s mortgage lender regarding Fair’s home loan mortgage modification.
6. By accepting representation of Fair as a client, collecting advanced fees and
negotiating with Fair’s mortgage lender, Respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law in willful violation of the regulations of the profession in Pennsylvania and rule 1-300(B) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
7. By entering into an agreement for, charging, and collecting fees from Fair, when he was not licensed to practice law in Pennsylvania, Respondent entered into an agreement for, charged, and collected an illegal fee in willful violation of rule 4-200(A) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
8. The laws of the State of Oregon, including the Oregon Rules of Professional Conduct, prohibit attorneys not licensed in Oregon from practicing law in Oregon subject to several limited exceptions.
9. Respondent is not presently, and never has been, admitted to practice law in the State of Oregon and Respondent was not otherwise entitled to practice law in the State of Oregon during the relevant time period.
10. On July 13, 2009, Respondent accepted the representation of Victor Zatsepin ("Zatsepin"), a resident of Oregon, in order to negotiate and obtain for Zatsepin a home mortgage loan modification for his Oregon residential property.
11. On July 13, 2009, Zatsepin paid Respondent advanced fees totaling $3,500.
12. On December 29, 2010, Respondent refunded $2,500 of the advanced fees he received from to Zatsepin.
13. From the middle of July 2009 through March 2010, Respondent and agents acting on behalf of Respondent negotiated with Zatsepin’s home loan mortgage lender regarding Zatsepin’s home loan mortgage modification.
14. By accepting representation of Zatsepin as a client, collecting advanced fees and negotiating with Zatsepin’s mortgage lender, Respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law in willful violation of the regulations of the profession in Oregon and rule 1-300(B) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
15. By entering into an agreement for, charging, and collecting fees from Zatsepin, when he was not licensed to practice law in Oregon, Respondent entered into an agreement for, charged, and collected an illegal fee in willful violation of rule
4-200(A) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
16. The laws of the State of Washington, including the Washington Rules of Professional Conduct, prohibit attorneys not licensed in Washington from practicing law in Washington subject to several limited exceptions.
17. Respondent is not presently, and never has been, admitted to practice law in the State of Washington and Respondent was not otherwise entitled to practice law in the State of Washington during the relevant time period.
18. On January 18, 2010, Respondent accepted the representation of Enrique Rodriguez (“Rodriguez"), a resident of Washington, in order to negotiate and obtain for Rodriguez a home mortgage loan modification for his Washington residential property.
19. On February 17, 2010, Rodriguez paid Respondent advanced fees totaling $3,000.
20. In February 2010, Respondent and agents acting on behalf of Respondent negotiated with Rodriguez’s home loan mortgage lender regarding Rodriguez’s homeloan mortgage modification.
21. By accepting representation of Rodriguez as a client, collecting advanced fees and negotiating with Rodriguez’s mortgage lender, Respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law in willful violation of the regulations of the profession in Washington and rule 1-300(B) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
22. By entering into an agreement for, charging, and collecting fees from Rodriguez, when he was not licensed to practice law in Washington, Respondent entered into an agreement for, charged, and collected an illegal fee in willful violation of rule 4-200(A) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
23, The laws of the State of Washington, including the Washington Rules of Professional Conduct, prohibit attomeys not licensed in Washington from practicing law in Washington subject to several limited exceptions.
24. Respondent is not presently, and never has been, admitted to practice law in the State of Washington and Respondent was not otherwise entitled to practice law in the State of Washington during the relevant time period.
25. On February 18, 2009, Respondent accepted the representation of Jill Edwards ("Edwards"), a resident of Washington, in order to negotiate and obtain for Edwards a home mortgage loan modification for her Washington residential property.
26. In March 2009, Edwards paid Respondent advanced fees totaling $4,500.
27. From March 2009 through March 2010, Respondent and agents acting on behalf of Respondent negotiated with Edwards’s home loan mortgage lender regarding Edwards’s home loan mortgage modification.
28. By accepting representation of Edwards as a client, collecting advanced fees and negotiating with Edwards’s mortgage lender, Respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law in willful violation of the regulationsof the profession in Washington and rule 1-300(B) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
29. By entering into an agreement for, charging, and collecting fees from Edwards, when he was not licensed to practice law in Washington, Respondent entered into an agreement for, charged, and collected an illegal fee in willful violation of rule 4-200(A) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
30. The laws of the State of Pennsylvania, including the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct, prohibit attorneys not licensed in Pennsylvania from practicing law in Pennsylvania subject to several limited exceptions.
31. Respondent is not presently, and never has been, admitted to practice law in the State of Pennsylvania and Respondent was not otherwise entitled to practice law in the State of Pennsylvania during the relevant time period.
32. On February 6, 2010, Respondent accepted the representation of Carlie Cole ("Cole"), a resident of Pennsylvania, in order to negotiate and obtain for Cole a home mortgage loan modification for her Pennsylvania residential property.
33. On February 12, 2010, Cole paid Respondent advanced fees totaling $2,000.
34. From February 2010 through September 2010, Respondent and agents acting on behalf of Respondent negotiated with Cole’s home loan mortgage lender regarding Cole’s home loan mortgage modification.
35. By accepting representation of Cole as a client, collecting advanced fees and negotiating with Cole’s mortgage lender, Respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law in willful violation of the regulations of the profession in Pennsylvania and rule l’300(B) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
36. By entering into an agreement for, charging, and collecting fees from Cole, when he was not licensed to practice law in Pennsylvania, Respondent entered into an agreement for, charged, and collected an illegal fee in willful violation of rule 4-200(A) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
37. The laws of the State of Nevada, including the Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct, prohibit.attorneys not licensed in Nevada from practicing law in Nevada subject to several limited exceptions.
38. Respondent is not presently, and never has been, admitted to practice law in the State of Nevada and Respondent was not otherwise entitled to practice law in the State of Nevada during the relevant time period.
39. On January 30, 2009, Respondent accepted the representation of Marsha Lamb ("Lamb"), a resident of Nevada, in order to negotiate and obtain for Lamb a home mortgage loan modification.
40. On February 4, 2009, Lamb paid Respondent advanced fees totaling $3,000.
41. From February 2009 through April 2010, Respondent and agents acting on behalf of Respondent negotiated with Lamb’s home loan mortgage lender regarding Lamb’s home loan mortgage modification.
42. By accepting representation of Lamb as a client, collecting advanced fees and negotiating with Lamb’s mortgage lender, Respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law in willful violation of the regulations of the profession in Nevada and rule 1-300(B) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
43. By entering into an agreement for, charging, and collecting fees from Lamb, when he was not licensed to practice law in Nevada, Respondent entered into an agreement for, charged, and collected an illegal fee in willful violation of rule 4-200(A) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
44. The laws of the State of Oregon, including the Oregon Rules of Professional Conduct, prohibit attorneys not licensed in Oregon from practicing law in Oregon subject to several limited exceptions.
45. Respondent is not presently, and never has been, admitted to practice law in the State of Oregon and Respondent was not otherwise entitled to practice law in the State of Oregon during the relevant time period.
46. On May 29, 2009, Respondent accepted the representation of Doug Kohlhagen ("Kohlhagen"), a resident of Oregon, in order to negotiate and obtain for Kohlhagen two home mortgage loan modifications for his Oregon residential properties.
47. From June 2009 through July 2009, Kohlhagen paid Respondent advanced fees totaling $6,000.
48. From November 2009 through April 2010, Respondent and agents acting on behalf of Respondent negotiated with Kolhagen’s home loan mortgage lender regarding his home loan mortgage modifications.
49. By accepting representation of Kohlhagen as a client, collecting advanced fees and negotiating with Kohlhagen’s mortgage lender, Respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law in willful violation of the regulations of the profession in Oregon and rule 1-300(B) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
50. By entering into an agreement for, charging, and collecting fees from Kohlhagen, when he was not licensed to practice law in Oregon, Respondent entered into an agreement for, charged, and collected an illegal fee in willful violation of rule 4-200(A) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
51. The laws of the State of Pennsylvania, including the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct, prohibit attorneys not licensed in Pennsylvania from practicing law in Pennsylvania subject to several limited exceptions.
52. Respondent is not presently, and never has been, admitted to practice law in the State of Pennsylvania and Respondent was not otherwise entitled to practice law in the State of Pennsylvania during the relevant time period.
53. On November 9, 2010, Respondent accepted the representation of Gina Toth-Becker ("Toth-Becker"), a resident of Pennsylvania, in order to negotiate and obtain for Toth-Becker a home mortgage loan modification for her Pennsylvania residential property.
54. In November 2009, Toth-Becker paid Respondent advanced fees totaling $3,000.
55. From November 2009 through February 2010, Respondent and agents acting on behalf of Respondent negotiated with Toth-Becker’s home loan mortgage lender regarding Toth-Becker’s home loan mortgage modification.
56. By accepting representation of Toth-Becker as a client, collecting advanced fees and negotiating with Toth-Becker’s mortgage lender, Respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law in willful violation of the regulations of the profession in Pennsylvania and rule 1-300(B) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
57. By entering into an agreement for, charging, and collecting fees from Toth-Becker, when he was not licensed to practice law in Pennsylvania, Respondent entered into an agreement for, charged, and collected an illegal fee in willful violation of rule 4-200(A) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
The disclosure date referred to, on page 2, paragraph A(7), was December 21, 2011.
Respondent, who has no prior record of discipline in seven years of practice, cooperated with the State Bar, .acknowledged his wrongdoing, and agreed to the imposition of discipline without requiring a hearing.
Respondent completed a police officer training program and became a sworn peace officer in 2010.
Standard 1.3 provides that the primary purposes of attorney discipline are, "the protection of the public, the courts and the legal profession; the maintenance of high legal professional standards by attorneys and the preservation of public confidence in the legal profession."
Standard 2.10 provides that the violation of rule 1-300(B), Rules of Professional Conduct [Unauthorized Practice of Law in Another Jurisdiction] and rule 4-200(A) [Illegal Fee] shall result in reproval or suspension, depending on the gravity of the offense or the harm to the victim.
In In the Matter of Wells (Review Dept. 2005) 2005 WL 3293313, the Review Department recommended that the respondent be suspended for two years, stayed, with six months of actual suspension. In Wells, the respondent was found to have engaged in the unauthorized practice of law in South Carolina on two occasions. The respondent was also found to have held herself out as entitled to practice in South Carolina when she was not. The respondent charged not only illegal fees, but her fees were found to be excessive and unconscionable. The respondent was found culpable of moral turpitude by lying to both the State Bar and the South Carolina Solicitor’s Office during the course of the investigation of her conduct. In aggravation, the respondent had a prior record of discipline, was found to have engaged in multiple acts of wrongdoing, was found to have harmed the public the administration of justice and her clients, and the respondent demonstrated indifference to the consequences of her misconduct.
In In the Matter of Harney (Review Dept. 1995) 3 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 266, the Review Department placed the respondent on a six month actual suspension for concealing the statutory fee limit under the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act ("MICRA") from both the court and his client. The respondent collected a fee that was $266,850 in excess of the MICRA limit. The respondent was found culpable of a number of other violations, including conduct involving moral turpitude. The Harney court, like the Wells court, acknowledged that illegal fee cases do not necessarily warrant the same discipline as an unconscionable fee matter.
In this case, Respondent did not charge or collect unconscionable fees or engage in moral turpitude. Therefore, imposition of a sixty-day actual suspension accompanied by one year stayed suspension and a one-year probationary is appropriate under the standards and case law.
Respondent
acknowledges that the Office of Chief Trial Counsel has informed Respondent
that as of, December 28, 2011, the prosecution costs in this matter are
approximately $9,041. Respondent further acknowledges that should this
stipulation be rejected or should relief from the stipulation be granted, the
costs in this matter may increase due to the cost of further proceedings.
Case Number(s): Inv 10-O,05781 ;10-O-06909;10-O-09787;10-O- 10211;11-O-10459;11-O-10585;11-O-13786;11-O-18213-DFM
In the Matter of: David John Ruyle, Jr.
By their signatures below, the parties and their counsel, as applicable, signify their agreement with each of the recitation and each of the terms and conditions of this Stipulation Re Facts, Conclusions of Law and Disposition.
Signed by:
Respondent: David John Ruyle, Jr.
Date: 12/28/11
Respondent’s Counsel: Arthur L. Margolis
Date: 12/28/11
Deputy Trial Counsel: Rosalba L. Gutierrez
Date: 12/29/11
In the Matter of: David John Ruyle, Jr.
Case Number(s): Investigation Numbers: 10-0-05781 ;10-O-06909;10-O-09787;10-O-10211;11-O-10459; 11-O-10585;11-O-13786;11-O-18213-DFM
Finding the stipulation to be fair to the parties and that it adequately protects the public, IT IS ORDERED that the requested dismissal of counts/charges, if any is GRANTED without prejudice, and:
<<not>> checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED and the DISCIPLINE RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED AS MODIFIED as set forth below, and the DISCIPLINE IS RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
<<not>> checked. All Hearing dates are vacated.
On page 4[Discipline heading] of the stipulation, an "X" in inserted in the box at paragraph D.(1)(b).
On page 7 [Financial Conditions] of the stipulation, regarding restitution to Carlie Cole, "September 2010" is deleted, and in its place is inserted "September 15, 2010".
On page 7 [Financial Conditions] of the stipulation, regarding restitution to Gina Toth-Becker, "February 2010" is deleted, and in its place is inserted "February 15, 2010". Also, "Gina Toth-Beeker" is deleted, and in its place is inserted "Gina Toth-Becker".
On page 13 [ATTACHMENT TO STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION] of the stipulation, the heading "Case No. 11-O-10585 (Marsh Lamb)" is deleted, and in its place is inserted "Case No. 11-O-10585 (Marsha Lamb)".
On page 17 [ATTACHMENT TO STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION-AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING DISCIPLINE] of the stipulation, first full paragraph, line 3, "probationary" is deleted, and in its place is inserted "probation".
The parties are bound by the stipulation as approved unless: 1) a motion to withdraw or modify the stipulation, filed within 15 days after service of this order, is granted; or 2) this court modifies or further modifies the approved stipulation. (See rule 5.58 (E) & (F), Rules of Procedure.) The effective date of this disposition is the effective date of the Supreme Court order herein, normally 30 days after the file date. (See rule 9.18(a), California Rules of Court.)
Signed by:
Judge of the State Bar Court: Donald F. Miles
Date: 1/10/12
(Effective January 1, 2011)
Actual Suspension Order
[Rules Proc. of State Bar; Rule 5.27(B); Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a(4)]
I am a Case Administrator of the State Bar Court of California. I am over the age of eighteen and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to standard court practice, in the City and County of Los Angeles, on January 11, 2012, I deposited a true copy of the following document(s):
STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION AND ORDER APPROVING
in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:
checked. by first-class mail, with postage thereon fully prepaid, through the United States Postal Service at Los Angeles, California, addressed as follows:
ARTHUR LEWIS MARGOLIS
MARGOLIS & MARGOLIS LLP
2000 RIVERSIDE DR
LOS ANGELES, CA 90039
checked. by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of California addressed as follows:
ROSALBA GUTIERREZ, Enforcement, Los Angeles
I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in Los Angeles, California, on January 11, 2012.
Signed by:
Rose Luthi
Case Administrator
State Bar Court