Case Number(s): 10-O-07313, 10-O-10279, 10-O-10779, 10-O-10781, 11-O-16059
In the Matter of: Charles Thomas Marshall, Bar #176091, A Member of the State Bar of California, (Respondent).
Counsel For The State Bar: Katherine Kinsey
State Bar of California
1149 S. Hill Street
Los Angeles, CA 90015
213-765-1503
Bar# 183740
Counsel for Respondent: Counsel For Respondent
Paul J. Virgo
9909 Topanga Blvd. #282
Chatsworth, CA 91311
(310) 666-9701
Bar # 67900
Submitted to: Assigned Judge, State Bar Court Clerk’s Office San Francisco.
Filed: October 26, 2011.
<<not>> checked. PREVIOUS STIPULATION REJECTED
Note: All information required by this form and any additional information which cannot be provided in the space provided, must be set forth in an attachment to this stipulation under specific headings, e.g., "Facts," "Dismissals," "Conclusions of Law," "Supporting Authority," etc.
1. Respondent is a member of the State Bar of California, admitted April 20, 1995.
2. The parties agree to be bound by the factual stipulations contained herein even if conclusions of law or disposition are rejected or changed by the Supreme Court.
3. All investigations or proceedings listed by case number in the caption of this stipulation are entirely resolved by this stipulation and are deemed consolidated. Dismissed charge(s)/count(s) are listed under "Dismissals." The stipulation consists of 13 pages, not including the order.
4. A statement of acts or omissions acknowledged by Respondent as cause or causes for discipline is included under "Facts."
5. Conclusions of law, drawn from and specifically referring to the facts are also included under "Conclusions of Law".
6. The parties must include supporting authority for the recommended level of discipline under the heading "Supporting Authority."
7. No more than 30 days prior to the filing of this stipulation, Respondent has been advised in writing of any pending investigation/proceeding not resolved by this stipulation, except for criminal investigations.
8. Payment of Disciplinary Costs-Respondent acknowledges the provisions of Bus. & Prof. Code §§6086.10 & 6140.7. (Check one option only):
<<not>> checked. Costs are added to membership fee for calendar year following effective date of discipline.
checked. Costs are to be paid in equal amounts prior to February 1 for the following membership years: 2013, 2014. (Hardship, special circumstances or other good cause per rule 5.132, Rules of Procedure.) If Respondent fails to pay any installment as described above, or as may be modified by the State Bar Court, the remaining balance is due and payable immediately.
<<not>> checked. Costs are waived in part as set forth in a separate attachment entitled "Partial Waiver of Costs".
<<not>> checked. Costs are entirely waived.
Respondent was admitted on April 20, 1995 and has no prior record of discipline.
Restitution:
Respondent must pay restitution (including the principal amount, plus interest of 10% per annum) to the payee listed below. If the Client Security Fund (“CSF”) has reimbursed the payee for all or any portion of the principal amount listed below, Respondent must also pay restitution to CSF in the amount paid, plus applicable interests and costs.
Payee; Sixto Monroy, Principal Amount; $2,890.00, Interest Accrues From; July 30, 2010
Respondent must pay the above restitution and provide satisfactory proof of payment to the Office of Probation not later than within thirty (30) days from the effective date of discipline herein.
(Effective January 1, 2011)
Stayed Suspension
In the Matter of: Charles Thomas Marshall
Case Number(s): 10-O-07313, 10-O-10279,10-O-10779,10-O-10781, 11-O-16059
Financial Conditions
a. Restitution
Checked Respondent must pay restitution (including the principal amount, plus interest of 10% per annum) to the payee(s) listed below. If the Client Security Fund ("CSF") has reimbursed one or more of the payee(s) for all or any portion of the principal amount(s) listed below, Respondent must also pay restitution to CSF in the amount(s) paid, plus applicable interest and costs.
Payee; Carisa Barnes, Principal Amount; $2,795, Interest Accrues From; October 12, 2009
Payee; VinhLieng, Principal Amount; $2,800, Interest Accrues From; October 29, 2009
Reynaldo & Margery Amparo , Principal Amount; $2,795 Interest Accrues From; August6,2009
[X] Respondent must pay above-referenced restitution and provide satisfactory proof of payment to the Office of Probation not later than Within one (l) year of the effective date of the discipline herein.
b. Installment Restitution Payments
Respondent must pay the above-referenced restitution on the payment schedule set forth below. Respondent must provide satisfactory proof of payment to the Office of Probation with each quarterly probation report, or as otherwise directed by the Office of Probation. No later than 30 days prior to the expiration of the period of probation (or period of reproval), Respondent must make any necessary final payment(s) in order to complete the payment of restitution, including interest, in full.
Payee/CSF (as applicable) Minimum Payment Amount Payment Frequency
[] If Respondent fails to pay any installment as described above, or as may be modified by the State Bar Court, the remaining balance is due and payable immediately.
c. Client Funds Certificate
[] 1. If Respondent possesses client funds at any time during the period covered by a required quarterly
report, Respondent must file with each required report a certificate from Respondent and/or a certified
public accountant or other financial professional approved by the Office of Probation, certifying that:
Respondent has maintained a bank account in a bank authorized to do business in the State of
California, at a branch located within the State of California, and that such account is designated
as a "Trust Account" or "Clients’ Funds Account";
(Effective January 1, 2011)
Financial Conditions
TTACHMENT TO
STIPULATION RE FACTS~ CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION
IN THE MATTER OF: Charles Thomas Marshall
CASE NUMBER(S): 10-O-07313, 10-O-10279, 10-O-10779, 10-O-10781, 11-O-16059
FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
Respondent admits that the following facts are true and that he is culpable of violations of the specified
statutes and/or Rules of Professional Conduct.
Case No. 10-0-07313 (’Complainant: Carisa Barnes)
FACTS:
1. On October 12, 2009, Carisa Barnes ("Barnes") employed Respondent to handle the short
sale of her home, which included an opportunity to lease her home back with an option to buy. On
October 12, 2009, Barnes paid Respondent $2,795 in advanced attorney’s fees.
2. In January 2010, Barnes’s lender scheduled her home for a foreclosure sale for February 4,
2010. Since her home would not be sold through a short sale, Barnes requested a refund from
Respondent.
3. On February 25, 2010, Respondent’s associate, Dennis Lain ("Lain"), sent an email to
Barnes acknowledging that she was owed a refund of fees. Lain asked Barnes to fill out a refund form
and return it.
4. On February 25, 2010, Bames completed Respondent’s "process form for refund" and
returned it. The form asked to allow two to four weeks for the refund. Respondent received the form
but failed to provide a refund.
5. On March 29, 2010, Barnes sent an email to Respondent verifying that she had completed
his refund form but had not yet received her refund. In the email, Barnes said she had left voicemail
messages at his office as well as emailed Respondent, but he had not provided a refund. Respondent
received the email but did not provide a refund.
6. On April 21, 2010, Barnes emailed Respondent about her refund. In the email, Barnes said
it had been two weeks since she has spoken to him about her refund, and Respondent told her to speak
to Lain about the refund. However, Lain continued to send Barnes to Respondent for her refund. In the
April 21, 2010 email, Bames once again asked Respondent to contact her regarding her refund.
Respondent received the email but did not respond.
7. Respondent did not earn the fees paid by Barnes and has not refunded any of the attorney’s
fees to Barnes.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
By failing to refund unearned attorney’s fees to Barnes, Respondent failed to refund promptly
any part of a fee paid in advance that has not been earned in willful violation of Rules of Professional
Conduct, rule 3-700(D)(2).
Case No. 10-O- 10279 (Complainant: Vinh Lieng)
FACTS:
8. On October 11, 2009, Senate Bill 94, prohibiting the collection of advanced fees for
mortgage loan modification services, became operative.
9. On October 29, 2009, Vinh Lieng employed Respondent for loan modification services and
paid Respondent $2,800 in advanced attorney’s fees.
10. As a result, Respondent collected advanced fees for mortgage loan modifications services
for a client after October 11, 2009.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
By collecting advanced fees for a loan modification after October 11, 2009, Respondent willfully
violated Business and Professions Code section 6106.3.
Case No. 10-O- 10779 (Complainant: Sixto Monroy)
FACTS:
11. On May 8, 2009, Sixto Monroy ("Monroy") employed Respondent to handle the short sale
of his home. As part of the short sale, Monroy’s home would be leased back to him with an option to
buy. On May 8, 2009, Monroy paid Respondent $2,795 in advanced attorney’s fees.
12. On May 8, 2009, Monroy completed Respondent’s form for the Lease Option Program. On
the form, it stated that the fees paid by Monroy would be refunded immediately if Monroy’s short sale
was not accepted for any reason. Thereafter, Monroy’.s short sale was not approved.
13. In January 2010, Monroy requested a refund from Respondent, but Respondent did not
refund any of the attomey’s fees to Monroy.
14. In January 2010, Monroy filed a small claims action against Respondent to obtain a refund
of the $2,795 in attorney’s fees.
15. On April 15, 2010, the court in the small claims action entered judgment against Respondent
and ordered him to pay $2,795 to Monroy.
16. On May 14, 2010, Respondent appealed the small claims action. On July 30, 2010, the
court ordered judgment in favor of Monroy and awarded $2,795 plus $95 in court costs to Monroy. On
August 4, 2010, Respondent was properly served with the notice of entry of judgment.
17. Respondent has not refunded the attorney’s fees to Monroy and has not paid the $95 in
costs.
18. On December 7, 2010, the State Bar opened an investigation, case no. 10-O-10779, pursuant
to a complaint made against Respondent by Sixto Monroy (the "Monroy matter").
19. On July 9, 2010, a State Bar complaint analyst mailed a letter to Respondent’s address of
record regarding the Monroy matter. The July 9, 2010 letter requested that Respondent respond in
writing by July 23, 2010 to specific allegations of misconduct being investigated by the State Bar in the
Monroy matter. Respondent received the July 9, 2010 letter.
20. On February 24, 2011, a State Bar investigator mailed another letter to Respondent’s address
of record regarding the Monroy matter. The February 24, 2011 letter requested that Respondent respond
in writing by March 10, 2011 to specific allegations of misconduct being investigated by the State Bar in
the Monroy matter. Respondent received the February 24, 2011 letter but failed to respond.
21. Respondent did not provide a written response to the allegations in the Monroy matter.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
By failing to refund the $2,795 in attorney’s fees to Monroy, Respondent failed to refund
promptly any part of a fee paid in advance that has not been earned in willful violation of Rules of
Professional Conduct, rule 3-700(D)(2).
By not providing a written response to the allegations in the Monroy matter or otherwise
cooperating in the investigation of the Monroy matter, Respondent failed to cooperate and participate in
a disciplinary investigation pending against Respondent in willful violation of Business and Professions
Code, section 6068(i).
Case No. 10-O- 10781 (Complainant: Miguel Loaiza)
FACTS:
22. On September 30, 2009, Miguel Loaiza ("Loaiza") employed Respondent to handle the
short sale of his home, which included an opportunity to lease his home back with an option to buy. On
September 30, 2009, Loaiza paid Respondent $2,795 in advanced attorney’s fees. If the short sale was
not successful, Loaiza would receive a full refund.
23. By January 2010, no progress had been made in obtaining a short sale on Loaiza’s behalf, so
he requested a refund from Respondent. Respondent did not provide the refund.
24. On January 21, 2010, Loaiza filed a small claims action against Respondent in order to
obtain a refund of the $2,795 in attorney’s fees.
25. On April 15, 2010, the court in the small claims action entered judgment against Respondent
and ordered him to pay the $2,795 to Loaiza. On May 14, 2010, Respondent appealed the judgment,
and on July 30, 2010, the court, once again, entered judgment for Loaiza.
26. On October 28, 2010, Respondent paid the judgment plus any costs and accrued interest and
a satisfaction of judgment was filed with the court.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
By failing to promptly refund the $2,795 in attorney’s fees to Loaiza, Respondent failed to
refund promptly any part of a fee paid in advance that has not been earned in willful violation of Rules
of Professional Conduct, rule 3-700(D)(2).
Case No. 11-O-16059 (Complainant: Reynaldo & Margery Amparo)
FACTS:
27. In August 2009, Reynaldo & Margery Amparo (the "Amparos") employed Respondent to
handle the short sale of their home, which included an opportunity to lease back their home with an
option to buy. On August 6, 2009, the Amparos paid Respondent $2,795 in advanced attomey’s fees
and were told that the funds would be refunded if the short sale did not occur.
28. By November 2009, there had been no progress regarding the short sale of the Amparo
home, and in March 2010, the Amparos hired a realtor, who was able to successfully negotiate the short
sale of the Amparo home.
29. On March 23, 2010, Reynaldo sent an. email to Respondent asking for a refund of attorney’s
fees. Respondent received the email but did refund any of the attorney’s fees.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
By failing to promptly refund the $2,795 in attorney’s fees to the Amparos, Respondent failed to
refund promptly any part of a fee paid in advance that has not been earned in willful violation of Rules
of Professional Conduct, rule 3-700(D)(2).
PENDING PROCEEDINGS.
The disclosure date referred to, on page 2, paragraph A(7), was October 5,2011.
AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING DISCIPLINE.
Standard 1.3 provides that the primary purposes of attorney discipline are, "the protection of the public,
the courts and the legal profession; the maintenance of high legal professional standards by attorneys
and the preservation of public confidence in the legal profession."
Standard 2.6 (a) states that any violations of Business and Professions Code, section 6068 shall result in
disbarment or suspension depending on the gravity of the offense and the harm, if any, to the victim.
Standard 2.10 applies. It requires reproval or suspension for a violation of any provision of the Business
and Professions Code not specified by the Standards, according to the gravity of the offense or the harm,
if any, to the victim, with due regard for the purposes of imposing discipline set forth in Standard 1.3.
Case Number(s): 10-O-07313, 10-O-10279, 10-O-10779, 10-O-10781, 11-O-16059
In the Matter of: Charles Thomas Marshall
By their signatures below, the parties and their counsel, as applicable, signify their agreement with each of the recitation and each of the terms and conditions of this Stipulation Re Facts, Conclusions of Law and Disposition.
Signed by:
Respondent: Charles T. Marshall
Date: 10/3/2011
Respondent’s Counsel: Paul J. Virgo
Date: 10/5/2011
Deputy Trial Counsel: Katherine Kinsey
Date: 10/5/2011
[Rules Proc. of State Bar; Rule 5.27(B); Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a(4)]
I am a Case Administrator of the State Bar Court of California. I am over the age of eighteen and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to standard court practice, in the City and
County of San Francisco, on October 26, 2011, I deposited a true copy of the following document(s):
STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSION OF LAW AND DISPOSITIONS AND ORDER APPROVING
in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:
checked. by first-class mail, with postage thereon fully prepaid, through the United States Postal Service at San Francisco, California, addressed as follows:
Paul Jean Virgo
9909 Topanga Blvd #282
Chatsworth, CA 91311
checked. by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of California addressed as follows:
Katherine Kinsey, Enforcement, Los Angeles
I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in San Francisco, California, on October 26, 2011.
Signed by:
George Hue
Case Administrator
State Bar Court