Case Number(s): Filed Matters: 11-O-10160-LMA, 11-O-14131, 11-O-14726; Unfiled Matters: 11-O-15310, 11-O-16055, 11-O-16908, 11-O-17937
In the Matter of: Daniel Wallace Rinaldelli , Bar # 219162 , A Member of the State Bar of California, (Respondent).
Counsel For The State Bar: Anand Kumar
Deputy Trial Counsel
1149 S. Hill Street
Los Angeles, CA 90015
(213) 765-1000
Bar# 261592
Counsel for Respondent: Rodney Ritner
421 W. Water Street, Third Floor
P.O. Box 228
Decorah, Iowa 52101
(563) 382-5071
(909) 648-7737
Bar# 165916
Submitted to: Settlement Judge – State Bar Court Clerk’s Office San Francisco.
<<not>> checked. PREVIOUS STIPULATION REJECTED
Note: All information required by this form and any additional information which cannot be provided in the space provided, must be set forth in an attachment to this stipulation under specific headings, e.g., "Facts," "Dismissals," "Conclusions of Law," "Supporting Authority," etc.
1. Respondent is a member of the State Bar of California, admitted May 3, 2002.
2. The parties agree to be bound by the factual stipulations contained herein even if conclusions of law or disposition are rejected or changed by the Supreme Court.
3. All investigations or proceedings listed by case number in the caption of this stipulation are entirely resolved by this stipulation and are deemed consolidated. Dismissed charge(s)/count(s) are listed under "Dismissals." The stipulation consists of 20 pages, not including the order.
4. A statement of acts or omissions acknowledged by Respondent as cause or causes for discipline is included under "Facts."
5. Conclusions of law, drawn from and specifically referring to the facts are also included under "Conclusions of Law".
6. The parties must include supporting authority for the recommended level of discipline under the heading "Supporting Authority."
7. No more than 30 days prior to the filing of this stipulation, Respondent has been advised in writing of any pending investigation/proceeding not resolved by this stipulation, except for criminal investigations.
8. Payment of Disciplinary Costs-Respondent acknowledges the provisions of Bus. & Prof. Code §§6086.10 & 6140.7. (Check one option only):
<<not>> checked. Until costs are paid in full, Respondent will remain actually suspended from the practice of law unless relief is obtained per rule 5.130, Rules of Procedure.
checked. Costs are to be paid in equal amounts prior to February 1 for the following membership years: three (3) billing cycles immediately following the effective date of the Supreme Court order in this matter. (Hardship, special circumstances or other good cause per rule 5.132, Rules of Procedure.) If Respondent fails to pay any installment as described above, or as may be modified by the State Bar Court, the remaining balance is due and payable immediately.
<<not>> checked. Costs are waived in part as set forth in a separate attachment entitled "Partial Waiver of Costs".
<<not>> checked. Costs are entirely waived.
FEE ARBITRATION:
Respondent must offer binding fee arbitration to Marta Chausee, Richard Bays, Vito Girardi and Mark Bolton in the manner set forth below:
A. Duty to Notify Individuals of Right to Mandatory Fee Arbitration
No later than thirty (30) days after the effective date of discipline, Respondent agrees to send a letter by certified mail, return receipt requested, to the individuals set forth below and agrees to therein offer to initiate, pay any costs and fees associated with the fee arbitration, and participate in binding fee arbitration with said individuals, upon the request of any such individuals, regarding fees Respondent received for representation of the former clients set forth below, unless Respondent has previously sent such a written offer to said individuals. The letter shall include the address and phone number of the Office of Probation along with a statement that the Office of Probation will be monitoring his fee arbitration conditions and may be contacted by the individual.
Respondent must offer Marta Chausee, Richard Bays, Vito Girardi and Mark Bolton the option of participating in binding fee arbitration for the $18,530.00 (Chausee), $8,500.00 (Bays), $8,000.00 (Girardi) and $3,500.00 (Bolton) in fees each respective client paid Respondent. within forty (40) days after the effective date of discipline, Respondent agrees to provide the Office of Probation with a copy of the letters offering to initiate and participate in fee arbitration with the individuals set forth above, along with a copy of the return receipt from the U.S. Postal Service, or other proof of mailing.
B. Upon Individual’s Consent to Mandatory Fee Arbitration, Duty to Initiate Fee Arbitration
Respondent agrees to advise the Office of Probation, in writing, of any request to participate in fee arbitration made by any individual set forth above within thirty (30) days after any such request. Respondent agrees to provide the Office of Probation with any information requested to verify Respondent’s compliance, including submission of any written request for fee arbitration or the submission of a declaration from any individual setting forth the date arbitration was requested.
Respondent agrees to initiate fee arbitration within thirty (30) days of any request, including making any payment required by the organization conducting the fee arbitration. Respondent agrees to fully and promptly participate in the fee arbitration as directed by the organization conducting the fee arbitration. Respondent will not be permitted to raise the statute of limitations as a defense to the fee arbitration with respect to any of the above individuals.
Respondent further agrees to accept binding arbitration on the arbitration request form. If the arbitration proceeds as non-binding, however, Respondent hereby agrees to abide by the arbitration award and foregoes the right to file an action seeking a trial de novo in court to vacate the award.
C. Duty to Comply with the Arbitration Award
Within thirty (30) days after issuance of any arbitration award or judgment or agreement reflected in a stipulated award issued pursuant to a fee arbitration matter, Respondent agrees to provide a copy of said award, judgment or stipulated award to the Office of Probation.
Respondent agrees to abide by any award, judgment or stipulated award of any such fee arbitration and agrees to provide proof thereof to the Office of Probation within thirty (30) days after compliance with any such award, judgment or stipulated award. If the award, judgment or stipulated award does not set forth a deadline for any payment, Respondent is to make full payment within sixty (60) days of the issuance of any such award, judgment or stipulated award.
To the extent that Respondent has paid any fee arbitration award, judgment or stipulated award prior to the effective date of the Supreme Court’s final disciplinary order in this proceeding, Respondent will be given credit for such payment(s) provided satisfactory proof of such payment(s) is or has been shown to the Office of Probation.
D. Obligation to Pay Restitution to the Client Security Fund.
If the State Bar Client Security Fund has reimbursed any of the above individuals for all or any portion of any award, judgment or stipulated award pursuant to fee arbitration, Respondent agrees to pay restitution to the Client Security Fund of the amount paid, plus applicable interest and costs, in accordance with Business and Professions Code section 6140.5. To the extent the Client Security Fund has paid only principal amounts, Respondent will still be liable for interest payments to such individuals. Any restitution to the Client Security Fund is enforceable as provided in Business and Professions Code section 6140.5, subdivisions (c) and (d).
E. Effect of Failure to Comply with Fee Arbitration Conditions.
Respondent understand that failure to strictly comply with these conditions regarding fee arbitration may result in this Court ordering Respondent to pay back the full amount of attorneys’ fees paid to Respondent by each of the individuals listed plus 10% interest from the date Respondent received the fees.
IN THE MATTER OF: Daniel Wallace Rinaldelli, State Bar No. 219162
STATE BAR COURT CASE NUMBER: 11-O-10160; 11-O-14131; 11-O-14726; 11-O-15310; 11-O-16055; 11-O-16908; 11-O-17937
FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
Pursuant to this stipulation herein, Respondent pleads nolo contendere to the following facts and violations as reflected in the nolo contendre attachment (see page 19). Respondent completely understands that the plea for nolo contendere shall be considered the same as an admission of the stipulated facts and of his culpability of the statutes and/or Rules of Professional Conduct specified herein.
Case No. 11-O-10160 (Complainant: Marta Chausee)
FACTS:
1. On August 28, 2008, Marta Chausee Kelly ("Chausee") retained Respondent to represent her in a spousal support appeal and paid Respondent $15,000.00 in advanced fees. The retainer agreement included a number of legal services to be performed by Respondent, including preparation of an opening brief.
2. On October 1, 2008, Respondent filed a notice of appeal on behalf of Chausee with the California Court of Appeal, Second District, Division Four in the matter entitled Kelly v. Kelly, case number B211030.
3. In connection with the costs of filing the appeal, Chausee paid a total of $3,580.00:$655.00 to the Court Clerk on September 15, 2008, $2,500.00 on November 3, 2008 for court transcripts to the Superior Court Clerk; and $425.00 on November 14, 2008 to Respondent for costs to be paid to the Superior Court Clerk.
4. Between April 2009 and June 2009, Respondent filed three applications with the Court of Appeal to extend time to file the opening brief. The extensions were granted. In granting the last extension, the Court of Appeal extended the time to file the brief until July 31, 2009 with no further extensions. Respondent did not file an opening brief by July 31, 2009.
5. On August 10, 2009, the Court of Appeal notified Respondent by letter that if the opening brief was not filed within 15 days of the notice, or good cause was shown for relief from default, the appeal would be dismissed. Respondent received the notice.
6. Respondent failed to file the brief within 15 days of the court’s notice, and on September 1, 2009, the Court of Appeal dismissed Chausee’s appeal for failure to file an opening brief.
7. Respondent contends he sent Chausee a letter on September 3, 2009, notifying Chausee that the appeal had been dismissed. However, Chausee contends she never received the letter.
8. On September 23, 2009, Chausee sent Respondent a letter requesting a status update of the appeal and for the details of the progress made and information regarding future court dates. Respondent did not respond to the letter. On October 23, 2009, Chausee sent Respondent another letter requesting an update on the status of the appeal.
9. On November 11, 2009, Respondent and Chausee met at Respondent’s office to discuss the appeal when Chausee learned for the first time that her appeal had been dismissed because Respondent had failed to file an opening brief.
10. At the November 11, 2009 meeting, Chausee and Respondent discussed a refund of the unearned fees paid to Respondent and Chausee requested an accounting of the services performed by Respondent. However, Respondent disputes this.
11. On January 27, 2010, Chausee sent Respondent a letter requesting a refund of the $15,000.00 in unearned fees. Respondent received the letter but did not respond.
12. On May 26, 2010, Chausee sent Respondent another letter requesting her refund and an accounting. Respondent received the letter but did not respond.
13. To date, Respondent has not paid any portion of the $15,000.00 to Chausee nor provided her with a final accounting to Chausee after her January 27, 2010 request.
14. On February 2, 2011, the State Bar opened a disciplinary investigation identified as case number 11-O-10160 concerning a complaint submitted by Chausee against Respondent.
15. On March 15,2011, a State Bar Investigator sent a letter to Respondent’s membership records address requesting Respondent to respond in writing to the allegations in Chausee’s complaint. On March 23, 2011, Respondent requested an extension, which was granted, to respond by April 12, 2011. On April 12, 2011, Respondent requested another extension, which was granted, to respond by April 26, 2011. Having received no response, the State Bar investigator sent Respondent a letter on May 27, 2011 requesting Respondent’s written response by June 10, 2011. On June 8, 2011, Respondent requested another extension, which was granted, permitting Respondent to respond by June 30, 2011. On June 17, 2011, Respondent requested another extension, which was granted, permitting Respondent to respond by July 6, 2011.
16. Respondent did not provide a written response to the allegations raised by Chausee’s complaint by July 6, 2011 or at any time during the disciplinary investigation.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
1. By not filing an opening brief for Chausee, resulting in the dismissal of Chausee’s appeal, Respondent intentionally, recklessly, or repeatedly failed to perform legal services with competence in willful violation of rule 3-110(A), Rules of Professional Conduct.
2. By not informing Chausee before abandoning her appeal and not timely informing Chausee when the court dismissed her appeal, Respondent failed to keep a client reasonably informed of significant developments in which Respondent had agreed to provide legal services in willful violation of Business and Professions Code, section 6068(m).
3. By failing to promptly refund to Chausee any part of the $15,000.00 unearned advance fees he collected, Respondent willfully violated rule 3-700(D)(2), Rules of Professional Conduct.
4. By failing to render appropriate accounts to Chausee regarding all funds coming into
Respondent’s possession, Respondent willfully violated rule 4-100(B)(3), Rules of
Professional Conduct.
5. By not providing the State Bar with a written response to the allegations raised by Chausee’s complaint at any time during the disciplinary investigation, Respondent failed to cooperate and participate in a disciplinary investigation pending against Respondent in willful violation of Business and Professions Code, section 6068(i).
Case No. 11-O- 14131 (Complainant: Richard Bays)
FACTS:
1. On April 1, 2009, Richard Bays ("Bays") retained Respondent to represent Bays in a spousal support appeal in the California Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division Two in the matter entitled In re the Marriage of Virginia and Richard Bays, case number E047979. Respondent was not originally retained to prepare and file an opening brief.
2. Between April 2009 and July 2010, the parties attempted to resolve their spousal support dispute through a negotiated settlement. The parties’ negotiations were unsuccessful and in July 2010, Bays paid Respondent $8,500.00 to draft and file the opening brief in Bays’s appeal.
3. Between July 2010 and November 2010, Respondent requested multiple extensions to file the opening brief, including an extension which was granted and permitted Respondent to file the opening brief by October 31, 2010. However, Respondent failed to file the opening brief by October 31, 2010.
4. On November 3, 2010, the Court of Appeal notified Respondent by letter that if the opening brief was not filed within 15 days of the notice, Bays’s appeal would be dismissed. Respondent received the court’s notice, but did not file an opening brief on Bays’s behalf.
5. Respondent contends he discussed with Bays the filing of the opening brief to preserve Bays’s appeal in November 2010 prior to the 15-day deadline. However, Bays disputes this.
6. On November 24, 2010, the Court of Appeal dismissed Bays’s appeal for failure to file an opening brief. As a result, the court ordered Bays to pay costs on appeal for his ex-wife’s costs of suit. Respondent received notice of the dismissal and the court’s order.
7. In December 2010, Bays contacted Respondent to inform Respondent that he may have tentatively settled the spousal support dispute.
8. In January 2011, Bays found out for the first time that his appeal had been dismissed and attempted to contact Respondent. Respondent disputes this. After leaving several voice messages for Respondent in January and February of 2011, Bays and Respondent had a phone conversation on March 23, 2011, regarding the dismissal of Bays’s appeal and Bays requested a refund of the unearned fees and an accounting of the services Respondent provided.
9. To date, Respondent has not refunded any portion of the $8,500.00 in unearned fees he collected nor provided a final accounting to Bays after his March 23, 2011 request.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
1. By not preparing or filing an opening brief for Bays, resulting in the dismissal of Bays’s appeal, Respondent intentionally, recklessly, or repeatedly failed to perform legal services with competence in willful violation of rule 3-110(A), Rules of Professional Conduct.
2. By failing to render appropriate accounts to Bays regarding all funds coming into Respondent’s possession, Respondent willfully violated rule 4-100(B)(3), Rules of Professional Conduct.
3. By failing to promptly refund to Bays any part of the $8,500.00 in unearned advance fees he collected, Respondent willfully violated rule 3-700(D)(2), Rules of Professional Conduct.
Case No. 11-O-14726 (Complainant: Tomoe Kanaya)
FACTS:
1. On January 11, 2011, Tomoe Kanaya ("Kanaya") retained Respondent to represent her in a paternity/child custody action and paid Respondent $4,500 in advanced fees to file a paternity petition.
2. On February 24, 2011, Kanaya terminated Respondent’s services for failure to file the petition and informed Respondent that she had hired new counsel. Kanaya also requested a refund of the advanced fees.
3. On July 14, 2011, Respondent signed an agreement to refund $3,600.00 to Kanaya in three installments before September 30, 2011. To date, Respondent has not made a refund of any portion of the $3,600 he collected in advanced fees. Respondent did not earn the $3,600.00.
CONCLUSION OF LAW:
1. By failing to promptly refund to Kanaya any part of the $3,600.00 unearned advance fees he collected, Respondent willfully violated rule 3-700(D)(2), Rules of Professional Conduct.
Case No. 11-O-15310 (Complainant: Vito Girardi)
FACTS:
1. On August 17, 2011, the State Bar opened a disciplinary investigation identified as case number 11-O-15310 concerning a complaint submitted by Vito Girardi ("Girardi") against Respondent.
2. On August 26, 2011, and September 13,2011, a State Bar investigator sent letters to Respondent, through counsel for Respondent, Rodney Ritner ("Ritner") regarding the State Bar’s investigation of Girardi’s complaint at Ritner’s membership records address. Respondent and Respondent’s counsel received the letters.
3. In the letters, the State Bar requested a written response to the allegations raised by Girardi’s complaint by September 12, 2011, and September 26, 2011, respectively. Respondent did not provide a written response to the allegations raised by Girardi’s complaint by September 26, 2011 or at any time during the disciplinary investigation. Respondent finally submitted a response during the negotiation of the settlement herein to the State Bar on February 13, 2012.
CONCLUSION OF LAW:
1. By not providing the State Bar with a written response to the allegations raised by Girardi’s complaint by September 26, 2011 or at any time during the disciplinary investigation, Respondent failed to cooperate and participate in a disciplinary investigation pending against Respondent in willful violation of Business and Professions Code, section 6068(i).
Case No. 11-O- 16055 (Complainant: Evelyn Burrell)
FACTS:
1. On January 19, 2005, Evelyn Burrell ("Burrell") retained Respondent to represent her in a guardianship matter and Burrell paid Respondent $17,804.55 in legal fees--$10,000.00 as a flat fee retainer and $7,804.55 for services covered by the initial retainer. Subsequently, a fee dispute ensued between the parties as to whether Respondent had earned all the fees he collected.
2. Accordingly, in January 2007, the parties participated in fee arbitration. In the arbitration award, the arbitrator determined that Respondent had earned only a portion of the $17,804.55 in fees he collected from Burrell and ordered Respondent to pay Burrell $4,502.76 in two installments of $2,502.76 and $2,000.
3. Thereafter, Respondent failed to pay $2,502.76 of the fee arbitration award and Burrell initiated a small claims action against Respondent to enforce the arbitration award and recover the $2,502.76 in unearned fees. On January 3,2011, Burrell received a default judgment against Respondent in the amount of $2,807.04 ($2,502.76 plus interest and costs).
4. Burrell subsequently sought a writ of execution from the Riverside County Superior Court. On August 8, 2011, the court issued a writ of execution indicating that Respondent owed Burrell $2,880.06. To date, Respondent has not refunded $2,880.06 to Burrell for the unearned fees he collected.
5. On September 2, 2011, the State Bar opened a disciplinary investigation identified as case number 11-O-16055 concerning a complaint submitted by Burrell against Respondent.
6. On September 30, 2011, and October 17, 2011, a State Bar investigator sent letters to Respondent, through Ritner regarding the State Bar’s disciplinary investigation of Burrell’s complaint at Ritner’s membership records address. Respondent and Respondent’s counsel received the letters.
7. In the letters, the State Bar requested a written response to the allegations raised by Burrell’s complaint by October 14, 2011, and October 28, 2011, respectively. Respondent did not provide a written response to the allegations raised by Burrell’s complaint by October 28, 2011 or thereafter.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
1. By failing to promptly refund to Burrell of the $2,502.76 in unearned fees he collected, Respondent willfully violated rule 3-700(D)(2), Rules of Professional Conduct.
2. By not providing the State Bar with a written response to the allegations raised by Burrell’s complaint at any time during the disciplinary investigation, Respondent failed to cooperate and participate in a disciplinary investigation pending against Respondent in willful violation of Business and Professions Code, section 6068(i).
Case No. 11-O-16908 (Complainant: Mark Bolton)
FACTS:
1. On January 8, 2009, Mark Bolton ("Bolton") retained Respondent to represent him in a marital dissolution and paid Respondent an advanced fee of $3,500.00.
2. Respondent initially performed work to finalize Bolton’s marital dissolution and subsequently assigned the case to an associate attorney at Respondent’s law office, who failed to finalize the dissolution.
3. Respondent was aware of the associate attorney’s representation in the Bolton matter, but was unaware of the lack of progress made on Bolton’s behalf.
4. Having been unable to finalize his marital dissolution through Respondent’s law office, Bolton terminated representation from Respondent’s law office in April 2011.
5. On September 29, 2011, the State Bar opened a disciplinary investigation identified as case number 11-O-16908 concerning a complaint submitted by Bolton against Respondent.
6. On October 24, 2011, and November 7, 2011, a State Bar investigator sent letters to Respondent, through Ritner, regarding the State Bar’s disciplinary investigation of Bolton’s complaint at Ritner’s membership records address. Respondent and Respondent’s counsel received the letters.
7. In the letters, the State Bar requested a written response to the allegations raised by Bolton’s complaint by November 7, 2011, and November 21, 2011, respectively. Respondent did not provide a written response to the allegations raised by Bolton’s complaint by November 21, 2011 or at any time during the disciplinary investigation. Respondent ultimately submitted a response to the State Bar on February 13, 2012 during the negotiation of the settlement herein.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
1. By not making sure his associate finalized Bolton’s marital dissolution, Respondent failed to supervise the associate attorney and intentionally, recklessly, or repeatedly failed to perform legal services with competence in willful violation of rule 3-110(A), Rules of Professional Conduct.
2. By not providing the State Bar with a written response to the allegations raised by Bolton’s complaint by November 21, 2011 or at any time during the disciplinary investigation, Respondent failed to cooperate and participate in a disciplinary investigation pending against Respondent in willful violation of Business and Professions Code, section 6068(i).
Case No. 11-O-17937 (Complainant: Mera Williams)
FACTS:
1. On October 31, 2011, the State Bar opened a disciplinary investigation identified as case number 11-O- 17937 concerning a complaint submitted by Mera Williams ("Williams") against Respondent.
2. On December 9, 2011, and December 28, 2011, a State Bar investigator sent letters to Respondent, through Ritner regarding the State Bar’s disciplinary investigation of Williams’s complaint at Ritner’s membership records address. Respondent and Respondent’s counsel received the letters.
3. In the letters, the State Bar requested a written response to the allegations raised by Williams’s complaint by December 23,2011, and January 11, 2012, respectively. Respondent did not provide a written response to the allegations raised by Williams’s complaint by January 11, 2012 or at any time during the disciplinary investigation.
CONCLUSION OF LAW:
1. By not providing the State Bar with a written response to the allegations raised by Williams’s complaint at any time during the disciplinary investigation, Respondent failed to cooperate and participate in a disciplinary investigation pending against Respondent in willful violation of Business and Professions Code, section 6068(i).
PENDING PROCEEDINGS.
The disclosure date referred to, on page 2, paragraph A(7), was March 2, 2012.
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES.
FACTS SUPPORTING AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES.
Under Standard 1.2(b)(ii), Respondent’s current misconduct described above evidences multiple acts of wrongdoing as indicated above in case numbers 11-O-10160; 11-O-14131; 11-O-14726; 11-O-15310; 11-O-16055; 11-O-16908; 11-O-17937.
Under Standard 1.2(b)(iv), Respondent’s misconduct harmed significantly clients Bays, Kanaya and Burrell.
AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING DISCIPLINE.
The Standards For Attorney Sanctions For Professional Misconduct ("Standard or "Standards") are entitled to "great weight" and "promote the consistent and uniform application of disciplinary measures." (In re Silverton (2005) 36 Cal.4th 81, 92.) The presumptively appropriate level of discipline for any misconduct is as set forth in the standards.
Standard 1.3 provides that the primary purposes of attorney discipline are, "the protection of the public, the courts and the legal profession; the maintenance of high legal professional standards by attorneys and the preservation of public confidence in the legal profession."
Standard 1.6 provides that the appropriate "...sanction for an act of professional misconduct shall be that set forth in the following standards for the particular act of misconduct found or acknowledged."
Standard 2.2(b) provides that:
Culpability of a member of commingling of entrusted funds or property with personal property or the commission of another violation rule 4-100, Rules of Professional Conduct, none of which offenses result in the wilful misappropriation of entrusted funds or property shall results in at least a three month actual suspension from the practice of law, irrespective of mitigating circumstances.
Standard 2.4(b) provides that:
Culpability of a member of willfully failing to perform services in an individual matter or matters not demonstrating a pattern of misconduct or culpability of a member of willfully failing to communicate with a client shall result in reproval or suspension depending upon the extent of the misconduct and the degree of harm to the client.
Standard 2.10 provides that culpability of a member of wilful violation of any Rule of Professional Conduct not specified in the standards shall result in reproval or suspension according to the gravity of the offense or the harm, if any, to the victim, with due regard to the purposes of imposing discipline set for the Standard 1.3.
The case law also supports the discipline stipulated to here by the State Bar and Respondent Rinaldelli. In In the matter Kaplan (Review Dept. 1993) 2 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 509, the attorney-respondent was found culpable of multiple failures to perform, including negligent law office management, in violation of former rule 6-101 (A)(2), Rules of Professional Conduct (current rule 3110(A)), multiple violations of rule 4-100(B), violations of rule 3-700(D)(1) and multiple failures to respond to reasonable client status inquiries in violation of section 6068(m), Business and Professions Code. The attorney’s misconduct in Kaplan involved negligent law office management over an extended period of time (four years) which resulted in seven counts of misconduct for ten different clients. The Review Department noted the attorney’s numerous violations over an extended period of time and recommended discipline consisting of a two-year stayed suspension, two years probation with conditions, including a three-month actual suspension. Similarly, Respondent Rinaldelli’s misconduct here involves multiple failures to perform and multiple clients. Accordingly, discipline for Respondent’s current misconduct consisting of two years of stayed suspension, two years of probation with conditions and a three-month actual suspension is warranted.
DISMISSALS.
The parties respectfully request the Court to dismiss the following alleged violations in the interest of justice:
Count: Alleged Violation:
Case No.: 11-O-14131, Count: 2, Alleged Violation: Business & Professions Code, section 6068(m) [Failure to Respond to Client Inquiries];
Case No.: 11-O-14131, Count: 3, Alleged Violation: Business and Professions Code, section 6106 [Moral Turpitude - Misrepresentation]
COSTS OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS.
Respondent acknowledges that the Office of the Chief Trial Counsel has informed Respondent that as of March 2, 2012, the prosecution costs in this matter are approximately $9,929.00. Respondent further acknowledges that should this stipulation be rejected or should relief from the stipulation be granted, the costs in this matter may increase due to the cost of further proceedings.
Case Number(s): 11-O-10160; 11-O-14131; 11-O-14726; 11-O-15310; 11-O-16055; 11-O-16908; 11-O-17937
In the Matter of: Daniel Wallace Rinaldelli
Nolo Contendere Plea Stipulations to Facts, Conclusions of Law, and Disposition
The terms of pleading nolo contendere are set forth in the Business and Professions Code and the Rules of Procedures of the State Bar. The applicable provisions are set forth below:
Business and Professions Code § 6085.5 Disciplinary Charges; Pleas to Allegations
There are three kinds of pleas to the allegations of a notice of disciplinary charges or other pleading which initiates a disciplinary proceeding against a member:
(a) Admission of culpability.
(b) Denial of culpability.
(c) Nolo contendere, subject to the approval of the State Bar Court. The court shall ascertain whether the member completely understands that a plea of nolo contendere will be considered the same as an admission of culpability and that, upon a plea of nolo contendere, the court will find the member culpable. The legal effect of such a plea will be the same as that of an admission of culpability for all purposes, except that the plea and any admissions required by the court during any inquiry it makes as to the voluntariness of, or the factual basis for, the pleas, may not be used against the member as an admission in any civil suit based upon or growing out of the act upon which the disciplinary proceeding is based.
Rules of Procedure of the State Bar, rule 5.56. Stipulations to Facts, Conclusions of Law, and Disposition
“(A) Contents. A proposed stipulation to facts, conclusions of law, and disposition must comprise:
[¶] . . . [¶]
(5) a statement that the member either:
(a) admits the truth of the facts comprising the stipulation and admits culpability for misconduct; or
(b) pleads nolo contendere to those facts and misconduct;
[¶] . . . [¶]
(B) Plea of Nolo Contendere. If the member pleads nolo contendere, the stipulation must also show that the member understands that the plea is treated as an admission of the stipulated facts and an admission of culpability.”
I, the Respondent in this matter, have read the applicable provisions of Business and Professions Code section 6085.5 and rule 5.56 of the Rules of Procedure of the State Bar. I plead nolo contendere to the charges set forth in this stipulation and I completely understand that my plea will be considered the same as an admission of culpability except as stated in Business and Professions Code section 6085.5(c).
Signed by:
Respondent: Daniel Wallace Rinaldelli
Date: March 16, 2012
SIGNATURE OF THE PARTIES
Case Number(s): 11-O-10160; 11-O-14131; 11-O-14726; 11-O-15310; 11-O-16055; 11-O-16908; 11-O-17937
In the Matter of: Daniel Wallace Rinaldelli
By their signatures below, the parties and their counsel, as applicable, signify their agreement with each of the recitation and each of the terms and conditions of this Stipulation Re Facts, Conclusions of Law and Disposition.
Signed by:
Respondent: Daniel Wallace Rinaldelli
Date: March 16, 2012
Respondent’s Counsel: Rodney Ritner
Date: March 13, 2012
Deputy Trial Counsel: Anand Kumar
Date: March 16, 2012
Case Number(s): 11-O-10160; 11-O-14131; 11-O-14726; 11-O-15310; 11-O-16055; 11-O-16908; 11-O-17937
In the Matter of: Daniel Wallace Rinaldelli
Finding the stipulation to be fair to the parties and that it adequately protects the public, IT IS ORDERED that the requested dismissal of counts/charges, if any is GRANTED without prejudice, and:
checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED and the DISCIPLINE RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
<<not>> checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED AS MODIFIED as set forth below, and the DISCIPLINE IS RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
<<not>> checked. All Hearing dates are vacated.
The parties are bound by the stipulation as approved unless: 1) a motion to withdraw or modify the stipulation, filed within 15 days after service of this order, is granted; or 2) this court modifies or further modifies the approved stipulation. (See rule 5.58 (E) & (F), Rules of Procedure.) The effective date of this disposition is the effective date of the Supreme Court order herein, normally 30 days after the file date. (See rule 9.18(a), California Rules of Court.)
Signed by:
Judge of the State Bar Court: Donald F. Miles
Date: March 26, 2012
[Rules Proc. of State Bar; Rule 5.27(B); Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a(4)]
I am a Case Administrator of the State Bar Court of California. I am over the age of eighteen and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to standard court practice, in the City and
County of San Francisco, on March 27, 2012, I deposited a true copy of the following document(s):
STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION AND ORDER APPROVING
in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:
checked. by first-class mail, with postage thereon fully prepaid, through the United States Postal Service at San Francisco, California, addressed as follows:
Rodney G. RITNER
421 W WATER ST
PO BOX 228
DECORAH, IA 52101
checked. by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of California addressed as follows:
ANAND KUMAR, Enforcement, Los Angeles
I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in San Francisco, California, on March 27, 2012.
Signed by:
Mazie Yip
Case Administrator
State Bar Court