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<b>State Bar Court of California Hearing Department San Francisco ACTUAL SUSPENSION</b>		
<b>Counsel For The State Bar</b>  Treva R. Stewart Deputy Trial Counsel 180 Howard Street San Francisco, CA 94105 (415) 538-2452  Bar # 239829	<b>Case Number(s):</b>  11-O-12353	<b>For Court use only</b>  <b>PUBLIC MATTER</b>  <b>FILED</b> <i>JS</i>  MAR 27 2012  STATE BAR COURT CLERK'S OFFICE SAN FRANCISCO
<b>In Pro Per Respondent</b>  Kulvinder Singh 12 Castaic Court Roseville, CA 95678 (916) 939-5151  Bar # 182109	<b>Submitted to: Settlement Judge</b>  STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION AND ORDER APPROVING  <b>ACTUAL SUSPENSION</b>  <input type="checkbox"/> PREVIOUS STIPULATION REJECTED	
<b>In the Matter of:</b> Kulvinder Singh  Bar # 182109  A Member of the State Bar of California (Respondent)		

**Note: All information required by this form and any additional information which cannot be provided in the space provided, must be set forth in an attachment to this stipulation under specific headings, e.g., "Facts," "Dismissals," "Conclusions of Law," "Supporting Authority," etc.**

**A. Parties' Acknowledgments:**

- (1) Respondent is a member of the State Bar of California, admitted June 3, 1996.
- (2) The parties agree to be bound by the factual stipulations contained herein even if conclusions of law or disposition are rejected or changed by the Supreme Court.
- (3) All investigations or proceedings listed by case number in the caption of this stipulation are entirely resolved by this stipulation and are deemed consolidated. Dismissed charge(s)/count(s) are listed under "Dismissals." The stipulation consists of 12 pages, not including the order.
- (4) A statement of acts or omissions acknowledged by Respondent as cause or causes for discipline is included under "Facts."



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- (5) **Conclusions of law**, drawn from and specifically referring to the facts are also included under "Conclusions of Law".
- (6) The parties must include supporting authority for the recommended level of discipline under the heading "Supporting Authority."
- (7) No more than 30 days prior to the filing of this stipulation, Respondent has been advised in writing of any pending investigation/proceeding not resolved by this stipulation, except for criminal investigations.
- (8) **Payment of Disciplinary Costs**—Respondent acknowledges the provisions of Bus. & Prof. Code §§6086.10 & 6140.7. (Check one option only):
- Until costs are paid in full, Respondent will remain actually suspended from the practice of law unless relief is obtained per rule 5.130, Rules of Procedure.
  - Costs are to be paid in equal amounts prior to February 1 for the following membership years: **2013, 2014.** (Hardship, special circumstances or other good cause per rule 5.132, Rules of Procedure.) If Respondent fails to pay any installment as described above, or as may be modified by the State Bar Court, the remaining balance is due and payable immediately.
  - Costs are waived in part as set forth in a separate attachment entitled "Partial Waiver of Costs".
  - Costs are entirely waived.

**B. Aggravating Circumstances [for definition, see Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct, standard 1.2(b)]. Facts supporting aggravating circumstances are required.**

- (1)  **Prior record of discipline** [see standard 1.2(f)]
- (a)  State Bar Court case # of prior case
  - (b)  Date prior discipline effective
  - (c)  Rules of Professional Conduct/ State Bar Act violations:
  - (d)  Degree of prior discipline
  - (e)  If Respondent has two or more incidents of prior discipline, use space provided below.
- (2)  **Dishonesty:** Respondent's misconduct was surrounded by or followed by bad faith, dishonesty, concealment, overreaching or other violations of the State Bar Act or Rules of Professional Conduct.
- (3)  **Trust Violation:** Trust funds or property were involved and Respondent refused or was unable to account to the client or person who was the object of the misconduct for improper conduct toward said funds or property.
- (4)  **Harm:** Respondent's misconduct harmed significantly a client, the public or the administration of justice. **See attachment.**
- (5)  **Indifference:** Respondent demonstrated indifference toward rectification of or atonement for the consequences of his or her misconduct.

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- (6)  **Lack of Cooperation:** Respondent displayed a lack of candor and cooperation to victims of his/her misconduct or to the State Bar during disciplinary investigation or proceedings.
- (7)  **Multiple/Pattern of Misconduct:** Respondent's current misconduct evidences multiple acts of wrongdoing or demonstrates a pattern of misconduct.
- (8)  **No aggravating circumstances** are involved.

**Additional aggravating circumstances:**

**C. Mitigating Circumstances [see standard 1.2(e)]. Facts supporting mitigating circumstances are required.**

- (1)  **No Prior Discipline:** Respondent has no prior record of discipline over many years of practice coupled with present misconduct which is not deemed serious.
- (2)  **No Harm:** Respondent did not harm the client or person who was the object of the misconduct.
- (3)  **Candor/Cooperation:** Respondent displayed spontaneous candor and cooperation with the victims of his/her misconduct and to the State Bar during disciplinary investigation and proceedings.
- (4)  **Remorse:** Respondent promptly took objective steps spontaneously demonstrating remorse and recognition of the wrongdoing, which steps were designed to timely atone for any consequences of his/her misconduct.
- (5)  **Restitution:** Respondent paid \$ \_\_\_\_\_ on \_\_\_\_\_ in restitution to \_\_\_\_\_ without the threat or force of disciplinary, civil or criminal proceedings.
- (6)  **Delay:** These disciplinary proceedings were excessively delayed. The delay is not attributable to Respondent and the delay prejudiced him/her.
- (7)  **Good Faith:** Respondent acted in good faith.
- (8)  **Emotional/Physical Difficulties:** At the time of the stipulated act or acts of professional misconduct Respondent suffered extreme emotional difficulties or physical disabilities which expert testimony would establish was directly responsible for the misconduct. The difficulties or disabilities were not the product of any illegal conduct by the member, such as illegal drug or substance abuse, and Respondent no longer suffers from such difficulties or disabilities. **At the time of misconduct, Respondent was engaged in a highly contentious divorce and the subject misconduct was directly related to those proceedings.**
- (9)  **Severe Financial Stress:** At the time of the misconduct, Respondent suffered from severe financial stress which resulted from circumstances not reasonably foreseeable or which were beyond his/her control and which were directly responsible for the misconduct. **Respondent experienced severe financial stress as a result of the divorce proceedings.**
- (10)  **Family Problems:** At the time of the misconduct, Respondent suffered extreme difficulties in his/her personal life which were other than emotional or physical in nature.
- (11)  **Good Character:** Respondent's good character is attested to by a wide range of references in the legal and general communities who are aware of the full extent of his/her misconduct.

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- (12)  **Rehabilitation:** Considerable time has passed since the acts of professional misconduct occurred followed by convincing proof of subsequent rehabilitation.
- (13)  **No mitigating circumstances** are involved.

**Additional mitigating circumstances:**

**At the time of the misconduct, Respondent had no record of discipline during approximately fourteen years of practice.**

**D. Discipline:**

(1)  **Stayed Suspension:**

- (a)  Respondent must be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one-year.
- i.  and until Respondent shows proof satisfactory to the State Bar Court of rehabilitation and present fitness to practice and present learning and ability in the law pursuant to standard 1.4(c)(ii) Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct.
  - ii.  and until Respondent pays restitution as set forth in the Financial Conditions form attached to this stipulation.
  - iii.  and until Respondent does the following:
- (b)  The above-referenced suspension is stayed.

(2)  **Probation:**

**Respondent must be placed on probation for a period of two-years, which will commence upon the effective date of the Supreme Court order in this matter. (See rule 9.18, California Rules of Court)**

(3)  **Actual Suspension:**

- (a)  Respondent must be actually suspended from the practice of law in the State of California for a period of 30 days.
- i.  and until Respondent shows proof satisfactory to the State Bar Court of rehabilitation and present fitness to practice and present learning and ability in the law pursuant to standard 1.4(c)(ii), Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct
  - ii.  and until Respondent pays restitution as set forth in the Financial Conditions form attached to this stipulation.
  - iii.  and until Respondent does the following:

**E. Additional Conditions of Probation:**

- (1)  If Respondent is actually suspended for two years or more, he/she must remain actually suspended until he/she proves to the State Bar Court his/her rehabilitation, fitness to practice, and learning and ability in the general law, pursuant to standard 1.4(c)(ii), Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct.
- (2)  During the probation period, Respondent must comply with the provisions of the State Bar Act and Rules of Professional Conduct.

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- (3)  Within ten (10) days of any change, Respondent must report to the Membership Records Office of the State Bar and to the Office of Probation of the State Bar of California ("Office of Probation"), all changes of information, including current office address and telephone number, or other address for State Bar purposes, as prescribed by section 6002.1 of the Business and Professions Code.
- (4)  Within thirty (30) days from the effective date of discipline, Respondent must contact the Office of Probation and schedule a meeting with Respondent's assigned probation deputy to discuss these terms and conditions of probation. Upon the direction of the Office of Probation, Respondent must meet with the probation deputy either in-person or by telephone. During the period of probation, Respondent must promptly meet with the probation deputy as directed and upon request.
- (5)  Respondent must submit written quarterly reports to the Office of Probation on each January 10, April 10, July 10, and October 10 of the period of probation. Under penalty of perjury, Respondent must state whether Respondent has complied with the State Bar Act, the Rules of Professional Conduct, and all conditions of probation during the preceding calendar quarter. Respondent must also state whether there are any proceedings pending against him or her in the State Bar Court and if so, the case number and current status of that proceeding. If the first report would cover less than 30 days, that report must be submitted on the next quarter date, and cover the extended period.

In addition to all quarterly reports, a final report, containing the same information, is due no earlier than twenty (20) days before the last day of the period of probation and no later than the last day of probation.

- (6)  Respondent must be assigned a probation monitor. Respondent must promptly review the terms and conditions of probation with the probation monitor to establish a manner and schedule of compliance. During the period of probation, Respondent must furnish to the monitor such reports as may be requested, in addition to the quarterly reports required to be submitted to the Office of Probation. Respondent must cooperate fully with the probation monitor.
- (7)  Subject to assertion of applicable privileges, Respondent must answer fully, promptly and truthfully any inquiries of the Office of Probation and any probation monitor assigned under these conditions which are directed to Respondent personally or in writing relating to whether Respondent is complying or has complied with the probation conditions.
- (8)  Within one (1) year of the effective date of the discipline herein, Respondent must provide to the Office of Probation satisfactory proof of attendance at a session of the Ethics School, and passage of the test given at the end of that session.
- No Ethics School recommended. Reason: .
- (9)  Respondent must comply with all conditions of probation imposed in the underlying criminal matter and must so declare under penalty of perjury in conjunction with any quarterly report to be filed with the Office of Probation.
- (10)  The following conditions are attached hereto and incorporated:
- |   |   |
|---|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Substance Abuse Conditions | <input type="checkbox"/> Law Office Management Conditions |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Medical Conditions         | <input type="checkbox"/> Financial Conditions             |

#### F. Other Conditions Negotiated by the Parties:

- (1)  **Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination:** Respondent must provide proof of passage of the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination ("MPRE"), administered by the National Conference of Bar Examiners, to the Office of Probation during the period of actual suspension or within one year, whichever period is longer. **Failure to pass the MPRE results in actual suspension without**

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**further hearing until passage. But see rule 9.10(b), California Rules of Court, and rule 5.162(A) & (E), Rules of Procedure.**

No MPRE recommended. Reason:

- (2)  **Rule 9.20, California Rules of Court:** Respondent must comply with the requirements of rule 9.20, California Rules of Court, and perform the acts specified in subdivisions (a) and (c) of that rule within 30 and 40 calendar days, respectively, after the effective date of the Supreme Court's Order in this matter.
- (3)  **Conditional Rule 9.20, California Rules of Court:** If Respondent remains actually suspended for 90 days or more, he/she must comply with the requirements of rule 9.20, California Rules of Court, and perform the acts specified in subdivisions (a) and (c) of that rule within 120 and 130 calendar days, respectively, after the effective date of the Supreme Court's Order in this matter.
- (4)  **Credit for Interim Suspension [conviction referral cases only]:** Respondent will be credited for the period of his/her interim suspension toward the stipulated period of actual suspension. Date of commencement of interim suspension:
- (5)  **Other Conditions:**

# STIPULATION FOR ACTUAL SUSPENSION ATTACHMENT

*In the Matter of Kulvinder Singh*  
Case Number 11-O-12353

## I. PROCEDURAL STATEMENT

### A. Procedural Statement

1. On November 22, 2011, the State Bar of California filed a Notice of Disciplinary Charges ("NDC") which alleged that respondent violated Business & Professions Code §§ 6106, 6068(g) and 6068(b).
2. On December 6, 2011, respondent filed his response to the NDC.
3. On February 6, 2012, the State Bar Court granted the State Bar's motion to strike respondent's December 6, 2011 response and ordered respondent to file an amended response by February 13, 2012.
4. On February 13, 2012, respondent filed an amended response to the NDC.

## II. FACTS AND LEGAL CONCLUSIONS

### A. Factual Statement

1. On August 10, 2009, respondent filed a complaint against Keegan & Myers, PC ("Keegan & Myers"), F. Patrick Keegan ("F. Keegan"), Sandra R. Myers ("S. Myers"), Harleen Sodhi ("Sodhi"), Rachel Malerbi ("Malerbi"), and Veer Bahadur Singh ("Veer Singh"), in the proceeding of *Kulvinder Singh Sahansra v. Eugene Roeder et al.*, Superior Court of California, County of Placer, Case No. M-CV-0040859 (Case No. M-CV-0040859).
2. On September 30, 2009, an Anti-SLAPP motion pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16 was filed on behalf of Keegan & Myers, F. Keegan, S. Myers, and Sodhi. Following the filing of the Anti-SLAPP motion, Robert Sinclair ("Sinclair") substituted into the case as counsel for defendants.
3. On January 27, 2010, the court granted the Anti-SLAPP motion, dismissing all causes of action against Keegan & Myers, F. Keegan, S. Myers, and Sodhi and awarded defendants' attorney's fees.
4. On February 18, 2010, Keegan & Myers, F. Keegan, S. Myers, and Sodhi each filed a memorandum of costs in the amount of \$17,665.
5. On March 5, 2010, Respondent filed a motion to tax costs. The hearing for the motion to tax costs was set for October 26, 2010.
6. On March 26, 2010, Sinclair, as counsel for Keegan & Myers, F. Keegan, S. Myers, and Sodhi, filed a motion for attorney's fees on behalf of Keegan & Myers, F. Keegan, S.

Myers, Sodhi, Malerbi and Veer Singh as provided by Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16 (c). The amount sought was \$9395.00 as to Keegan & Myers, F. Keegan and S. Myers, \$9990 as to Malerbi and Veer Singh and \$19,735 as to Sodhi. The motion requested an increase of \$3200 per moving party if respondent opposed the motion.

7. On April 9, 2010, respondent filed a dismissal without prejudice as to all defendants in case no. M-CV-0040859 ("April 9, 2010 dismissal"). The dismissal was entered.
8. On April 22, 2010, respondent entered into a settlement agreement with Keegan & Myers, F. Keegan, S. Myers, and Sodhi. Among other terms, the settlement agreement required that respondent pay the defendants \$21,650.00, withdraw his motion to tax costs, and dismiss the complaint with prejudice. In exchange, the defendants agreed to withdraw their motions for attorney's fees. Respondent was required to provide Sinclair, by April 30, 2010, an endorsed filed copy of the dismissal with prejudice and a copy of his request to withdraw his motion to tax costs.
9. Respondent signed the written settlement agreement and paid Keegan & Myers \$21,650. The signatures of the other parties to the agreement are dated April 22, 2010 and April 28, 2010.
10. On April 29, 2010, respondent's request for dismissal with prejudice was rejected for entering due to the April 9, 2010 dismissal. Respondent took no action to set aside the April 9, 2010 dismissal nor made any further effort to have a dismissal with prejudice entered.
11. On April 30, 2010, respondent sent Sinclair a copy of his letter addressed to the court requesting that his motion to tax costs be removed from the calendar. ("April 30, 2010 letter"). The letter stated: "we request the motion to strike/tax costs hearing date of October 26, 2010 be dropped from the calendar as moot." Respondent never sent the letter to the court.
12. On May 10, 2010, Sinclair caused an email to be sent to the court requesting to drop the June 10, 2010 hearing on the motion for attorney's fees. Respondent was copied on the email request. On that same date, in response to the court's query regarding the status of the hearing on the motion to tax costs, Sinclair caused respondent's April 30, 2010 letter to be forwarded to the court via email.
13. On November 15, 2010, respondent wrote Judge Pineschi a letter demanding that his motion to tax costs remain on calendar. In his letter, respondent wrote: "On or about Oct. 20<sup>th</sup>, I got a message from Ryan in legal research asking if the motion was still on. I called him and said yes. Apparently Jana is his boss or colleague, and she said to me on Nov. 12<sup>th</sup> that she was told I wrote a letter dropping it. I said it was a subject of a settlement, but the motion was going forward since I did not send in the letter."
14. Also on November 15, 2010, respondent wrote Judge Garbolino a letter and stated that he never withdrew his motion to tax costs and wanted to proceed with it: "I never agreed to drop the motion to tax costs . . ."
15. On December 1, 2010 Sinclair filed an opposition to the motion to tax costs, which included as exhibits, a copy of respondent's April 30, 2010 letter and a copy of the fully



executed settlement agreement.

16. On January 13, 2011, respondent's motion to tax costs was heard. During the hearing, respondent told the court that the first time that he saw the pages of the settlement agreement preceding the signature page was when he reviewed the opposition to the motion to tax costs.
17. On February 1, 2011, the court denied respondent's motion to tax costs as moot because Respondent entered into a settlement agreement. Also, the court found that Respondent intentionally misled opposing counsel into thinking Respondent had withdrawn the motion to tax costs.

#### **B. Conclusions Of Law And Supporting Authority**

Respondent committed an act of moral turpitude in violation of Business & Professions Code § 6106 by entering into the settlement agreement and thereafter not withdrawing his motion to tax costs, intentionally misleading Sinclair concerning the withdrawal of the motion, arguing that the motion should proceed, and misleading the court at the hearing on the motion by claiming he had never seen the pages of the settlement agreement other than the page he signed.

Respondent misled the court by an artifice or false statement of fact in violation of Business & Professions Code § 6068(b) by entering into the settlement agreement and thereafter writing the court arguing that his motion to tax costs should proceed to hearing and misleading to the court at the hearing on the motion by claiming he had never seen the pages of the settlement agreement other than the page he signed.

#### Supporting Authority

Standard 2.3 requires an actual suspension for dishonest conduct: "Culpability of a member of an act of moral turpitude, fraud, or intentional dishonesty toward a court, client or another person or of concealment of a material fact to a court, client or another person shall result in actual suspension or disbarment depending upon the extent to which the victim of the misconduct is harmed or misled and depending upon the magnitude of the act of misconduct and the degree to which it relates to the member's acts within the practice of law."

The Supreme Court in *Bach v. State Bar* (1987) 43 Cal.3d 848 ordered an actual sixty-day suspension of Mr. Bach, who had one instance of prior discipline, for misleading a judge as to whether a court had ordered Mr. Bach to have his client attend mediation. The court held: "... the *validity* of the orders as to which he made misrepresentations is irrelevant. Whether or not Bach believed he had colorable arguments against the orders' enforceability, he was duty bound not to mislead or attempt to mislead the court about their existence." (*Id.* at 855.)

*In the Matter of Chesnut* (Review Dept. 2000) 4 Cal State Bar Ct. Rptr. 166 presented the circumstance of a respondent who lied to two courts concerning whether he had served a party. Mr. Chesnut had a prior record of discipline, which included a fifteen-day actual suspension. The Review Department recommended two-years stayed suspension conditioned on six-months actual suspension and other probationary terms. In *Coviello v. State Bar of California* (1955) 45 Cal.2d 57, Mr. Coviello inserted or caused to be inserted the name of his client as grantee in each deed. Then, Mr. Coviello presented the deeds to opposing

counsel to gain an advantage in litigation. Mr. Coviello had been suspended thirty days for a prior instance of discipline, and the court suspended him six months for the most recent conduct.

### **III. DISMISSALS**

The parties respectfully request the Court to dismiss the following alleged violations in the interest of justice:

<u>Case No.</u>	<u>Count</u>	<u>Alleged Violation</u>
11-O-12353	Two	Business & Professions Code Section 6068(g)

### **IV. WAIVERS**

The parties waive all variances between the facts and conclusions of law asserted in the NDC and the facts and conclusions of law contained in this stipulation.

### **V. PENDING DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS**

There are not any other disciplinary proceedings pending against respondent as of February 13, 2012. The disclosure date referenced in the Stipulation For Actual Suspension, subdivision A, paragraph (7) is February 13, 2012.

### **VI. COST OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS**

Respondent acknowledges that the Office of the Chief Trial Counsel has informed respondent that as of February 13, 2012, the prosecution costs in this matter are approximately \$3,269.00. Respondent further acknowledges that should this stipulation be rejected or should relief from the stipulation be granted, the costs in this matter might increase due to the cost of further proceedings.

### **VII. STATE BAR ETHICS SCHOOL.**

Because respondent has agreed to attend State Bar Ethics School as part of this stipulation, respondent may receive Minimum Continuing Legal Education credit upon the satisfactory completion of State Bar Ethics School.

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In the Matter of: Kulvinder Singh	Case Number(s): 11-O-12353
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**Nolo Contendere Plea Stipulations to Facts, Conclusions of Law, and Disposition**

The terms of pleading nolo contendere are set forth in the Business and Professions Code and the Rules of Procedures of the State Bar. The applicable provisions are set forth below:

**Business and Professions Code § 6085.5 Disciplinary Charges; Pleas to Allegations**

There are three kinds of pleas to the allegations of a notice of disciplinary charges or other pleading which initiates a disciplinary proceeding against a member:

- (a) Admission of culpability.
- (b) Denial of culpability.
- (c) Nolo contendere, subject to the approval of the State Bar Court. The court shall ascertain whether the member completely understands that a plea of nolo contendere will be considered the same as an admission of culpability and that, upon a plea of nolo contendere, the court will find the member culpable. The legal effect of such a plea will be the same as that of an admission of culpability for all purposes, except that the plea and any admissions required by the court during any inquiry it makes as to the voluntariness of, or the factual basis for, the pleas, may not be used against the member as an admission in any civil suit based upon or growing out of the act upon which the disciplinary proceeding is based.

**Rules of Procedure of the State Bar, rule 5.56. Stipulations to Facts, Conclusions of Law, and Disposition**

“(A) Contents. A proposed stipulation to facts, conclusions of law, and disposition must comprise:

[¶] . . . [¶]

(5) a statement that the member either:

- (a) admits the truth of the facts comprising the stipulation and admits culpability for misconduct; or
- (b) pleads nolo contendere to those facts and misconduct;

[¶] . . . [¶]

(B) Plea of Nolo Contendere. If the member pleads nolo contendere, the stipulation must also show that the member understands that the plea is treated as an admission of the stipulated facts and an admission of culpability.”

I, the Respondent in this matter, have read the applicable provisions of Business and Professions Code section 6085.5 and rule 5.56 of the Rules of Procedure of the State Bar. I plead nolo contendere to the charges set forth in this stipulation and I completely understand that my plea will be considered the same as an admission of culpability except as stated in Business and Professions Code section 6085.5(c).



March 12, 2012      *Kulvinder Singh*      Kulvinder Singh  
 Date                      Respondent's Signature                      Print Name

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In the Matter of: Kulvinder Singh	Case number(s): 11-O-12353
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### SIGNATURE OF THE PARTIES

By their signatures below, the parties and their counsel, as applicable, signify their agreement with each of the recitations and each of the terms and conditions of this Stipulation Re Facts, Conclusions of Law, and Disposition.

<u>March 12, 2012</u> Date	<u></u> Respondent's Signature	<u>Kulvinder Singh</u> Print Name
<del><u>March 15, 2012</u></del> Date	<del><u>N/A</u></del> Respondent's Counsel Signature	<del><u>N/A</u></del> Print Name
<u>March 15, 2012</u> Date	<u></u> Deputy Trial Counsel's Signature	<u>Treva R. Stewart</u> Print Name



**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

[Rules Proc. of State Bar; Rule 5.27(B); Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a(4)]

I am a Case Administrator of the State Bar Court of California. I am over the age of eighteen and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to standard court practice, in the City and County of San Francisco, on March 27, 2012, I deposited a true copy of the following document(s):

**STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND  
DISPOSITION AND ORDER APPROVING**

in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:


- by first-class mail, with postage thereon fully prepaid, through the United States Postal Service at San Francisco, California, addressed as follows:

KULVINDER SINGH  
WWW.SINGHLAWOFFICE.COM  
12 CASTAIC CT  
ROSEVILLE, CA 95678

- by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of California addressed as follows:

TREVA R. STEWART, Enforcement, San Francisco

I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in San Francisco, California, on March 27, 2012.

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Mazie Yip  
Case Administrator  
State Bar Court