Case Number(s): 11-O-14037-RAH
In the Matter of: Alexandre Nicholas Lebecki Bar # 152745 A Member of the State Bar of California, (Respondent).
Counsel For The State Bar: Anthony J. Garcia, Deputy,Trial Counsd
State Bar of California
1141,9 South Hill Street
Los Angeles, CA, 90015
(213) 765-1089
Counsel for Respondent: In Pro Per Respondent
Alexandre Nicholas Lebecki
11693 SanVicente Boulevard, #417
Los Angeles, CA 90049
(310) 550-5880
Bar # 152475
Submitted to: Assigned Judge, State Bar Court Clerk’s Office Los Angeles
Filed: October 30, 2012
<<not>> checked. PREVIOUS STIPULATION REJECTED
Note: All information required by this form and any additional information which cannot be provided in the space provided, must be set forth in an attachment to this stipulation under specific headings, e.g., "Facts," "Dismissals," "Conclusions of Law," "Supporting Authority," etc.
1. Respondent is a member of the State Bar of California, admitted June 6, 1991.
2. The parties agree to be bound by the factual stipulations contained herein even if conclusions of law or disposition are rejected or changed by the Supreme Court.
3. All investigations or proceedings listed by case number in the caption of this stipulation are entirely resolved by this stipulation and are deemed consolidated. Dismissed charge(s)/count(s) are listed under "Dismissals." The stipulation consists of 11 pages, not including the order.
4. A statement of acts or omissions acknowledged by Respondent as cause or causes for discipline is included under "Facts."
5. Conclusions of law, drawn from and specifically referring to the facts are also included under "Conclusions of Law".
6. The parties must include supporting authority for the recommended level of discipline under the heading "Supporting Authority."
7. No more than 30 days prior to the filing of this stipulation, Respondent has been advised in writing of any pending investigation/proceeding not resolved by this stipulation, except for criminal investigations.
8. Payment of Disciplinary Costs-Respondent acknowledges the provisions of Bus. & Prof. Code §§6086.10 & 6140.7. (Check one option only):
checked. Costs are awarded to the State Bar.
<<not>> checked. Costs are waived in part as set forth in a separate attachment entitled "Partial Waiver of Costs".
<<not>> checked. Costs are entirely waived.
9.
ORDER OF INACTIVE ENROLLMENT:
The parties are aware that if this stipulation is approved, the judge will
issue an order of inactive enrollment under Business and Professions Code
section 6007, subdivision (c)(4), and Rules of Procedure of the State Bar, rule
5.111(D)(1).
Disbarment.
IN THE MATTER OF: Alexandre Nicholas Lebecki
CASE NUMBER: 11-O-14037
FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
Respondent admits that the following facts are true and that he is culpable of violations of the specified
statutes and/or Rules of Professional Conduct.
Case No, 11-O-14037 (Complainants: Souren and Angela Bedoyan)
FACTS:
1. In July 2006, Souren and Angela Bedoyan (the Bedoyans) purchased an empty lot from the First Assembly of God Church (the church) for $1,650,000. After purchasing the lot, the Bedoyans attempted to lease part of the lot to another business. The City of Los Angeles stopped the attempted lease and informed the Bedoyans that the City possessed a restrictive covenant on the lot and that the lot could only be used for church parking.
2. On October 31, 2008, the Bedoyans hired Respondent to sue the church for damages the Bedoyans incurred due to the lot’s diminished value and for their lost rental income. Respondent agreed to take the case on a contingency fee basis. Respondent agreed to take a 25% contingency of any sums recovered as his legal fee.
3. On December 3, 2008, Respondent filed a lawsuit against the church.
4. On January 4, 2009, the Bedoyans and the church settled the lawsuit. The terms of the settlement required the church to pay the Bedoyans $172,000 as damages for lost rent and the church had ninety days, or until April 5, 2009, to get the lot’s restrictive covenants removed. If the church failed to get the lot’s restrictive covenants lifted by April 5, 2009, the church agreed to pay the Bedoyans an additional $400,000, and an additional $10,000 for rent lost through April 5, 2009.
5. On February 9, 2009, the church disbursed $172,000 in settlement funds to Respondent. Respondent received the funds and deposited them into his client trust account (CTA). Shortly after February 9, 2009, the church disbursed an additional $10,000 in settlement funds to Respondent to pay for the Bedoyans’ lost rent from January 2009 through April 2009. Respondent received the $10,000 and deposited it into his CTA
6. On May 24, 2009, the court held a hearing and found that the lot’s restrictive covenant was not yet lifted.
7. In July 2009, the lot’s restrictive covenant was lifted.
8. On November 17, 2009, the court entered a judgment for the Bedoyans in the amount of $400,000.
9. Because it had successfully lifted the lot’s restrictive covenants, the church challenged the November 17, 2009 judgment awarding the Bedoyans $400,000 plus interest.
10. On June 7, 2010, the court affirmed the November 17, 2009, judgment.
11. On December 30, 2010, Respondent obtained $408, 794.46 from the church’s account for the church’s failure to get the restrictive covenant lifted by April 5, 2009. Respondent accepted $408, 794.46 from the church as full payment of the church’s debt. Respondent deposited $408,794.46 of the Bedoyans’ funds into his CTA.
12. The monetary value of the lot increased after the restrictive covenant was lifted. According to appraised values obtained by Respondent, the lot was worth $555,000 when it had restrictive covenants in place and $1,225,000 when the covenants were lifted. The difference between the two values is $670,000.
13. On January 3,2011, Respondent sent the Bedoyans a statement containing the breakdown of fees he contended that he was owed.
14. In sum, Respondent recovered $590,794.46 on behalf of the Bedoyans and was entitled to $147,698.62 as his contingent fee. The Bedoyans did not dispute this amount.
15. Respondent’s statement also included a calculation that he was entitled to an additional $167,500 as a contingent fee due to the lot’s increased value after the restrictive covenants were lifted.
The Bedoyans disputed Respondent’s entitlement to the additional $167,500.
16. On January 4, 2011, the Bedoyans called Respondent to advise him that they were disputing the additional fee of $167,500 that Respondent was claiming he was owed.
17. On January 5, 2011, Respondent informed the Bedoyans that he would maintain $167,500, the disputed funds, in his client trust account (CTA).
18. The balance in Respondent’s CTA dipped below $167,500 on multiple dates, including but not limited to the following:
19. On March 31, 2011 the balance in Respondent’s CTA was $131,990.72. On January 30, 2012, the balance in Respondent’s CTA was $ 51,139.28.
20. Respondent misappropriated $116,360.72 of the Bedoyans’ funds.
21. On September 23,2011, the Bedoyans deposed Respondent. At the deposition, Respondent testified under oath that $107,000 of the disputed funds was still in the trust account. On that day, there was $99,594.30 in Respondent’s CTA. When Respondent testified that he had $107,000 in his CTA, he was grossly negligent in not knowing that the actual amount was $99,594.30.
22. At his September 23,2011, deposition, Respondent testified under oath that he knew that the disputed amount of attorney fees was $167,500
23. Between September 23,2011 and January 30, 2012, Respondent withdrew an additional $48,455.02 of the disputed funds from his CTA.
24. On April 17, 2012, the Bedoyans and Respondent settled their dispute. As part of the settlement, Respondent agreed to pay the Bedoyans $175,000.
25. In accord with their settlement agreement, Respondent made an initial payment of $107,000 to the Bedoyans on April 17, 2012, and agreed to pay $5,645 per month to the Bedoyans until the balance was paid in full. The remaining balance was $67,500. 26. As part of the settlement, Respondent agreed that his first monthly payment of $5,645 per month would be paid to the Bedoyans on May 15, 2012. To date, Respondent has not made any monthly payments to the Bedoyans.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
27. By withdrawing funds from his CTA that resulted in the balance in his CTA dropping below $167,500, the amount of the disputed funds, Respondent withdrew client funds from a client trust account prior to the resolution of a dispute with the client over Respondent’s fight to receive those funds in willful violation of California Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 4-100(A)(2).
28. By misappropriating $116,360.72 of the Bedoyans’ funds Respondent committed an act or acts involving moral turpitude, dishonesty or corruption in willful violation of California Business and Professions Code section 6106. By testifying that he had $107,000 in his CTA on September 23, 2012, when he only had $99,594.30 in his CTA, Respondent was grossly negligent in not knowing the amount of the Bedoyans’ funds that he was holding and therefore committed an act or acts involving moral turpitude, dishonesty or corruption in willful violation of California Business and Professions Code
section 6106
ADDITIONAL FACTS RE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES.
Trust Violation
Respondent’ misconduct involved trust funds that he was obligated to hold for his clients, and Respondent has not accounted for the missing funds.
Harm
Respondent’s failure to maintain his clients’ funds in his trust account resulted in his failure to promptly deliver those funds to his client. The clients’ loss of the use of their funds has caused harm to Respondent’s clients.
Multiple Acts/Pattern
Respondent’s misconduct evidences of multiple acts of misconduct. Respondent’s CTA dipped below $167,500 on multiple occasions.
OTHER MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES.
No Prior Discipline
Respondent has been practicing since 1991 with no prior record of discipline. He is entitled to some mitigating credit for no prior discipline even where the underlying conduct is found to be serious or significant. (In the Matter of Stamper (Review Dept. 1990) 1 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 96, 106, fn. 13.)
Pre-trial Stipulation
Respondent is receiving mitigation for entering into a full stipulation with the Office of the Chief Trial Counsel prior to trial in case no. 11-O-14037-RAH, thereby preserving State Bar Court time and resources. (In the Matter of Downey (Review Dept. 2009) 5 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr 189,195; In the Matter of Johnson (Review Dept. 2000) 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 179, 190.)
AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING DISCIPLINE.
The Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct provide a "process of fixing discipline" pursuant to a set of written principles to "better discharge the purposes of attorney discipline as announced by the Supreme Court." (Rules Proc. of State Bar, tit. IV, Stds. for Atty. Sanctions for Prof. Misconduct, Introduction (all further references to standards are to this source).) The primary purposes of disciplinary proceedings and of the sanctions imposed are "the protection of the public, the courts and the legal profession; the maintenance of high professional standards by attorneys and the preservation of public confidence in the legal profession." (In re Morse (1995) 11 Cal.4th 184, 205; std .3.)
Although not binding, the standards are entitled to "great weight" and should be followed "whenever possible" in determining level of discipline. (In re Silverton (2005) 36 Cal’4th 81, 92, quoting In re Brown (1995) 12 Cal.4th 205,220 and In re Young (1989) 49 Cal.3d 257, 267, fn. 11.) Adherence to the standards in the great majority of cases serves the valuable purpose of eliminating disparity and assuring consistency, that is, the imposition of similar attorney discipline for instances of similar attorney misconduct. (In re Nancy (1990) 51 Cal.3d 186, 190.) Any discipline recommendation different from that set forth in the applicable standards should clearly explain the reasons for the deviation. (Blair v. State Bar (1989) 49 Cal.3d 762, 776, fn. 5.)
Respondent admits to committing two acts of professional misconduct. Standard 1.6 (a) requires that where a Respondent acknowledges two or more acts of misconduct, and different sanctions are prescribed by the standards that apply to those acts, the sanction imposed shall be the more or most severe prescribed in the applicable standards.
The most severe sanction applicable to Respondent’s misconduct is found in standard 2.2(a) which applies to Respondent’s violations of California Business and Professions Code section 6106.
Standard 2.2(a) provides that culpability of a member of a wilful misappropriation of entrusted funds or property shall result in disbarment. Only if the amount of funds or property misappropriated is insignificantly small or if the most compelling mitigating circumstances clearly predominate, shall disbarment not be imposed. In those latter cases, the discipline shall not be less that a one-year actual suspension, irrespective of mitigating circumstances.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that disbarment is the usual discipline for the willful misappropriation of client funds. (See, Grim v. State Bar (1991) 53 Cal.3d 21; Edwards v. State Bar (1990) 52 Cal.3d 28, 37; Howard v. State Bar (1990) 51 Cal.3d 215,221; and Chang v. State Bar (1989) 49 Cal.3d 114, 128).)
In this matter, Respondent willfully misappropriated a significant sum of client funds. Pursuant to Standard 2.2(a), this fact alone indicates that the appropriate discipline in this matter is disbarment. The mitigating circumstances acknowledged in this stipulation are neither the most compelling mitigating circumstances nor do they clearly predominate.
PENDING PROCEEDINGS.
The disclosure date referred to, on page 2, paragraph A(7), was October 3, 2012.
WAIVER OF VARIANCE BETWEEN NOTICE OF DISCIPLINARY CHARGES AND
STIPULATED FACTS AND CULPABILITY.
The parties waive any variance between the Notice of Disciplinary Charges filed in this matter, and the facts and/or conclusions of law obtained in this stipulation. Additionally, the parties waive the issuance of an amended Notice of Disciplinary Charges. The parties further waive the right to the filing of a Notice of Disciplinary Charges and to a formal hearing on any charge not included in the pending Notice of Disciplinary Charges.
Case Number(s): 11-O-14037-RAH
In the Matter of: Alexandre Nicholas Lebecki
Finding the stipulation to be fair to the parties and that it adequately protects the public, IT IS ORDERED that the requested dismissal of counts/charges, if any is GRANTED without prejudice, and:
<<not>>checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED and the DISCIPLINE RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED AS MODIFIED as set forth below, and the DISCIPLINE IS RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
<<not>>checked. All Hearing dates are vacated.
On page 1 of the stipulation, in the box entitled "In the Matter of.’", "Bar # 152745" is deleted, and in its place is inserted "Bar # 152475"; and On page 5 of the stipulation, paragraph E.(2), "Sauren Bedoyan" is deleted, and in its place is inserted "Souren Bedoyan".
The parties are bound by the stipulation as approved unless: 1) a motion to withdraw or modify the stipulation, filed within 15 days after service of this order, is granted; or 2) this court modifies or further modifies the approved stipulation. (See rule 5.58 (E) & (F), Rules of Procedure.) The effective date of this disposition is the effective date of the Supreme Court order herein, normally 30 days after the file date. (See rule 9.18(a), California Rules of Court.)
Respondent is ordered transferred to involuntary inactive status pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 6007, subdivision (c)(4). Respondent’s inactive enrollment will be effective three (3) calendar days after this order is served by mail and will terminate upon the effective date of the Supreme Court’s order imposing discipline herein, or as provided for by rule 5.111(D)(2) or the Rules of Procedure of the State Bar of California, or as otherwise ordered by the Supreme Court pursuant to its plenary jurisdiction.
Signed by:
Richard A. Honn
Judge of the State Bar Court
Date: October 30, 2012
[Rules Proc. of State Bar; Rule 5.27(B); Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a(4)]
I am a Case Administrator of the State Bar Court of California. I am over the age of eighteen and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to standard court practice, in the City and
County of Los Angeles on October 30, 2012, I deposited a true copy of the following document(s):
STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION AND ORDER APPROVING; ORDER OF INVOLUNTARY INACTIVE ENROLLMENT
in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:
checked. by first-class mail, with postage thereon fully prepaid, through the United States Postal Service at Los Angeles, California, addressed as follows:
ALEXANDRE N. LEBECKI
LAW OFV ALEXANDRE LEBECKI
11693 SAN VICENTE BLVD #417
LOS ANGELES, CA 90049
checked. by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of California addressed as follows:
ANTHONY GARCIA, Enforcement, Los Angeles
I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in Los Angeles, California, on October 30, 2012.
Signed by:
Rose M. Luthi
Case Administrator
State Bar Court