PUBLIC MATTER

STATE BAR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

HEARING DEPARTMENT - LOS ANGELES

In the Matter of	)	Case No. 14-O-05703
	)	
BARRY STEVEN JORGENSEN,	)	DECISION
	)	
A Member of the State Bar, No. 79620.	)	
	)	

Introduction[1]

Respondent Barry Steven Jorgensen (Respondent) is charged with five counts of misconduct in a single client matter. The charges include misleading a judge by concealing a material fact and aiding another in the unauthorized practice of law (UPL). The Office of Chief Trial Counsel of the State Bar of California (OCTC) has the burden of proving these charges by clear and convincing evidence.[2] This court finds Respondent culpable of three counts of misconduct and recommends that he be suspended from the practice of law in California for two years, that execution of that period of suspension be stayed, and that he be placed on probation for a period of two years subject to a nine-month actual suspension.

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[1] Unless otherwise indicated, all references to rules refer to the State Bar Rules of Professional Conduct. Furthermore, all statutory references are to the Business and Professions Code, unless otherwise indicated.

[2] Clear and convincing evidence leaves no substantial doubt and is sufficiently strong to command the unhesitating assent of every reasonable mind. (*Conservatorship of Wendland* (2001) 26 Cal.4th 519, 552.)

Significant Procedural History

OCTC initiated this proceeding by filing a Notice of Disciplinary Charges ("NDC") in case number 14-O-05703 on October 30, 2015. Respondent filed a response to the NDC on December 4, 2015. The parties filed a Stipulation of Facts and Admission of Documents on September 9, 2016.

A two-day trial took place on September 14 and September 15, 2016. The State Bar was represented by Deputy Trial Counsel Sherell N. McFarlane. Respondent represented himself. The matter was submitted for decision on September 15, 2016. The State Bar and Respondent filed their respective closing briefs on October 6, 2016.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

Respondent was admitted to the practice of law in California on June 2, 1978, and has been a member of the State Bar of California at all times since that date. These findings of fact and conclusions of law are based on the record, evidence admitted at trial, and facts set forth by the parties in their stipulation.

Case No. 14-O-05703

Facts

In 2012, Respondent was the attorney of record for the defendant in Los Angeles County Superior Court case number EC058142 entitled, *Edmond Feredonzadeh, et al. v. Tina Avakian.* A trial was set for September 23, 2014. The *Avakian* case was Respondent's first jury trial as lead counsel.

Before the *Avakian* trial began, Respondent contacted Dave Barela, a former attorney who resigned with disciplinary charges pending, and asked him to assist with the trial. Barela resigned with charges pending effective May 13, 2004. Before his resignation, Barela had been disciplined twice. The misconduct in his priors included making false representations,

misappropriation of client funds, the failure to promptly pay client funds, and the failure to maintain client funds in trust. The charges pending when Barela resigned involved trust account violations involving $30,000.

Respondent knew Barela had resigned with charges pending and was not licensed to practice law in California. Barela agreed to assist Respondent; he volunteered to oversee the trial documents and jury instructions, but he would not be compensated for his assistance. Respondent never informed the State Bar that Barela would be assisting him with the *Avakian* case. Barela was not licensed to practice law in any other jurisdiction.

When the trial proceedings began, Barela sat with Respondent at the counsel table. Respondent considered Barela his legal assistant. Later, on September 26, 2014, Superior Court Judge Elizabeth A. Lippitt noted that up until that morning, there were two attorneys representing the defendant Tina Avakian. Judge Lippitt was referring to Barela. When the court asked Respondent, "who was the gentleman that was with you?" Respondent replied "David Barela." Shortly thereafter Barela walked into the courtroom and the court asked, "And Mr. Barela, I understand, is an attorney but not licensed in California; correct?" In response, Barela replied, "Correct, your honor." Respondent then told the court that Barela was going to be his "paper chaser" and agreed with the court's characterization that Barela was going to be Respondent's "side kick, man Friday, everything above." The court then indicated that opposing counsel referred to Barela as a law clerk and stated, "I'm not comfortable with that title because he is a licensed attorney. . . . And I think law clerk is a little bit demeaning under the circumstances." The judge permitted Barela to sit at the defense counsel table because it was her understanding that Barela was an attorney licensed out-of-state.

As the court began to make preliminary decisions about exhibits and jury instructions, opposing counsel noticed that Barela was doing more than assisting Respondent. Opposing

counsel observed Barela directing Respondent and instructing him on which exhibits to admit. In addition, there were instances where opposing counsel objected to certain instructions and Barela advised Respondent what to argue in response. In addition to directing Respondent in court, Barela responded to the court's questions about certain jury instructions.

Based on Barela's actions in court, opposing counsel instructed his paralegal to Google Barela's name, which led the paralegal to check the State Bar website. At this point, opposing counsel discovered that Barela was a former attorney who was not entitled to practice law in California.

Later that morning, opposing counsel raised the issue of Barela's status with the court, stating, "Mr. Barela is a California suspended lawyer, not an outside California lawyer. He's sitting here. He's instructing this lawyer what to say and what not to say. He's practicing law illegally, your honor. He cannot be doing this." The court then stated, "I was given the representation that it [sic] was from out of state if I recall."

Opposing counsel addressed the court further by stating, "I understand, but I see this unlicensed person telling a licensed attorney sitting here what to do and what not to do. He's a suspended license [sic] with charges pending. That's where we stand, your honor . . . . He should not be sitting and instructing this lawyer what to say and what not to say."

The court responded and stated, "So Mr. Barela, from now on – I mean, it is – there's a lot of whispering going on between the two of you. Mr. Jorgensen's on the hook for this case. Mr. Jorgensen is the one that's got to make the calls on this, and during lunch time you all can flush out what the heck is going on on this. This is a completely different scenario than what was represented to me on Tuesday when this case came here."

After a short recess, the court again addressed the issue of Barela's State Bar license status after reviewing the information contained on the State Bar's website. The court stated in

part, "I know at least I have that ethical obligation as to inform the State Bar that Mr. Barela, quite frankly, is practicing law through Mr. Jorgensen . . . and for the record, he has continually been whispering in Mr. Jorgensen's ear with a stage whisper, and Mr. Jorgensen is not doing anything without consulting Mr. Barela."

Respondent then requested to be heard, stating in part, "Well, I mean my point is he's not – he's my legal assistant, and a legal assistant does not have to be a licensed attorney. He does my research and handles the paperwork. I don't understand why that's practicing law." The court stated in response, "He is sitting at counsel table and basically telling you what to do every step of the way. I think that's, you know, for all intents and purposes, practicing law."

The court subsequently addressed Respondent's client. The court stated, "Ms. Avakian, it has come to my attention today that the other gentleman that has been helping Mr. Jorgensen is not a licensed lawyer, do you understand that?" Respondent's client indicated that she understood, and she accepted that Respondent would be the only lawyer representing her on her case.

Conclusions

Count One - (§ 6068, subd. (d) [Seeking to Mislead a Judge])[3]
Count Two - (§ 6106 [Moral Turpitude - Misrepresentation])[4]

OCTC charged Respondent with willfully violating section 6106 by failing to inform the judge that a former California attorney who resigned with charges pending was not licensed to practice law in any other jurisdiction, when Respondent knew the court believed that the former attorney was licensed in another jurisdiction. OCTC charged Respondent with willfully

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[3] Section 6068, subdivision (d), provides that an attorney has a duty to employ those means only as are consistent with truth, and never to seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of law or fact.

[4] Section 6106 provides, in part, that the commission of any act involving dishonesty, moral turpitude, or corruption constitutes cause for suspension or disbarment.

violating section 6068, subdivision (d) based on the same facts alleged in the section 6106 charge. Respondent is culpable of the charged misconduct.

Section 6106 applies to the misrepresentation and concealment of material facts. (*In the Matter of Crane and Depew* (Review Dept. 1990) 1 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 139, 154-155; *In the Matter of Taylor* (Review Dept. 1991) 1 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 563, 576.) The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that Respondent knew the superior court judge believed Barela was an attorney licensed in another jurisdiction, yet Respondent concealed from the court that Barela was a former California attorney who resigned with charges pending and was not licensed in any jurisdiction. Respondent acknowledged that he heard the judge say that Barela was licensed outside of California, but Respondent never corrected the court's false belief. Moreover, Respondent's concealment was material. The superior court judge testified during the disciplinary hearing that if she had been aware that Barela was not licensed to practice, she would not have permitted him to sit at the counsel table.

Respondent argues that he is not culpable of violating section 6106 because the false impression was "nothing more than a misunderstanding by Judge Lippitt, and there was no intent . . . to mislead Judge Lippitt into believing that Barela was a licensed attorney in another jurisdiction." Respondent ignores that he had the ethical obligation to correct the superior court's false impression. Respondent had the opportunity to correct the judge's false belief, but failed to do so. "It is settled that concealment of material facts is just as misleading as explicit false statements, and accordingly, is misconduct calling for discipline. [Citations.]" (*Di Sabatino v. State Bar* (1980) 27 Cal.3d 159, 162-163.) Respondent is culpable of committing an act of moral turpitude by concealing from the court that Barela was a former attorney who resigned with charges pending knowing that the court thought Barela was licensed to practice in another jurisdiction, in willful violation of section 6106.

Respondent's concealment of the truth also violated section 6068, subdivision (d). But this charge is dismissed as duplicative of the section 6106 charge because the same misconduct underlies both violations. (*In the Matter of Maloney and Virsik* (Review Dept. 2005) 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 774, 786-787 [dismissal of § 6068, subd. (d), charge proper where underlying misconduct covered by § 6106 charge supporting identical or greater discipline].) Count One is dismissed with prejudice.

Count Three - (Rule 1-300(A) [Aiding the Unauthorized Practice of Law])[5]
Count Four – (Rule 1-311(B) [Employment of Resigned Member])[6]

OCTC charged Respondent with aiding Barela, a resigned member, in the unauthorized practice of law by allowing Barela to participate in the *Avakian* trial and by giving Respondent directions regarding jury instructions, in willful violation of rule 1-300(A). OCTC charged Respondent with willfully violating rule 1-311(B) based on the same facts alleged in the rule 1-300(A) charge. Respondent is culpable of the charged misconduct.

Respondent knew that Barela was a former attorney who resigned with charges pending. Yet, Respondent permitted Barela to sit with him at the defense counsel table and respond to the judge's questions about the jury instructions. Additionally, Barela directed Respondent on how to respond to opposing counsel's jury instruction objections and which instructions to accept or

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[5] Rule 1-300(A) provides that an attorney must not aid any person or entity in the unauthorized practice of law.

[6] Rule 1-311(B) provides that "A member shall not employ, associate professionally with, or aid a person the member knows or reasonably should know is a disbarred, suspended, resigned, or involuntarily inactive member to perform the following on behalf of the member's client:
(1) Render legal consultation or advice to the client;
(2) Appear on behalf of a client in any hearing or proceeding or before any judicial officer, arbitrator, mediator, court, public agency, referee, magistrate, commissioner, or hearing officer;
(3) Appear as a representative of the client at a deposition or other discovery matter;
(4) Negotiate or transact any matter for or on behalf of the client with third parties;
(5) Receive, disburse or otherwise handle the client's funds; or
(6) Engage in activities which constitute the practice of law."

reject. Barela's actions constitute UPL (*In the Matter of Tishgart* (Review Dept. 2014) 5 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 338, 344 [practice of law includes giving legal advice]), which Respondent aided.

Respondent maintains that there is a lack of clear and convincing evidence demonstrating that he aided Barela in UPL because Barela was acting as his legal assistant when the two had discussions at the counsel table. The court rejects Respondent's argument. First, as set forth above, Barela was responding to the judge's jury instruction questions. Next, Judge Lippitt observed Barela whispering in Respondent's ear with a "stage whisper;" loud enough so that words could be heard. During the *Avakian* trial, the court noted that "Mr. Jorgensen is not doing anything without consulting Mr. Barela." The judge testified that Respondent and Barela were in constant communication with Barela instructing Respondent how to proceed. This court finds Judge Lippitt's testimony credible. This credibility finding is based on Judge Lippitt's demeanor at trial and her thoughtful, consistent testimony. Moreover, opposing counsel also testified that Barela was instructing Respondent "what to do and what not to do," and "what to say and what not to say." Thus, this court finds clear and convincing evidence that Respondent aided Barela in UPL, in willful violation of rule 1-300(A).

Respondent's association with Barela during the *Avakian* trial also violated rule 1-311(B). However, because the same misconduct underlies the rule 1-300(A) charge, the court dismisses the rule 1-311(B) charge as duplicative. Count Four is dismissed with prejudice.

Count Five – (Rule 1-311(D) [Employment of Resigned Member])[7]

Respondent is charged with willfully violating rule 1-311(D) by failing to notify OCTC that he employed Barela, when he knew Barela was a former attorney who resigned with charges

[7] Rule 1-311(D) provides that an attorney, on employing a disbarred, suspended, resigned, or involuntary inactive lawyer, must give the State Bar and clients written notice of the employment and the employee's status.

pending. OCTC has clearly and convincingly established that Respondent is culpable of the charges in Count Five.

Respondent asked Barela to assist him with the *Avakian* trial knowing that Barela resigned with charges pending. Pursuant to rule 1-311(A), "employ" under rule 1-311(D) "means to engage the services of another, including employees, agents, independent contractors and consultants, regardless of whether any compensation is paid." Even though Respondent and Barela testified that Barela was not compensated for his assistance with the *Avakian* trial, Respondent is culpable of willfully violating rule 1-311(D) because he engaged Barela's services without giving the State Bar written notice, as required by the rule.

Aggravation[8]

The State Bar bears the burden of proving aggravating circumstances by clear and convincing evidence. (Std. 1.5.) The court finds the following with regard to aggravating circumstances.

Prior Record of Discipline (Std. 1.5(a).)

Respondent has one prior discipline record. On October 12, 2016, the Supreme Court ordered Respondent suspended for two years, stayed, and placed him on probation for two years with an actual suspension of six months. Respondent was culpable of collecting illegal advance fees for loan modification services in five client matters, and aiding UPL in all five of those matters. He was also culpable of splitting fees with a non-lawyer. Respondent was ordered to pay a total of $61,635 in restitution to his clients. The period of misconduct was from October 2011 through October 2012. Respondent's wrongdoing was aggravated by multiple acts of wrongdoing and significant client harm; but tempered by 33 years of discipline-free practice, cooperation, and community service. Respondent's prior record of discipline involved serious

[8] All references to standards (Std.) are to the Rules of Procedure of the State Bar, title IV, Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct.

misconduct and harm to his clients. It also involved aiding UPL, which he is culpable of in this disciplinary proceeding. Thus, the court affords significant aggravating weight to Respondent's prior record.

Multiple Acts (Std. 1.5(b).)

Respondent concealed material information from a judge, aided in the UPL of Barela, and failed to report to the State Bar that he employed Barela for the *Avakian* trial. Respondent engaged in multiple acts of wrongdoing, which is an aggravating factor.

Indifference Toward Rectification/Atonement (Std. 1.5(k).)

Respondent fails to appreciate the wrongfulness of his misconduct. During this disciplinary proceeding, Respondent testified that he did not do anything wrong. Even though he knew Judge Lippitt believed that Barela was an attorney licensed in another jurisdiction, Respondent stated that it was not important to correct the judge's false impression. Respondent's attitude demonstrates a lack of understanding of his ethical responsibilities as an attorney. Significant weight is assigned to this factor because Respondent's lack of insight makes him an ongoing danger to the public and legal profession. (*In the Matter of Layton* (Review Dept.1993) 2 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 366, 380 [lack of insight causes concern attorney will repeat misconduct].)

Mitigation

It is Respondent's burden to prove mitigating circumstances by clear and convincing evidence. (Std. 1.6.) The court finds the following with regard to mitigating circumstances.

Candor/Cooperation to Victims/State Bar (Std. 1.6(e).)

Respondent entered into a stipulation of facts that expedited the trial, but many of the admissions were easily proved. Thus, Respondent is afforded limited mitigating weight for his

cooperation. (*In the Matter of Johnson* (Review Dept. 2000) 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 179, 190 [more extensive weight in mitigation accorded those who admit culpability as well as facts].)

Respondent's significant aggravation for a prior discipline record, multiple acts, and lack of insight far outweighs the slight mitigating effect of his cooperation.

Discussion

OCTC argues that a one-year actual suspension is the appropriate level of discipline for Respondent's misconduct. Respondent maintains that if he is found culpable of any wrongdoing, his misconduct warrants no greater than a 30-day actual suspension.

Our discipline analysis begins with the standards, which promote the consistent and uniform application of disciplinary measures and are entitled to great weight. (*In re Silverton* (2005) 36 Cal.4th 81, 91 [Supreme Court will not reject recommendation arising from standards unless grave doubts as to propriety of recommended discipline].) Standards 1.8(a) and 2.11 are the most apt.

Standard 1.8(a) states that when a member has a single prior record of discipline, the "sanction must be greater than the previously imposed sanction," subject to certain exceptions that are not applicable here. Standard 2.11 provides that, "[d]isbarment or actual suspension is the presumed sanction for an act of moral turpitude ... or concealment of a material fact. . . . The degree of sanction depends on the magnitude of the misconduct; the extent to which the misconduct harmed or misled the victim, which may include the adjudicator; the impact on the administration of justice, if any; and the extent to which the misconduct related to the member's practice of law."

Respondent's misconduct was serious. An attorney's concealment violates "'the fundamental rules of ethics – that of common honesty – without which the profession is worse than valueless in the place it holds in the administration of justice.'" (*Alkow v. State Bar* (1952)

38 Cal.2d 257, 264, quoting *Tatlow v. State Bar* (1936) 5 Cal.2d 520, 524.) "It is the endeavor to secure an advantage by means of falsity which is denounced." (*Pickering v. State Bar* (1944) 24 Cal.2d 141, 145.) Respondent's misconduct was central to the practice of law, and as a result of his concealment, the superior court permitted a former attorney who resigned with charges pending to sit at the counsel table. This diminishes the public's confidence in the integrity of the legal system. Therefore, a period of actual suspension is appropriate.

To determine the appropriate level of discipline within the range provided, comparable case law is also considered. (*In the Matter of Elkins* (Review Dept. 2009) 5 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 160, 168.) The court finds guidance from two cases – *Bach v. State Bar* (1987) 43 Cal.3d 848 and *In the Matter of Downey* (Review Dept. 2009) 5 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 151.

In *Bach v. State Bar*, *supra*, 43 Cal.3d 848, Bach intentionally misled a judge. He informed the judge that he had not been ordered to produce his client at a child custody mediation, or in the alternative that he had not been served with such an order. However, the evidence showed that Bach was informed of the order both orally and in writing. The Supreme Court found that this conduct was serious, involved moral turpitude and was the kind of behavior "that threatens the public and undermines its confidence in the legal profession." (*Id.* at p. 857.) In ordering a one-year stayed suspension, with a three-year probation and 60 days' actual suspension, the court noted there was no mitigation evidence. (*Ibid.*) Moreover, the attorney in *Bach* had previously been publicly reproved for communicating with an adverse party represented by counsel.

In *In the Matter of Downey*, *supra*, 5 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 151, Downey signed a verification on behalf of his clients stating that his clients were absent from the county. Downey never verified that they were actually out of the county, but made the assumption based on his inability to reach them. The court found that Downey was grossly negligent and violated section

6106 by signing the verification on behalf of his clients and misrepresenting they were absent from the county. (*Id.* at p. 155.) The court also found that Downey's misconduct was aggravated by dishonesty and concealment. Almost one month after filing the verification, Downey discovered that the verification was untrue, but instead of rectifying the error, he concealed it. He had the opportunity to correct the false statement in an opposition to a motion to strike the complaint, which alleged that the verification was untrue, but he never corrected the misrepresentation. Downey also had a prior discipline record where he was suspended for four months. Downey received limited mitigation for good character and cooperation, and received a 150-day actual suspension.

As in *Bach* and *Downey*, Respondent is an attorney with one prior record of discipline who has misled a court. Further, Respondent's limited mitigation is similar to the slight or absence of mitigation those cases. Both Bach and Downey received progressive discipline for their misconduct. Similarly, this court finds that the totality of the circumstances warrants progressive discipline as outlined in standard 1.8(a). In light of Respondent's six-month prior suspension for serious misconduct and his current lack of insight, the court concludes that a nine-month period of actual suspension is appropriate to protect the public, the courts and the legal profession; to maintain high professional standards; and to preserve public confidence in the legal profession. (Std. 1.1.)

Recommendations

It is recommended that respondent Barry Steven Jorgensen, State Bar Number 79620, be suspended from the practice of law in California for two years, that execution of that period of

suspension be stayed, and that Respondent be placed on probation[9] for a period of two years subject to the following conditions:

1. Respondent Barry Steven Jorgensen is suspended from the practice of law for the first 9 months of probation.

2. Respondent must comply with the provisions of the State Bar Act, the Rules of Professional Conduct, and all of the conditions of Respondent's probation.

3. Within 10 days of any change in the information required to be maintained on the membership records of the State Bar pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 6002.1, subdivision (a), including Respondent's current office address and telephone number, or if no office is maintained, the address to be used for State Bar purposes, Respondent must report such change in writing to the Membership Records Office and the State Bar's Office of Probation.

4. Within 30 days after the effective date of discipline, Respondent must contact the Office of Probation and schedule a meeting with Respondent's assigned probation deputy to discuss these terms and conditions of probation. Upon the direction of the Office of Probation, Respondent must meet with the probation deputy either in person or by telephone. During the period of probation, Respondent must promptly meet with the probation deputy as directed and upon request.

5. Respondent must submit written quarterly reports to the Office of Probation on each January 10, April 10, July 10, and October 10 of the period of probation. Under penalty of perjury, Respondent must state whether Respondent has complied with the State Bar Act, the Rules of Professional Conduct, and all of the conditions of Respondent's probation during the preceding calendar quarter. In addition to all quarterly reports, a final report, containing the same information, is due no earlier than 20 days before the last day of the probation period and no later than the last day of the probation period.

6. Subject to the assertion of applicable privileges, Respondent must answer fully, promptly, and truthfully, any inquiries of the Office of Probation or any probation monitor that are directed to Respondent personally or in writing, relating to whether Respondent is complying or has complied with Respondent's probation conditions.[10]

At the expiration of the probation period, if Respondent has complied with all conditions of probation, Respondent will be relieved of the stayed suspension.

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[9] The probation period will commence on the effective date of the Supreme Court order imposing discipline in this matter. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 9.18.)

[10] It is not recommended that Respondent be ordered to attend the State Bar's Ethics School and Client Trust Accounting School, as he has recently been ordered to do so, on October 12, 2016, by the Supreme Court in case No. S235946.

Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination

It is not recommended that Respondent be ordered to take and pass the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination, as he was recently ordered to do so, on October 12, 2016, by the Supreme Court in case No. S227680.

California Rules of Court, Rule 9.20

It is further recommended that Respondent be ordered to comply with the requirements of rule 9.20 of the California Rules of Court, and to perform the acts specified in subdivisions (a) and (c) of that rule within 30 and 40 days, respectively, after the effective date of the Supreme Court order in this proceeding. Failure to do so may result in disbarment or suspension.

Costs

It is recommended that costs be awarded to the State Bar in accordance with Business and Professions Code section 6086.10, and are enforceable both as provided in Business and Professions Code section 6140.7 and as a money judgment.

Dated: December 12, 2016

YVETTE D. ROLAND
Judge of the State Bar Court

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

[Rules Proc. of State Bar; Rule 5.27(B); Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a(4)]

I am a Case Administrator of the State Bar Court of California. I am over the age of eighteen and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to standard court practice, in the City and County of Los Angeles, on December 13, 2016, I deposited a true copy of the following document(s):

DECISION

in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:

☒ by first-class mail, with postage thereon fully prepaid, through the United States Postal Service at Los Angeles, California, addressed as follows:

BARRY STEVEN JORGENSEN
750 N DIAMOND BAR BLVD # 224
DIAMOND BAR, CA 91765

☒ by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of California addressed as follows:

Sherell N. McFarlane, Enforcement, Los Angeles

I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in Los Angeles, California, on December 13, 2016.

Angela Carpenter
Case Administrator
State Bar Court