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**State Bar Court of California  
Hearing Department  
San Francisco  
DISBARMENT**

<b>Counsel for the State Bar</b>  <b>Dina E. Goldman</b> <b>Senior Trial Counsel</b> <b>180 Howard Street</b> <b>San Francisco, CA 94105</b> <b>(415) 538-2077</b>  Bar # 142601	<b>Case Number(s):</b> <b>16-O-17615</b>	<b>For Court use only</b> <b>PUBLIC MATTER</b>  <b>FILED</b> <b>OCT 30 2018</b>  <b>STATE BAR COURT CLERK'S OFFICE</b> <b>SAN FRANCISCO</b>
<b>Counsel For Respondent</b>  <b>Jonathan Arons</b> <b>100 Bush Street, Ste. 918</b> <b>San Francisco, CA 94104</b> <b>(415) 957-1818</b>  Bar # 111257	<b>Submitted to: Assigned Judge</b>  <b>STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION AND ORDER APPROVING; ORDER OF INVOLUNTARY INACTIVE ENROLLMENT</b>  <b>DISBARMENT</b>  <input type="checkbox"/> PREVIOUS STIPULATION REJECTED	
<b>In the Matter of:</b> <b>DANIEL PAUL WHITE</b>  Bar # 132457  A Member of the State Bar of California (Respondent)		

**Note: All information required by this form and any additional information which cannot be provided in the space provided, must be set forth in an attachment to this stipulation under specific headings, e.g., "Facts," "Dismissals," "Conclusions of Law," "Supporting Authority," etc.**

**A. Parties' Acknowledgments:**

- (1) Respondent is a member of the State Bar of California, admitted **December 11, 1987**.
- (2) The parties agree to be bound by the factual stipulations contained herein even if conclusions of law or disposition are rejected or changed by the Supreme Court.
- (3) All investigations or proceedings listed by case number in the caption of this stipulation are resolved by this stipulation and are deemed consolidated. Dismissed charge(s)/count(s) are listed under "Dismissals." The stipulation consists of **12** pages, not including the order.
- (4) A statement of acts or omissions acknowledged by Respondent as cause or causes for discipline is included under "Facts."
- (5) Conclusions of law, drawn from and specifically referring to the facts are also included under "Conclusions of Law."

(Effective July 1, 2018)



- (6) The parties must include supporting authority for the recommended level of discipline under the heading "Supporting Authority."
- (7) No more than 30 days prior to the filing of this stipulation, Respondent has been advised in writing of any pending investigation/proceeding not resolved by this stipulation, except for criminal investigations.
- (8) Payment of Disciplinary Costs—Respondent acknowledges the provisions of Bus. & Prof. Code §§6086.10 & 6140.7. It is recommended that (check one option only):
- Costs be awarded to the State Bar in accordance with Business and Professions Code section 6086.10, and are enforceable both as provided in Business and Professions Code section 6140.7 and as a money judgment. Unless the time for payment of discipline costs is extended pursuant to subdivision (c) of section 6086.10, costs assessed against a member who is actually suspended or disbarred must be paid as a condition of reinstatement or return to active status.
  - Costs are waived in part as set forth in a separate attachment entitled "Partial Waiver of Costs."
  - Costs are entirely waived.
- (9) ORDER OF INACTIVE ENROLLMENT:  
The parties are aware that if this stipulation is approved, the judge will issue an order of inactive enrollment under Business and Professions Code section 6007, subdivision (c)(4), and Rules of Procedure of the State Bar, rule 5.111(D)(1).

**B. Aggravating Circumstances [Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct, standards 1.2(h) & 1.5]. Facts supporting aggravating circumstances are required.**

- (1)  **Prior record of discipline:**
- (a)  State Bar Court case # of prior case:
  - (b)  Date prior discipline effective:
  - (c)  Rules of Professional Conduct/ State Bar Act violations:
  - (d)  Degree of prior discipline:
  - (e)  If Respondent has two or more incidents of prior discipline, use space provided below:
- (2)  **Intentional/Bad Faith/Dishonesty:** Respondent's misconduct was dishonest, intentional, or surrounded by, or followed by bad faith.
- (3)  **Misrepresentation:** Respondent's misconduct was surrounded by, or followed by misrepresentation.
- (4)  **Concealment:** Respondent's misconduct was surrounded by, or followed by concealment.
- (5)  **Overreaching:** Respondent's misconduct was surrounded by, or followed by overreaching.

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- (6)  **Uncharged Violations:** Respondent's conduct involves uncharged violations of the Business and Professions Code or the Rules of Professional Conduct.
- (7)  **Trust Violation:** Trust funds or property were involved and Respondent refused or was unable to account to the client or person who was the object of the misconduct for improper conduct toward said funds or property.
- (8)  **Harm:** Respondent's misconduct harmed significantly a client, the public, or the administration of justice. **See Attachment to Stipulation at p. 8.**
- (9)  **Indifference:** Respondent demonstrated indifference toward rectification of or atonement for the consequences of Respondent's misconduct.
- (10)  **Lack of Candor/Cooperation:** Respondent displayed a lack of candor and cooperation to victims of Respondent's misconduct, or to the State Bar during disciplinary investigations or proceedings.
- (11)  **Multiple Acts:** Respondent's current misconduct evidences multiple acts of wrongdoing. **See Attachment to Stipulation at p. 8.**
- (12)  **Pattern:** Respondent's current misconduct demonstrates a pattern of misconduct.
- (13)  **Restitution:** Respondent failed to make restitution. **See Attachment to Stipulation at p. 9.**
- (14)  **Vulnerable Victim:** The victim(s) of Respondent's misconduct was/were highly vulnerable. **See Attachment to Stipulation at p. 9.**
- (15)  **No aggravating circumstances** are involved.

**Additional aggravating circumstances:**

**C. Mitigating Circumstances [Standards 1.2(i) & 1.6]. Facts supporting mitigating circumstances are required.**

- (1)  **No Prior Discipline:** Respondent has no prior record of discipline over many years of practice coupled with present misconduct which is not likely to recur.
- (2)  **No Harm:** Respondent did not harm the client, the public, or the administration of justice.
- (3)  **Candor/Cooperation:** Respondent displayed spontaneous candor and cooperation with the victims of Respondent's misconduct or to the State Bar during disciplinary investigations and proceedings.
- (4)  **Remorse:** Respondent promptly took objective steps demonstrating spontaneous remorse and recognition of the wrongdoing, which steps were designed to timely atone for any consequences of Respondent's misconduct.
- (5)  **Restitution:** Respondent paid \$ \_\_\_\_\_ on \_\_\_\_\_ in restitution to \_\_\_\_\_ without the threat or force of disciplinary, civil or criminal proceedings.
- (6)  **Delay:** These disciplinary proceedings were excessively delayed. The delay is not attributable to Respondent and the delay prejudiced Respondent.
- (7)  **Good Faith:** Respondent acted with a good faith belief that was honestly held and objectively reasonable.

- (8)  **Emotional/Physical Difficulties:** At the time of the stipulated act or acts of professional misconduct, Respondent suffered extreme emotional difficulties or physical or mental disabilities which expert testimony would establish was directly responsible for the misconduct. The difficulties or disabilities were not the product of any illegal conduct by Respondent, such as illegal drug or substance abuse, and the difficulties or disabilities no longer pose a risk that Respondent will commit misconduct.
- (9)  **Severe Financial Stress:** At the time of the misconduct, Respondent suffered from severe financial stress which resulted from circumstances not reasonably foreseeable or which were beyond Respondent's control and which were directly responsible for the misconduct.
- (10)  **Family Problems:** At the time of the misconduct, Respondent suffered extreme difficulties in Respondent's personal life which were other than emotional or physical in nature.
- (11)  **Good Character:** Respondent's extraordinarily good character is attested to by a wide range of references in the legal and general communities who are aware of the full extent of Respondent's misconduct.
- (12)  **Rehabilitation:** Considerable time has passed since the acts of professional misconduct occurred followed by subsequent rehabilitation.
- (13)  **No mitigating circumstances** are involved.

**Additional mitigating circumstances:**

**Lack of Prior Discipline -- See Attachment to Stipulation at p. 9.**

**Pre-Filing Stipulation -- See Attachment to Stipulation at p. 9.**

**Physical Difficulties -- See Attachment to Stipulation at p. 9.**

**D. Recommended Discipline:**

**Disbarment**

Respondent is disbarred from the practice of law in California and Respondent's name is stricken from the roll of attorneys.

**E. Additional Requirements:**

- (1) **California Rules of Court, Rule 9.20:** Respondent must comply with the requirements of California Rules of Court, rule 9.20, and perform the acts specified in subdivisions (a) and (c) of that rule within 30 and 40 days, respectively, after the effective date of the Supreme Court order imposing discipline in this matter. Failure to do so may result in disbarment or suspension.

For purposes of compliance with rule 9.20(a), the operative date for identification of "clients being represented in pending matters" and others to be notified is the filing date of the Supreme Court order, not any later "effective" date of the order. (*Athearn v. State Bar* (1982) 32 Cal.3d 38, 45.) Further, Respondent is required to file a rule 9.20(c) affidavit even if Respondent has no clients to notify on the date the Supreme Court filed its order in this proceeding. (*Powers v. State Bar* (1988) 44 Cal.3d 337, 341.) In addition to being punished as a crime or contempt, an attorney's failure to comply with rule 9.20 is, inter alia, cause for disbarment, suspension, revocation of any pending disciplinary probation, and denial of an application for reinstatement after disbarment. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 9.20(d).)

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- (2)  **Restitution (Single Payee):** Respondent must make restitution in the amount of \$ **534,550.58**, plus 10 percent interest per year from **May 24, 2018**, to **Lewis and Edna White, co-trustees of the Theresa Mendes Revocable Trust** (or reimburse the Client Security Fund to the extent of any payment from the Fund to such payee in accordance with Business and Professions Code section 6140.5).
- (3)  **Restitution (Multiple Payees):** Respondent must make restitution to each of the following payees (or reimburse the Client Security Fund to the extent of any payment from the Fund to such payee in accordance with Business and Professions Code section 6140.5):

<i>Payee</i>	<i>Principal Amount</i>	<i>Interest Accrues From</i>

- (4)  **Other Requirements:** It is further recommended that Respondent be ordered to comply with the following additional requirements:

**ATTACHMENT TO**

**STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION**

IN THE MATTER OF:

DANIEL PAUL WHITE

CASE NUMBER:

16-O-17615

**FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.**

Respondent admits that the following facts are true and that he is culpable of violations of the specified statutes and/or Rules of Professional Conduct

Case No. 16-O-17615 (Complainant: Gerald Mendes)

**FACTS:**

1. Gerald Mendes (Mendes) is the main beneficiary of the Gerald Harry Mendes Trust, a spendthrift trust (GHMT), created and administered by the Theresa Mendes Revocable Trust (TMRT) dated January 14, 1993, and thereafter amended several times most recently in 2001. All funds for the GHMT came from Mendes' 90 percent share of the trust funds of the TMRT. The trustee for the TMRT was responsible for supplying funds to the GHMT out of the funds for the TMRT.
2. Pursuant to the terms of the TMRT, respondent became the successor trustee of the TMRT in May of 2008 when Theresa Mendes became incapacitated.
3. The TMRT includes a self-dealing position allowing the trustee to "borrow funds from . . . the trust, with interest at then-prevailing rates, and give . . . security for the loans in any commercially reasonable form." Respondent was aware of the requirement that security was required for any funds he borrowed from the TMRT while he served as trustee.
4. Between April 9, 2010, and March 31, 2013, respondent borrowed \$381,762.88 from the TMRT while he served as the trustee for TMRT. Respondent did not provide any security for the \$381,762.88 that he borrowed from the TMRT. Respondent used the money he took from the TMRT for personal living expenses and to support his law practice. The \$381,762.88 that respondent borrowed were designated by the TMRT for use to fund the GHMT for the benefit of Mendes.
5. Respondent provided only one accounting to Mendes during the six years he served as trustee in September 2012. In that accounting, respondent provided a balance sheet showing a loan from TMRT to respondent in the amount of \$356,210.07. In a

letter accompanying the accounting, respondent stated that “as you can see from the accounting, much of the trust is invested in [respondent]’s business, and future inheritance is pledged in writing. . . .” Respondent did not disclose that he had failed to provide adequate security for the loan.

6. On November 1, 2012, respondent hired James Berge (Berge) to represent him in his capacity as the trustee of the TMRT. Berge provided an accounting in August of 2013, which showed that between April 9, 2010 and March 31, 2013, respondent borrowed \$381,762.88 from the TMRT without giving adequate security as required by the trust agreement. The accounting noted that respondent had not repaid the loans and that there was accrued unpaid interest of \$83,543.66 through March 31, 2013.
7. Respondent to date has repaid only \$20,000 of the \$381,762.88 that he borrowed from the TMRT. He made the \$20,000 payment in May of 2014.
8. Respondent resigned as trustee of the TMRT effective October 31, 2014. Respondent’s parents, Lewis and Edna White, were appointed co-trustees of the TMRT on October 31, 2014.
9. In December of 2014, Mr. and Mrs. White hired counsel, Stephen Picone (Picone), to represent them in their capacity as co-trustees of the TMRT.
10. On April 7, 2015, Picone filed a lawsuit on behalf of the trust in San Mateo County Superior Court, Case No. 125556 (the “San Mateo County” case), seeking return of the monies respondent borrowed from the TMRT without adequate security and that respondent had failed to repay to the trust.
11. On May 13, 2015, at a hearing the San Mateo County case, respondent told the court “I owe the money. . . I am willing to have a judgment entered against me. . . I borrowed the money, I owe the money.”
12. On May 24, 2018, Judge George Miram entered judgment in the San Mateo County case against respondent in the amount of \$487,550.58. The judgment also ordered respondent to compensate the TMRT for attorney’s fees in the amount of \$47,000 that the TMRT had incurred in obtaining the judgment against respondent for the moneys that respondent owed the TMRT. A total judgment of \$534,550.58 was entered in favor of TMRT and Lewis White and Edna White as successor co-trustees, and against respondent.
13. Respondent to date has not paid the judgment, except for the \$20,000 payment to the TMRT made in May of 2014.
14. On November 15, 2016, Mendes filed a complaint against respondent with the State Bar (“Mendes complaint”). On December 8, 2016, the State Bar sent a letter to

respondent requesting a response to the allegations in the Mendes complaint. Respondent replied in a letter dated December 19, 2016, which stated that he relied on his right to remain silent under the California and United States Constitutions. He further stated that he understood that his reliance on his right to remain silent amounted to non-cooperation and would result in his disbarment, which he did not oppose.

#### CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

15. By borrowing \$381,762.88 from the TMRT while he was trustee for the TMRT, by failing to provide adequate security for the loan as required by the terms of the TMRT, by failing to pay interest on the loan, and by failing to comply with the demand for payment by Mendes on behalf of TMRT, which led to a lawsuit being filed and incurring of attendant attorney's fees and costs of suit, respondent intentionally misappropriated the funds for his own use and benefit and thereby committed an act of moral turpitude in willful violation of Business and Professions Code, section 6106.
16. By borrowing \$381,762.88 from the TMRT while he was trustee for the TMRT, by failing to provide adequate security for the loan as required by the terms of the TMRT, by failing to pay interest on the loan, and by failing to comply with the demand for payment by Mendes on behalf of TMRT, which led to a lawsuit being filed and incurring of attendant attorney's fees and costs of suit, respondent intentionally breached his common law fiduciary duty to TMRT and the beneficiaries of TMRT and thereby willfully violated Business and Professions Code, section 6068(a).
17. By failing to provide an annual accounting each year after he became trustee of the TMRT in 2008, respondent violated Probate Code section 16062, subdivision (a), and thereby violated Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (a).

#### AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES

##### **Significant Harm to Client, Public or Administration of Justice (Std. 1.5(j)):**

Respondent's misappropriation of \$381,762.88 plus \$105,787.70 interest from the TMRT designated to fund GHMT for which Mendes was the primary beneficiary, caused significant harm to Mendes, because both Mendes and the new trustees to the TMRT had to incur the time and expense of hiring counsel in an attempt to force respondent to return the money. Mendes was deprived of the benefit of the TMRT funds that could have been used to fund GHMT, and court time and resources in San Mateo County were spent on the case against respondent that could have been spent on other cases.

**Multiple Acts of Wrongdoing (Std. 1.5(b)):** Respondent's repeated withdrawals of funds from the TMRT and repeated failures to provide annual accountings constitute multiple acts of misconduct.



**Failure to Make Restitution (Std. 1.5(m)):** Respondent has failed to make restitution by failing to pay the judgment entered against him and in favor of the TMRT, or otherwise repay any of the funds that he removed from the TMRT and converted to his own use. As of May 24, 2018, the date the judgment was entered in the San Mateo County case, respondent owed \$534,550.58, which included the original \$381,762.88 principal borrowed from the trust, \$105,787.70 in unpaid interest, and \$47,000 in attorney's fees.

**High Level of Vulnerability of the Victim (Std. 1.5(n)):** Mendes is a 74 year old man with spina bifida who is permanently confined to a wheelchair, and the TMRT and the GHMT were created for his benefit because of his disabilities. As such, respondent's misconduct harmed a highly vulnerable victim.

## MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES

**No Prior Record of Discipline:** Respondent was admitted to the State Bar on December 11, 1987, and had practiced law with no prior discipline for 20 years at the time he engaged in misconduct in this matter. While respondent's misconduct is serious, respondent's lack of a prior record over twenty years of practice before the misconduct began is entitled to significant weight in mitigation. (*Cooper v. State Bar* (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1016, 1029 [where misconduct is serious, long-term discipline-free practice is most relevant where misconduct is aberrational].)

**Prefiling Stipulation:** By entering into this stipulation, respondent has acknowledged his misconduct and is entitled to mitigation for recognition of wrongdoing and saving the State Bar significant resources and time. (*Silva-Vidor v. State Bar* (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1071, 1079 [mitigative credit given for entering into a stipulation as to facts and culpability]; *In the Matter of Spaitth* (Review Dept. 1996) 3 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 511, 521 [attorney's stipulation to facts and culpability was held to be a mitigating circumstance].)

**Physical Difficulties:** During the time he engaged in misconduct, respondent suffered a relapse of a heart condition for which he had surgery in 2008. Although respondent has not established a nexus between his health problems and his misconduct, he is entitled to some mitigation. (See *In the Matter of Mitchell* (Review Dept. 1991) 1 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 332, 341 [court accords mitigation for an attorney's emotional difficulties stemming from his wife's miscarriage in the 8<sup>th</sup> month of pregnancy and subsequent pregnancy, even though not established by expert testimony].)

## AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING DISCIPLINE

The Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct "set forth a means for determining the appropriate disciplinary sanction in a particular case and to ensure consistency across cases dealing with similar misconduct and surrounding circumstances." (Rules Proc. of State Bar, tit. IV, Stds. for Atty. Sanctions for Prof. Misconduct, std. 1.1. All further references to Standards are to this source.) The Standards help fulfill the primary purposes of discipline, which include: protection of the public, the courts and the legal profession; maintenance of the highest professional standards; and preservation of public confidence in the legal profession. (See std. 1.1; *In re Morse* (1995) 11 Cal.4th 184, 205.)

Although not binding, the standards are entitled to “great weight” and should be followed “whenever possible” in determining level of discipline. (*In re Silverton* (2005) 36 Cal.4th 81, 92, quoting *In re Brown* (1995) 12 Cal.4th 205, 220 and *In re Young* (1989) 49 Cal.3d 257, 267, fn. 11.) Adherence to the standards in the great majority of cases serves the valuable purpose of eliminating disparity and assuring consistency, that is, the imposition of similar attorney discipline for instances of similar attorney misconduct. (*In re Naney* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 186, 190.) If a recommendation is at the high end or low end of a Standard, an explanation must be given as to how the recommendation was reached. (Std. 1.1.) “Any disciplinary recommendation that deviates from the Standards must include clear reasons for the departure.” (Std. 1.1; *Blair v. State Bar* (1989) 49 Cal.3d 762, 776, fn. 5.) In determining whether to impose a sanction greater or less than that specified in a given standard, in addition to the factors set forth in the specific standard, consideration is to be given to the primary purposes of discipline; the balancing of all aggravating and mitigating circumstances; the type of misconduct at issue; whether the client, public, legal system or profession was harmed; and the member’s willingness and ability to conform to ethical responsibilities in the future. (Stds. 1.7(b) and (c).)

In this matter, respondent admits to committing multiple acts of professional misconduct, the most serious being committing an acts of moral turpitude by misappropriating funds designated for the benefit of Mendes, while he was entrusted with access to those funds as the trustee of the TMRT. To date, respondent has not paid back the \$381,762.88 misappropriated funds, has not paid any of the \$105,787.70 interest, and has not paid any of the \$47,000 attorney’s fees incurred in order to obtain a \$534,550.58 judgment against him for the funds that he took from the TMRT. Standard 1.7 (a) requires that where a respondent “commits two or more acts of misconduct and the Standards specify different sanctions for each act, the most severe sanction must be imposed.” The most severe sanction applicable to respondent’s misconduct is found in standard 2.1(a), which provides: “Disbarment is the presumed sanction for intentional or dishonest misappropriation of entrusted funds or property, unless the amount misappropriated is insignificantly small or sufficiently compelling mitigating circumstances clearly predominate, in which case actual suspension is appropriate.”

Respondent misappropriated a large amount of money – \$534,550.58. Although respondent has demonstrated some mitigation based on his 20 years of discipline free practice and on his willingness to enter a pre-filing stipulation as to facts and culpability, this mitigation is not sufficiently compelling and it does not predominate when contrasted with the aggravating factors that respondent caused by harming a vulnerable victim, committing multiple acts misconduct, and failing to make restitution in order to warrant deviating from standard 2.1(a)’s disbarment recommendation. (See, e.g., *In the Matter of Song* (Review Dept. 2013) 5 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 273, 279, 282 [disbarment appropriate even with 12-year record of discipline-free practice where respondent misappropriated significant sum to satisfy his personal obligations and showed lack of insight by offering ill-founded explanations for misconduct].)

Case law also supports disbarment for intentional misappropriations, even when the attorney has no prior record of discipline. (See *Kelly v. State Bar* (1988) 45 Cal.3d 649 [disbarment for \$20,000 misappropriation, moral turpitude, dishonesty, and improper communication with adverse party, despite no prior record and no aggravation]; *Gordon v. State Bar* (1982) 31 Cal.3d 748 [disbarment for \$27,000 misappropriation, even with 13 years of discipline-free practice, financial difficulties, emotional difficulties due to divorce, remorse, and lack of harm]; *In the Matter of Spaith* (Review Dept. 1996) 3 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 511 [disbarment for \$40,000

misappropriation, intentionally misleading client about funds, mitigation including emotional problems, repayment of money, 15 years of discipline-free practice, strong character evidence, and candor and cooperation with State Bar not sufficiently compelling]; see also *In the Matter of Schooler* (Review Dept. 2016) 5 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 494 [disbarment for attorney trustee's multiple breaches of fiduciary duties, making misrepresentations to the probate court, failing to follow court order and pay sanctions, and filing frivolous appeals].)

**COSTS OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS.**




Respondent acknowledges that the Office of Chief Trial Counsel has informed respondent that as of August 2, 2018, the prosecution costs in this matter are \$3,300. Respondent further acknowledges that should this stipulation be rejected or should relief from this stipulation be granted, the costs in this matter may increase due to the cost of further proceedings.

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In the Matter of: DANIEL PAUL WHITE	Case Number(s): 16-O-17615
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**SIGNATURE OF THE PARTIES**

By their signatures below, the parties and their counsel, as applicable, signify their agreement with each of the recitations and each of the terms and conditions of this Stipulation Re Facts, Conclusions of Law, and Disposition.

<u>10/1/2018</u> Date	 Respondent's Signature	<u>Daniel Paul White</u> Print Name
<u>October 1, 2018</u> Date	 Respondent's Counsel Signature	<u>Jonathan Arons</u> Print Name
<u>10/2/2018</u> Date	 Deputy Trial Counsel's Signature	<u>Dina E. Goldman</u> Print Name

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In the Matter of: <b>DANIEL PAUL WHITE</b>	Case Number(s): <b>16-O-17615</b>
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### DISBARMENT ORDER

Finding the stipulation to be fair to the parties and that it adequately protects the public, IT IS ORDERED that the requested dismissal of counts/charges, if any, is GRANTED without prejudice, and:

- The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED and the DISCIPLINE RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
- The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED AS MODIFIED as set forth below, and the DISCIPLINE IS RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
- All Hearing dates are vacated.

The parties are bound by the stipulation as approved unless: 1) a motion to withdraw or modify the stipulation, filed within 15 days after service of this order, is granted; or 2) this court modifies or further modifies the approved stipulation. (See Rules Proc. of State Bar, rule 5.58(E) & (F).) **The effective date of this disposition is the effective date of the Supreme Court order herein, normally 30 days after the filed date of the Supreme Court order. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 9.18(a).)**

Respondent **Daniel Paul White** is ordered transferred to involuntary inactive status pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 6007, subdivision (c)(4). Respondent's inactive enrollment will be effective three (3) calendar days after this order is served by mail and will terminate upon the effective date of the Supreme Court's order imposing discipline herein, or as provided for by rule 5.111(D)(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the State Bar of California, or as otherwise ordered by the Supreme Court pursuant to its plenary jurisdiction.

October 30, 2018

*Pat McElroy*

Date

Judge of the State Bar Court

(Effective July 1, 2018)

Disbarment Order

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**DECLARATION OF SERVICE BY MAIL**

**RE: WHITE**  
**CASE NO: 16-O-17615**

I, the undersigned, over the age of eighteen (18) years, whose business address and place of employment is the State Bar of California, 180 Howard Street, San Francisco, California 94105, declare that I am not a party to the within action; that I am readily familiar with the State Bar of California's practice for collection and processing of correspondence for mailing with the United States Postal Service; that in the ordinary course of the State Bar of California's practice, correspondence collected and processed by the State Bar of California would be deposited with the United States Postal Service that same day; that I am aware that on motion of party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date or postage meter date on the envelope or package is more than one day after date of deposit for mailing contained in the affidavit. That in accordance with the practice of the State Bar of California for collection and processing of mail, I deposited or placed for collection and mailing in the City and County of San Francisco, on the date shown below, a true copy of the within

**STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION AND ORDER APPROVING, ORDER OF INVOLUNTARY INACTIVE ENROLLMENT**

in a sealed envelope placed for collection and mailing at San Francisco, on the date shown below, addressed to:

**Jonathan Irwin Arons**  
**Law Ofc Jonathan I Arons**  
**100 Bush St Ste 918**  
**San Francisco, CA 94104**

in an inter-office mail facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of California addressed to:

N/A

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed at San Francisco, California, on the date shown below.

DATED: October 2, 2018

SIGNED:   
Dawn Williams  
Declarant

**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

[Rules Proc. of State Bar; Rule 5.27(B); Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a(4)]

I am a Court Specialist of the State Bar Court of California. I am over the age of eighteen and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to standard court practice, in the City and County of San Francisco, on October 30, 2018, I deposited a true copy of the following document(s):

STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION AND ORDER APPROVING; ORDER OF INVOLUNTARY INACTIVE ENROLLMENT

in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:

by first-class mail, with postage thereon fully prepaid, through the United States Postal Service at San Francisco, California, addressed as follows:

JONATHAN IRWIN ARONS  
LAW OFC JONATHAN I ARONS  
100 BUSH ST STE 918  
SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94104

by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of California addressed as follows:

DINA E. GOLDMAN, Enforcement, San Francisco

I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in San Francisco, California, on October 30, 2018.



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Bernadette Molina  
Court Specialist  
State Bar Court